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I. INTRODUCTION 
There is a long history of adjudication of the rights and responsibilities of Indians 
and Indian tribes in their absence. For example, during and after the nineteenth 
century treaty era the Michigan Ottawa and Chippewa Tribes, a time when the tribe 
ceded millions of acres of land to the federal government in exchange for permanent 
homes and protection from the encroachments of non-Indian settlers, l railroads, and 
1. See United States v. Michigan, 471 F. Supp. 192,226 (W.D. Mich. 1979), stay granted. 
623 F.2d 448 (6th Cir. 1980), modified. 653 F.2d 277 (6th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1124 
(1981): 
The dominant motive [for the United States to enter into treaty negotiations in 
1835] appears to have been to cheat the Indians out of their lands and reduce their 
holdings to the reservations. Thereby the Indians would be deprived of their natural habit 
of roaming the range of the lands on their summer and winter migrations. Thereby the 
Indians would be deprived of their lands before they realized their eventual value. The 
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land speculators, non-Indians used legal processes to divest Ottawa and Chippewa 
families from their rights to the land? Often, non-Indian land speculators and settlers 
waited until the seasons when Indian families left for the wetlands in order to harvest 
wild rice, cattails, maple sugar, and other crops critical to their livelihood? In their 
absence, legally savvy non-Indians would appear in Traverse City courts and argue 
that the Indians had abandoned their lands.4 Notice was rarely given to Indians, few 
of whom were knowledgeable in Euro-American legal practice, or notice was 
intentionally delivered to an incorrect address.5 The local courts, literally in league 
with the plaintiffs, would proceed in the absence of the Indians who normally resided 
on the parcel at issue.6 The courts would declare, summarily, that the Indians had 
broken the treaties by leaving their homes and abandoning their homestead.7 Titles 
would be granted to the non-Indian plaintiffs.8 When the Indians returned from their 
traditional and seasonal harvest, their land no longer belonged to them-it belonged 
to non-Indian plaintiffs.9 In another example, state and local governments would 
initiate taxation of the real property of Indians in violation of the treaties, sometimes 
raising taxes with the explicit intention of driving Indians from the land.) 0 Eventually, 
figure received for the land-12Y:z-13 cents per acre-indicates that the Indians were 
cheated out of their land. 
ld at 226 (citations to record omitted). See generally FRANK POMMERSHEIM, BRAID OF fEATHERs: 
AMERICAN INDIAN LAW AND CONTEMPORARY TRrnAL LIFE 15-23 (1995) (describing the treaty origins 
and PUIJlOses of Indian reservations). 
2. See, e.g., Aish-Ka-Bwaw v. Schluttenhofer, 14 Pub. Lands Dec. 548, 548,1892 WL 885 
(1892) (reversing cancellation of Indian homestead entry that had been based on abandonment). See 
generally Indian Homesteads, 4 Pub. Lands Dec. 143, 143, 1885 WL4675 (1885): 
On the 14th of March, 1877, my predecessor directed a suspension of action upon 
certain contested Indian homestead entries in Ionia and Traverse City districts, Michigan, 
subsequently consolidated at Reed City. This was upon complaint and representation that 
the contests, made by white persons, were instituted for the pUIJlOse of taking advantage of 
the Indians' imperfect knowledge of the requirements of the land laws, and possibly 
meagre compliance, and thus after depriving them of their homes, such white persons and 
others in complicity with them were aiming to secure entries upon the land for their own 
benefit. 
ld. at 143. 
3. Cf JAMES M. McCLURKEN, GAH-BAEH-JHAGWAH-BUK: THE WAY IT HAPPENED 80 
(1991). 
4. ld 
5. ld 
6. ld 
7. ld 
8. See McCLURKEN, supra note 3, at 79-81. 
9. ld at 80. 
10. Bruce Alan Rubenstein, Justice Denied: An Analysis of American Indian-White 
Relations in Michigan, 1855-1889, at 117 (1974) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Michigan State 
University). On the Little Traverse Bay Bands of Odawa Reservation, an Emmett County official 
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the taxing government would initiate a tax foreclosure of the Indian lands. II Millions 
of acres of Indian land across the nation were lost due to tax foreclosures.1 2 Often, the 
Indians continued to live for years on the lands they believed to be secured to them by 
treaty. 13 Eventually, non-Indians would purchase the tax deed from the local 
government and force the Indian family off their land, which may have been 
occupied and improved for years.14 This history is not specific to lower courts. Many 
fundamental United States Supreme Court decisions defining tribal civil and criminal 
regulatory and adjudicatory jurisdiction and Indian rights, were decided without the 
presence of Indian tribes. IS 
In the last thirty to forty years, most Indians and Indian tribes have acquired a 
modicum of legal savvy sufficient to defeat most spurious challenges to their land 
title and sovereignty.16 However, the time-honored tradition of litigating the rights of 
Indians and Indian tribes in their absence continues in the operation of the 
compulsory joinder rule in some federal and state COurts. 17 
This article argues that these challenges, often in state courts, effectively 
adjudicate the sovereign rights and responsibilities of absent Indian tribes without the 
tribe's consent or participation. In other words, the courts allowing these cases to 
proceed are abrogating the sovereign immunity of the absent Indian tribes in an illicit 
and backdoor manner.18 This article argues that the merits of these cases, particularly 
cases regarding gaming compacts, can be resolved in a number of alternative venues 
and manners-namely a suit for declaratory relief against the tribe and the governor 
in federal court, enforcement actions in compliance with the Indian Gaming 
Regulatory Act ("IGRA"), limited waivers of tribal immunity in gaming compacts, or 
state political processes. 
summed up the policy of the local government when he said that the tax rate for Indian land would 
be raised until the area had "relieved itself of the presence of Indians." Id See also MCCLURKEN, 
supra note 3, at 79 ("Some [Emmett] county officials claimed that the Odawa owed taxes the day 
they received certificates even though the parcels remained under federal jurisdiction until a patent 
was issued. Because of this, many Auishnabek lost their lands to the benefit of land speculators and 
lumber companies that acquired the timber-rich parcels for low prices."). 
11. See MCCLURKEN, supra note 3, at 79. 
12. Cj id. 
13. Id at 79-80. 
14. Id 
15. See, e.g., United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375 (1886); The Cherokee Tobacco, 78 
U.S. (11 Wall.) 616 (1870); Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823); New Jersey v. 
Wilson, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 164 (1812); Fletcherv. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810). Seegenera/ly 
DAVID E. WILKINS, AMERICAN INDIAN SOVEREIGNlY AND mE U.S. SUPREME COURT 27, 54, 67 (1997) 
(discussing the import of many of these cases). 
16. See supra Part rv. 
17. See infrapp. 23-122. 
18. Cj MCCLURKEN, supra note 3, at 79-80. 
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This article also examines the broader law of a sovereign government's 
indispensability in any number of areas in which tribal rights and responsibilities are 
litigated. For example, the ability of an Indian tribe to sue for the recovery of land-a 
land claims suit-often turns on whether the federal government or a state is an 
indispensable party.19 In these cases, a tribe or tribal member may sue individual 
property owners to recover land on the theory that the transaction that conveyed the 
land from a tribal member or the tribe is void ab initio.20 The defendant landowners 
may argue that the state or federal government-often at least partially to blame for 
the bad conveyance-is an indispensable party?l The trend in these cases is toward 
dismissing the claims.22 
This article argues that federal and state courts tend to short change Indian tribes 
and tribal sovereignty in their application of the compulsory joinder rule. The courts 
err in giving greater weight to the narrow interests of the tribe's anti-gaming, anti-
treaty rights, and anti-tribe foes over the legitimate interests of tribal sovereignty. It is 
apparent that state and federal courts treat the sovereign immunity of the states and 
federal government with more deference than the immunity of tribes. At least one 
court has trumpeted Supreme Court dicta for the proposition that tribal immunity is 
an insignificant factor.2 However, immunity is immunity. Using procedural rules to 
qualify or abrogate the immunity from suit of a sovereign is an egregious abuse of 
discretion. Surely, the rules of procedure are not intended to operate as a backdoor 
mechanism for the waiver of a sovereign's immunity from suit. 
Part II of this article discusses the structure of the compulsory joinder rule, 
identifies the interests weighed by state and federal courts, and reviews the major 
cases outlining the broad contours of the rule. Part ill summarizes many of the so-
called Indian Law cases where the court decides whether an Indian tribe is an 
indispensable party to litigation. Other cases involving tribes where an absent state or 
federal sovereign is involved are discussed as well. The section is divided into broad 
classes of topics, including natural resources cases, Indian land claims, tribal 
government operations cases, and gaming operations cases. This part outlines the 
broad contours of the application of the compulsory joinder rule to instances in which 
a tribe is the absent party and, in places, contrasting the courts' treatment of a tribe's 
absence with a state or federal party's absence. This part is intended to act as a primer 
for tribal advocates on the very extensive litigation involving tribes as absent parties. 
Part IV is a study of the application of the compulsory joinder rule in one area of 
conflict-the gaming compact cases. This discusses the application of the rule to 
several gaming compact cases in which the necessary and indispensable party is a 
tribe and, in some limited cases, a state or federal party. In the gaming compact cases, 
19. See Nichols Y. Rysavy, 809 F.2d 1317,1331-32 (8th Cir. 1987). 
20. See Choctaw Nation Y. Seitz, 193 F.2d456, 459-60 (10th Cir. 1951). 
21. See Nichols, 809 F.2d at 1331-32. 
22. See id at 1331-34. 
23. See Davis Y. United States, 192 F.3d 951, 960 (lOth Cir. 1999). 
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for example, the compulsory joinder rule requires courts to engage in the direct 
balancing of tribal sovereign rights against parties who usually have no other interest 
but to shut down tribal gaming facilities?4 In most cases, even though proceeding in 
the lawsuit without the tribe effectively abrogates the tribe's sovereign immunity, 
courts will proceed?5 This part is intended to give examples to courts and litigants of 
alternative and viable methods of litigating or resolving challenges, which do not 
involve a backdoor waiver of immunity. Part V is intended to justify the dismissal of 
claims brought in the absence of a tribe in interest on the grounds that to do so would 
serve judicial economy and efficiency in the long run. This part also acts as a defense 
of the sovereign immunity of tribes in these contexts and offers additional strategic 
suggestions to tribal litigants. 
II. THE COMPULSORY JOINDER RULE AND LmGATION 
INvOLVING SOVEREIGNS 
A. The Purpose of the Compulsory Joinder Rule 
The compulsory joinder rule is essential to ensure that a lawsuit will not proceed 
absent a party that has an interest in the litigation?6 Under the federal rule27 and most 
24. See supra Part Iv. 
25. ld 
26. See Makah Indian Tribe v. Verity, 910 F.2d 555, 558 (9th Cir. 1990). 
27. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19 reads as follows: 
(a) Persons to be Joined if Feasible. A person who is subject to service of process and 
whose joinder will not deprive the court of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the 
action shall be joined as a party in the action if (l) in the person's absence complete relief 
cannot be accorded among those already parties, or (2) the person claims an interest 
relating to the subject of the action and is so situated that the disposition of the action in 
the person's absence may (i) as a practical matter impair or impede the person's ability to 
protect that interest or (ii) leave any of the persons already parties subject to a substantial 
risk of incurring double, multiple, or otherwise inconsistent obligations by reason of the 
claimed interest. If the person has not been so joined, the court shall order that the person 
be made a party. If the person should join as a plaintiff but refuses to do so, the person may 
be made a defendant, or, in a proper case, an involuntary plaintiff. If the joined party 
objects to venue and joinder of that party would render the venue of the action improper, 
that party shall be dismissed from the action. 
(b) Determination by Court Whenever Joinder Not Feasible. If a person as described 
in subdivision (a)(l)-(2) hereof cannot be made a party, the court shall determine whether 
in equity and good conscience the action should proceed among the parties before it, or 
should be dismissed, the absent person being thus regarded as indispensable. The factors 
to be considered by the court include: first, to what extent a judgment rendered in the 
person's absence might be prejudicial to the person or those already parties; second, the 
extent to which, by protective provisions in the judgment, by the shaping of relief, or other 
measures, the prejudice can be lessened or avoided; third, whether a judgment rendered in 
the person's absence will be adequate; fourth, whether the plaintiffwill have an adequate 
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state rules, the court must order absent persons joined, "if feasible.'.28 If joinder is not 
"feasible," the court must decide if it should allow the case to proceed "in equity and 
good conscience.'.29 The pwpose of the compulsory joinder rule is to protect several 
interests: "(1) the interests of the present defendant; (2) the interests of potential but 
absent plaintiffs and defendants; (3) the social interest in the orderly, expeditious 
administration of justice.',30 The "basic concept of due process" requires that each 
interested party, joined or absent, must be allowed the opportunity to defend its 
respective interests.31 
A fourth interest is stated in the rule, that is the interest of the plaintiff in 
determining the forum in which to bring suit. 32 As such, the due process concern is 
countered with the concept that ''the philosophy of the compulsory joinder rule in the 
federal courts is to avoid dismissal whenever possible.',33 The Supreme Court wrote, 
"[T]he impulse is towards entertaining the broadest possible scope of action, 
consistent with fairness to parties; joinder of claims, parties and remedies is strongly 
encouraged.',34 
Prior to the amendment of Federal Rule 19 in 1966, which required a more 
flexible approach, the courts rigidly applied the rule, dismissing claims in which the 
absent party was "indispensable.',3S Since ''the basic objective underlying all claim 
remedy if the action is dismissed for nonjoinder. 
FED.Rav.P. 19(a)-(b). 
28. Id at 19(a). 
29. Id at 19(b). 
30. John W. Reed, Compulsory Joinder of Parties in Civil Actiom, 55 MICH. L. REv. 327, 
330 (1957). 
31. Comment, The Litigant and the Absentee in Federal Multiparty Practice, 116 U. PA. L. 
REv. 531, 531 (1968) (citing Hamberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32 (1940)); see also Pamela J. Stephens, 
Manipulation of Procedural Rules in Pursuit of Substantive Goals: A Recomideration of the 
Impermissible Collateral Attack Doctrine, 24 ARIz. Sr. L.J. 1109, 1125 (1992) (quoting Martin v. 
Wilks, 490 U.S. 755, 761 (1989) (Stevens, 1., joined by Brennan, Marshall & Blackmun, 11., 
dissenting)). 
32. See FED. R avo P. 19(a). 
33. JACK H. FRIEDENTIJALET AL., CMLPROCEDURE § 6.5, at 335 n.7 (1985) (citing Heath v. 
Aspen Skiing Corp., 325 F. Supp. 223,229 (D. Colo. 1971)); see also Stabilisierungfonds Fur Wein 
v. Kaiser Stuhl Wme Distribs. Pty. Ltd., 647 F.2d 200,208 (D.c. Cir. 1981); Narragansett Tribe of 
Indians v. S. RI. Land Dev. Corp., 418 F. Supp. 798, 813 n.5 (D. R.I. 1976); Weyerhaeuser Mortg. 
Co. v. Equitable Gen. Ins. Co., 686 P.2d 1357, 1359 (Colo. Ct. App. 1983); MoW v. Johnson, 911 
P.2d 217, 220 (Mont. 1996). 
34. United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 724 (1966). 
35. See FRIEDENTIJAL ET AL., supra note 33, § 6.5, at 335-36 (discussing Shields v. Barrow, 
58 U.S. (17 How.) 130 (1855)). See generally 7 CHARLEs ALAN WRIGHTET AL., FEDERALPRAcnCE 
AND PROCEDURE § 1601, at 11 (3rd ed. 2001). The previous rule was apparently overwhelmed by 
volumes of scholarly literature dedicated to its overthrow. See Schutten v. Shell Oil Co., 421 F.2d 
869, 871 (5th Cir. 1970); Geoffiey C. Hazard, Jr., Indispemable Party: The Historical Origin of a 
Procedural Phantom, 61 COLUM. L. REv. 1254, 1254-55 (1961); Note, Indispemable Parties in the 
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and party joinder rules is rendering complete justice with as little litigation as 
possible,'') the rule was changed. The Supreme Court roundly affirmed the amended 
Rule 19 in Provident Tradesmens Bank & Trost Co. v. Patterson.37 Here the Court 
overruled a Third Circuit decision that returned to the rigid pre-1966 amendment 
method of automatically dismissing claims whenever a party with an interest made a 
motion?8 The Court relied heavily on the fact that a trial had been completed and the 
case had Eroceeded to the appellate level before the motion to dismiss was filed and 
reversed. 9 
The Court examined the four interests at stake in a Rule 19(b) analysis-where a 
determination is made if the necessary party is an indispensable party and if the suit 
can proceed "in equity and good conscience.''''o The first factor is the plaintiff's 
"interest in having a forum.'''' I The Court stated, ''the strength of this interest 
obviously depends upon whether a satisfactory altemative forum exists.''''2 The 
second interest is the defendant's interest in "avoid[ing] multiple litigation, or 
inconsistent relief, or sole responsibility for a liability he shares with another.''''3 
Thirdly, courts must consider whether it is in ''the interest of the outsider whom it 
would have been desirable to join.'M The Court stated the fact that the non-party is 
not bound by the judgment "obviously does not mean either (a) that a court may 
never issue a judgment that, in practice, affects a nonparty or (b) that (to the contrary) 
a court may always proceed without considering the potential effect on non parties 
simply because they are not 'bound' in the technical sense.''''5 Quoting the rule, the 
Court stated, "[T]he court must consider the extent to which the judgment may 'as a 
Federal Courts, 65 HARv. L. REv. 1050, 1050 (1952); Reed, supra note 30, at 330-31. The 1966 
amendment eliminated the terms "necessary party" and "indispensable party," cf Fed. R. Civ. P. 19, 
but they appear to continue to be the common parlance. Surely it does not assist attorneys who must 
realize that "necessary" and "indispensable" are synonymous in the English language but nearly 
opposites in their working definitions for purpose of this rule. 
36. FRIEoENTHAL IT AL., supra note 33, § 6.5, at 336. 
37. 390 U.S. 102, 107 (1968). 
38. Id 
39. Id.at 109, 11On.4. 
40. Id. at 109-11. 
41. Id at 109. The Court mentioned a note by the advisoty committee on the Federal Rilles 
of Civil Procedure that stated, '" [T]he court should consider whether there is any assurance that the 
plaintiff, if dismissed, coilld sue effectively in another forum where better joinder woilld be 
possible.'" Id. at 109 n.3 (quoting FED. R. CrY. P. 19, advisoty committee notes) (citing Fitzgerald v. 
Haynes, 241 F.2d417, 420 (3rd Cir. 1957); Fouke v. Schenewerlc, 197 F.2d 234, 236 (5th Cir. 1952)). 
42. Provident Tradesmens Bank & Trost Co., 390 U.S. at 109. 
43. Id. at 110. 
44. Id. 
45. Id. 
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practical matter impair or impede his ability to protect' his interest in the subject 
matter.'.46 
The Court also spoke of the fourth interest, the interest of the court system: 
Fourth, there remains the interest of the courts and the public in complete, 
consistent, and efficient settlement of controversies. We read the Rule's third 
criterion, whether the judgment issued in the absence of the nonjoined person 
will be 'adequate,' to refer to this public stake in settling disputes by wholes, 
whenever possible, for clearly the plaintiff, who himself chose both the forum 
and the parties defendant, will not be heard to complain about the sufficiency of 
the relief obtainable against them. After trial, considerations of efficiency of 
course include the fact that the time and expense of a trial have already been 
47 
spent. 
The Court made clear that the "adequacy of the judgment," or whether the case may 
be ad~uately decided by continuing without the absent party, is not the parties' 
interest. 8 Instead, this interest is that of the court's to efficiently and completely 
resolve the case.49 Moreover, Provident Tradesmens is a case bound in by its facts--
the parties had already gone to trial and neither side mentioned the absent party until 
the appellate level.50 Perhaps, the case would have been decided differently had the 
compulsory joinder issue been decided at the outset.51 Or, perhaps had the question 
been raised at the trial level and had the trial court proceeded without the absent party, 
the Court would have been more likely to agree that an otherwise indispensable party 
was no longer indispensable because of the judicial resources expended below. 
As an adjunct to the indispensability analysis, the rule mandates that federal 
courts "consider the possibility of shaping relief to accommodate these four 
interests.,,52 Put another way, the Court asked; "Can the decree be written so as to 
protect the legitimate interests of outsiders and, if so, would such a decree be 
adequate to plaintiff's needs and an efficient use of judicial machinery?,,s3 
The compulsory joinder analysis undertaken by courts does not lend itself 
toward predictability or certainty. The Supreme Court was quick to note in Provident 
Tradesmens, "[W]hether a particular lawsuit must be dismissed in the absence of [a 
necessary] person, can only be determined in the context of particular litigation.,,s4 
46. 1d.(quotingFEo.ROv.P.19(a». 
4 7. Provident Tradesmens Bank & Trost Co., 390 U.S. at Ill. 
48. ld. 
49. Seeid. 
50. ld. at 109, 110 nA. 
51. SeeCHARLEsALANWRIGHf,LAWOFFEoERALCOURfS § 70, at 500 (5thed. 1994). 
52. Provident Tradesmens Bank & Trost Co., 390 U.S. at 111. 
53. ld. at 112 n.1O. 
54. ld. at 118. 
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'" [T]here is no prescribed formula for determining in every case whether a person ... 
is an indispensable party. ",55 
B. The Indispensability of a Sovereign 
Provident Tradesmen.. .. is not a suit involving a potentially immune sovereign 
entity. 56 Instances in which the court has no jurisdiction over the absent party 
effectively renders "infeasible" the ability of the court to join the absentee, which is 
an equitable defect, not a jurisdictional one.57 The vast majority of cases in which the 
court proceeds without an absent party are those in which the absent party is not a 
sovereign, neither a federal, state, or tribal government.58 The advisory committee 
notes, however, mention only one related issue: whether a superior federal officer is 
an indispensable party to a suit against an inferior officer.59 When a sovereign is the 
absent party, the case transforms into a case about sovereign immunity, which is a 
jurisdictional question.60 Wright and Miller note, "In many instances, a ruling that the 
United States is an indispensable party is the equivalent in substance of a statement 
that sovereign immunity bars the Suit.,.f>l 
The line of Supreme Court cases beginning with California v. Arizona62 
(adjudicating the Colorado River water rights of California, Arizona, the United 
States, and (later) several Indian tribes)63 exemplify an interesting point-that courts 
are not readily willing to dismiss a case, even in the absence of a sovereign in interest. 
In California, the state sued the state of Arizona and the United States to quiet title to 
55. ld. at 118 n.l4 (quoting Niles-Bement-Pond Co. v. Iron Moulders' Union Local No. 68, 
254 U.S. 77, 80 (1920». 
56. Cf id. at 104. 
57. See WRIGlIT, supra note 51, § 71, at 502 (''The cases sometimes speak, and even act, as 
if the failure to join a party who may be regarded as 'indispensable' is a 'jurisdictional' defect. This 
heresy has been rejected over and over again by authoritative cases." (footnotes and citations 
ornitted». 
58. See STEPHEN C. YEAZELL, CIvIL PROCEDURE 936 (5th ed. 2000) ("Because claims of 
sovereign immunity will be rare, and the reach of modem long-ann jurisdiction is long, the more 
common objection is want of subject matter jurisdiction."). 
59. See FED. R Cw. P. 19, advisory committee notes (discussing Johnson v. Kirkland, 290 
F.2d 440, 44647 (5th Cir. 1961) (''The superior is indispensable as a party when, to secure the 
complainant from unauthorized governmental activity, it is essential that the superior take or not take 
action."». See generally 7 WRIGlITET AL, supra note 35, § 1622, at 340-42. 
60. See Kirsten Matoy Carlson, Towards Tribal Sovereignty and Judicial Efficiency: 
Ordering the De/enses o/Tribal Sovereign Immunity and Exhaustion o/Tribal Remedies, 101 MICH. 
L. REv. 569, 580-87 (2002). 
61. 7 WRIGHTET AL., supra note 35, § 1617, at 254. 
62. 440 U.S. 59 (1979). 
63. See Arizona v. California, 530 U.S. 392, 397 (2000); Arizona v. California, 460 U.S. 605 
(1983). 
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the lands beneath the Colorado River.64 The three parties "agreed that their interests in 
the land in question are inextricably linked.'.65 The parties also identified a 
jurisdictional problem. The United States did not give its consent to be sued and was 
therefore an indispensable party.66 The Court held that the United States had waived 
its immunity and avoided the problem.67 In Idaho ex reI. Evans v. Oregon,68 the Court 
decided that in cases between states over the apportionment of fish runs on the 
Columbia River, the United States was not an indispensable party.69 The dispute arose 
when Oregon and Washington entered into a fisheries management agreement with 
the treaty tribes?O Idaho alleged that the non-treaty fishers were taking "a 
disproportionate share of fish destined for Idaho, thereby depleting those runs to the 
detriment ofIdaho fishermen.,,71 The special master dismissed the claim on the basis 
that the federal government had interests in the regulation of the ocean fishery, the 
operation of the dams on the river, and was a trustee for the treaty tribes.72 The Court 
rejected the first interest as justification for dismissal because the federal 
government's interest in the ocean fishery "has little to do with proper allocation of 
the rights to take those fish once they have entered the river.'.73 The Court found on 
the second interest, that the United States's operation of the dams could be estimated 
in the instant case without the United States's participation.74 Finally, the 
responsibilities of the United States as trustee to the treaty tribes' fishing rights were 
not at issue in the case because, after Sohappy, "the Indians are limited to a fixed 
share of the fish" that would not be affected by the result in the instant case.75 The 
Court did not discuss the possibility that all of the parties, including the absent tribes, 
were interested in the total amount of fish available, not simply the allocation.76 
64. Arizona, 440 U.S. at 60. 
65. Id. at 62 n.3. 
66. See id. at 62-63 ('Thus, if the United States has not consented to be sued in an action 
such as this, California's motion for leave to file a complaint must be denied. 'A bill of complaint will 
not be entertained which, if filed, could only be dismissed because of the absence of the United States 
as a party."') (quoting Arizona v. California, 298 U.S. 558, 572 (1936)). 
67. See id. at 63 ("Because, however, we have concluded that the United States has already 
waived its sovereign immunity to suit in this case, we need not assess [the problem]."). 
68. 444 U.S. 380 (1980). 
69. See id. at 392-93. 
70. Sohappy v. Smith, 529 F.2d 570, 571-72 (9th Cir. 1976). 
71. Evans, 444 U.S. at 385. 
72. See id. at 386-87. 
73. Id. at 388. 
74. See id. at 388-89. 
75. Id. at 390. 
76. See Evans, 444 U.S. at 384-85. 
HeinOnline -- 40 Gonz. L. Rev. 12 2004-2005
12 GONZAGA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 40:1 
Current and future litigation involving treaty fishing rights involve, or will involve, 
the preservation of the habitat.77 
Conversely, when the plaintiffs are individual Indians or Indian tribes, the courts 
show no hesitation to dismiss.78 The Supreme Court held that the United States was 
an indispensable party to a state highway condemnation action against Indian land 
held in trust by the United States for the Indians.'9 Similarly, the Court held that the 
United States was an indispensable party in a suit brought by the state of Oklahoma to 
partition the Indian allotments held in trust by the federal government.80 These cases 
show, at least in an Indian Law context, how the United States might be an 
indispensable party as a sovereign with an interest in property at issue in the 
underlying dispute. 
C. The Contours of Tribal Sovereign Immunity 
It is well-established that Indian tribes have immunity from suit in federal, state, 
and tribal COurts.81 Recently, the United States Supreme Court reaffirmed that 
immunity from suit in Kiowa Tribe of Oklahoma v. Manufacturing Technologies, 
Inc.82 Tribal sovereign immunity survives even if the tribe is engaged in activity off 
the reservation.83 In Kiowa Tribe, the Court noted that its cases "have sustained tribal 
immunity from suit without drawing a distinction based on where the tribal activities 
occurred.',s4 Tribal immunity also survives when the tribe is engaged in commercial 
activities, as opposed to government activities.85 The Court in Kiowa Tribe took into 
77. Cf Brian J. Perron, Note, When Tribal Treaty Fishing Rights Become a Mere 
Opportunity to Dip One s Net Into the Water and Pull It Out Empty: The Crue for Money Damages 
When Treaty-Reserved Fish Habitat is Degraded, 25 WM. & MARy ENvrL. L. & POL'y REv. 784 
(2001). 
78. See Minnesota v. United States, 305 U.S. 382, 386-87 (1939). 
79. Id at 386. 
80. See United States v. Hellard, 322 U.S. 363, 365, 367-68 (1944). 
81. See, e.g., Kiowa Tribe v. Mfg. Techs., Inc., 523 U.S. 751, 753-54 (1998). 
82. Id 
83. See id. 754-55,760. 
84. Id at 754 (citing Puyallup Tribe, Inc. v. Dep't of Game, 433 U.S. 165, 167 (1977)); see 
Pink v. Modoc Indian Health Project, Inc., 157 F.3d 1185, 1188-89 (9th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 528 
U.S. 877 (1999); Sac and Fox Nation v. Hanson, 47 F.3d 1061, 1063-65 (10th Cir. 1995); Greene v. 
Mt Adams Furniture (In re Greene), 980 F.2d 590, 593-97 (9th Cir. 1992); Melby v. Grand Portage 
Band of Chippewa, 1998 WL 1769706, at *3 (D. Minn. Aug. 13, 1998); John v. Baker, 982 P.2d 738, 
758-59 (Alaska 1999); Morgan v. Colo. River Indian Tribe, 443 P.2d 421, 423-24 (Ariz. 1968); 
Gav1e v. Little Six, Inc., 555 N.W.2d 284,295 (Minn. 1996); Thompson v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 
962 P.2d 577,580-81 (Mont. 1998). 
85. See Kiowa Tribe, 523 U.S. at 754-55, 760 (citing Puyallup Tribe. Inc., 433 U.S. at 168; 
Okla. Tax Comm'n v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe, 498 U.S. 505 (1991); United States v. 
United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 309 U.S. 506,512 (1940)); Bassett v. Mashantucket Pequot 
Tribe, 204 F.3d 343,357 (2nd Cir. 2000); Sac & Fox Nation, 47 F.3d at 1064-65; Multimedia Games, 
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account the fact that the tribes may be engaged in "ski resorts, gambling, and sales of 
cigarettes to non-Indians" and still held that tribal immunity survived.86 Most 
importantly, ''tribal immunity is a matter of federal law and not subject to diminution 
by the States.',s7 
Despite authority affinning the immunity of tribal sovereigns, most cases 
involving tribal sovereigns as absent parties are not simple for the courts to decide. 
Gaming compact cases, for example, often force the courts to weigh competing 
interests, such as the interests of the gaming tribes versus the interests of the state and 
its citizens in having the merits of the compact litigated.88 Federal and most state 
courts have to rely on the standard of "in equity and good conscience" in determining 
whether to allow the case to proceed absent the sovereign.89 The compulsory joinder 
rule's "in equity and good conscience" standard is no standard at all. It is an excuse 
for unfettered discretion by state and federal courts and a cover for conclusory 
analysis of whether cases should be dismissed for failure to join a third party with an 
interest in the litigation. Equity allows the courts to take virtually any factor into 
consideration.9o Because courts may do so, they take into consideration a moralistic 
approach to Indian gaming and the rights of tribes,91 either in favor of or against 
Indian gaming. In essence courts may decide the relative merits of the gaming 
compact in advance of the proper litigation over the merits. Courts are asked to bring 
their biases and prejudices to the table in deciding questions of equity.92 
Now that many of the wars over treaty rights have subsided, the gaming compact 
cases are the most controversial and important to the tribeS.93 It is no secret that 
opponents of Indian gaming bring lawsuits in an attempt to force a change in public 
policy.94 These claimants are asking the courts to reverse the decisions of the 
policymakers.95 In some instances, the courts are willing to comply by using their 
Inc. v. WLGCAcquisition corp., 214 F. Supp. 2d 1131,1135 (N.D. Okla. 2001); Redding Rancheria 
v. Superior Court, 105 Cal. Rptr. 2d 773 (Cal. UApp. 2001); Gavle, 555 N.W.2d at 293. One federal 
appeals cowt wrote that it is in commercial activities where Indian tribes need the most protection. 
See Md. Casualty Co. v. Citizens Nat'1 Bank, 361 F.2d 517, 521-22 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied sub 
nom. Md. Casualty Co. v. Seminole Tn"be Inc., 385 U.S. 918 (1966). 
86. Kiowa Tribe, 523 U.S. at 758 (citing Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145 
(1973); OkJa. Tax Comm 'n, 498 U.S. at 505; Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996». 
87. Kiowa Tribe, 523 U.S. at 756 (citing Three Affiliated Tribes v. Wold Eng'r, 476 U.S. 
877,891 (1986); Washington v. Confederated Tribes, 447 U.S. 134, 154 (1980». 
88. See supra Part IV. 
89. See FED. R. av. p. 19(b). 
90. See, e.g., California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202,219 (1987). 
91. See, e.g., id 
92. See3AJAMESWM.MooRE,MOORE'sFEDERALPRAcnCE~ 19.01 (2ded.1996). 
93. See Cabazon Band of MISsion Indians, 480 U.S. at 205. 
94. See generally Sac & Fox Nation v. Norton, 240 FJd 1250 (10th Cir. 2001). 
95. See Pueblo v. Kelly, 104 F.3d 1546, 1551 (10th Cir. 1997). 
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powers of equity.96 Courts may consider how the gaming tribes are desperately poor 
and in need of revenues to house, feed, and care for their constituents.97 Perhaps, 
courts may take into account the possibility that a gaming tribe, with few members, 
has already enjoyed a massive boondoggle.98 The court may also examine the 
challengers' highly-politicized anti-Indian or anti-gaming interests, and relative 
disinterest in state constitutional law.99 The court may take into account the private 
and personal competitive interests of the challengers such as card rooms, dog and 
horse tracks, pornography publishers, and other gaming interests, alonffi with the 
challengers'token, even hypocritical, interest in state constitutional law. 1 0 Perhaps, 
the court may look at the economic impacts and social problems potentially created 
by Indian gaming or the massive revenue influx to state coffers in a time of economic 
decay.10I With all of these factors to weigh-which really are the same factors that 
the politicos must weigh when deciding whether or not to enter into a gaming 
compact-the court should enter into a full trial.102 Under IGRA and the state police 
powers, the court is required to determine the very public policy behind Indian 
gaming in states, all within the context of the compulsory joinder rule. 103 
III. THE COMPULSORY JOINDER RULE IN INDIAN CASES 
For the most part, courts dismiss a case when an absent tribe has a significant 
stake in the outcome of the litigation.104 Many of these cases are brought by 
individual Indians or other tribes.105 In many instances, the claims should have been, 
and could have been, brought directly against the tribe, but the plaintiffs wanted to 
avoid direct litigation with the absent tribe.106 There are glaring exceptions, however, 
to the general trend toward dismissal. 107 Cases brought by the federal or state 
governments are more likely to proceed in the absence of the relevant tribe, 
ostensibly because of the importance of the plaintiff, as opposed to the importance of 
96. See Grand Traverse Band of Ottawa & Chippewa Indians v. United States Attorney, 198 
F. Supp. 2d 920, 928 (W.o. Mich. 2002), aff'd, 369 FJd 960 (6th Cir. 2004). 
97. See id at 925-26. 
98. See, e.g., Pueblo v. Hodel, 663 F. Supp. 1300, 13150.21 (D.D.C. 1987). 
99. See Sears v. Hull, 961 P.2d 1013, 1019 (Ariz. 1998). 
100. See, e.g., Am. Greyhound Racing, Inc. v. Hull, 305 F.3d 1015, 1020, 1026 (9th Cir. 
2002). 
101. See Grand Traverse Band, 198 F. Supp. 2d at 925-26. 
102. Cf Am. Greyhound Racing, Inc., 305 F.3d at 1022. 
103. See id at 1018 (citing 25 U.S.c. § 2702 (2000». 
104. See, e.g., Shennoen v. United States, 982 F.2d 1312, 1317-18 (9th Cir. 1992). 
105. See, e.g., Makah Indian Tribe v. Verity, 910 F.2d 555, 556 (9th Cir. 1990). 
106. See generally id at 560. 
107. See, e.g., Washington v. Daley, 173 F.3d 1153, 1171 (9th Cir. 1999). 
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the claim. 108 In these cases, the court proceeds even thou~ its decision is the 
functional equivalent of a waiver of tribal sovereign immunity. I 9 
This part of the article outlines many of the cases decided by federal and state 
courts regarding whether an absent tribe is an indispensable party under the 
cqmpulsory joinder rule. The purpose of this part is to summarize for practitioners the 
major cases in each area of Indian Law jurisprudence in which the compulsory 
joinder rule is a basis for the decision of the court. Placing the discussion in the 
context of subject matter provides the added benefit of context. In many cases, it 
appears that courts rely on natural resource cases to support a decision in the gaming 
cases. Taking a case out of its context creates the problem of mixing the implicit 
weighing of equities in each case. A court necessarily looks at equity in its 
compulsory joinder analysis. I 10 A court analyzing a treaty rights claim might rely on a 
decision in a tort claim at a casino where the equities are surely different. 
A. Natural Resources and Land 
For tribes and individual Indians, the land is everything. III Along with treaties, 
many tribes have entered into land and natural resources-related leases which are 
contracts. I 12 Courts generally hold that a party to a contract is an indispensable party 
in other contexts. I 13 The cases discussed in this subpart are those involving an absent 
sovereign. 
1. Treaty Rights 
Before gaming, self-governance, bureaucracy, and tribal Courts, there were 
treaties that tribes signed to preserve their very existence. I 14 These treaties ma~ have 
established reservation boundaries, or hunting, fishing, and gathering rights. II They 
may have also included the right to expel unwanted intruders, or the right to tax and 
108. See, e.g., id. at 1167. 
109. See id at 1167-68. 
110. FED.RCIv.P' 19(b). 
Ill. See POMMERSHEIM, supra note 1, at 14, 18. 
112. See, e.g., Yazzie v. Morton, 59 F.RD. 377, 379 (D. Ariz. 1973). 
113. See Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Rite Aid, Inc., 210 F.3d 246, 252 (4th Cir. 2000) ("At the 
outset, we note that 'precedent supports the proposition that a contracting party is the paradigm of an 
indispensable party."') (quoting Travelers Indem. Co. v. Household Int'l, Inc., 775 F. Supp. 518, 527 
(D. Conn. 1991». 
114. See POMMERSHEIM, supra note 1, at 18 ("For the Indians, a great deal was at stake 
[during treaty negotiations]. They were concerned not simply with having a place to live but with 
preserving the land, which was critical for cultural survival and spiritual succor."). See generally 
ROBERT A. WILUAMS, JR., LINKING ARMs TOGETHER: AMERICAN INDIAN TREATY VISIONS OF LAW 
AND PEACE, 1600-1800 (1997). 
115. See generally POMMERSHEIM, supra note 1, at 18. 
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prosecute non-Indians. Although state and federal governments as well as non-
Indians have broken every one of these treaties, many remain extant. I 16 The history 
and litigation over these treaties is incredibly extensive. ll7 Treaty rights of fishing, 
hunting, and gathering are adjudicated and allocated between Indian tribes and non-
Indians (including states) or between tribes. liS Treaty cases are archetypal cases for 
applying the general rule that a fixed fund, of which the court is asked to allocate 
between parties, makes those parties indispensable to the litigation.119 For example, 
in Makah Indian Tribe v. Verity,120 the court dismissed an action by the Makah Indian 
Tribe, challenging federal regulations that implemented a settlement in litigation 
involving the allocation of the tribal ocean harvest of Columbia River salmon. I 21 The 
tribe also challenged the regulations promulgated by the Secretary of Cornmerce to 
implement the settlement. 122 The Makah Tribe sought to alter the salmon allocation to 
its benefit. 123 However, the allocation was a fixed fund, meaning that for the Makah 
to prevail, another tribe or group would lose out on the salmon allocation.124 The 
Ninth Circuit agreed that the other tribes involved in the settlement were necessary 
parties to the treaty claims.125 The district court found that "any share that goes to the 
Makah must come from [the] other tribes. ,,126 However, the court of appeals found 
the other tribes were not necessary parties to challenge the regulations, reasoning that 
"[t]he absent tribes would not be prejudiced because all of the tribes have an equal 
interest in an administrative process that is lawful.,,127 Applying the four-part test, the 
Ninth Circuit held that the absent tribes were indispensable parties as to the broader 
issue: 
Applying these principles, the district court concluded that the case should be 
dismissed. We agree with the court's analysis of the first three factors regarding 
the Makah's substantive claims. The district court found that prejudice was 
inevitable since "any relief would be detrimental to the other tribes"; the absent 
tribes had no proper representative because potential intertribal conflicts meant 
the United States could not represent all of them. The court held that there was 
116. Cj id. at 122. For a broader history of Indian treaties, see FRANCIS PAUL PRUCHA, 
AMERICAN lNDIANTREAnEs: THE H!sTORYOF APOLmCALANoMALY (1994). 
117. See PRUCHA, supra note 116. 
118. See, e.g., Makah Indian Tribe v. Verity, 910 F.2d 555,556 (9th Cir. 1990). 
119. See Wichita and Affiliated Tribes v. Hodel, 788 F.2d 765, 774 (D.C. Cir. 1986). 
120. 910 F.2d 555 (9th Cir. 1990). 
121. See id. at 556, 561. 
122. See id. at 557. 
123. Id 
124. See id at 559. 
125. MakahlndianTribe, 910 F.2dat 559-61. 
126. Id at 559. 
127. Id. 
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no way to shape relief because the 1987 harvest was a limited resource and any 
relief would be detrimental to either the Makah or the absent tribes. Similarly, 
the only "adequate" remedy would be at the cost of the absent parties because 
the Makah request at a minimum an equitable adjustment by the [s ]ecretary. 
Allowing input from all the tribes would require their participation and was 
therefore unacceptable. 128 
17 
This is a standard application of the compulsory joinder rule in the context of a fixed 
fund fact pattern. Where the spoils of the litigation are distributed as in a zero-sum 
game, the absent party loses directly in proportion to the winning party's gain.129 
Hence, the absent party must be indispensable. In Makah Indian Tribe, the sovereigns 
butting heads were Indian tribes, and the court rightly dismissed the action. I 30 
Similarly, one tribe cannot seek to litigate the respective riFnts of tribes under a 
treaty without the presence of the absent treaty signatory tribes. 31 In Keweenaw Bay 
Indian Community v. State of Michigan, 132 Keweenaw Bay sought to protect its lake 
trout treaty rights by suing the state of Michigan, several state agencies, and eight 
individual Indians who were members of the Red Cliff Band of Chippewa Indians 
and the Bad River Band of Chippewa Indians.133 The plaintiff alleged that the state 
defendants failed to protect the resource and that the individual defendants 
overharvested the resource.134 The individual defendants argued that the two absent 
tribes, Red Cliff and Bad River, both signatories to the same treaty that Keweenaw 
Bay was trying to adjudicate, were indispensable.135 The Sixth Circuit agreed for 
several reasons.136 First, since the absent tribes were signatories to the same treaty, 
"[t]he likelihood that they would seek legal recourse in the event that the judgment 
deprived them of fishing rights to which they believe they are entitled can hardly be 
characterized as speculative.,,137 Second, though Keweenaw Bay argued that a factual 
inquiry was required to determine if Bad River and Red Cliff had any interest in the 
treaty, the court rejected their argument and held that the absent tribes had a legally 
protectable interest for the purposes of the compulsory joinder rule.138 Third, the 
court found that 
128. Id. at 560. 
129. See, e.g., City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 558 (1989). 
130. Cf Makah Indian Tribe, 910 F.2d at 557, 560. 
131. See, e.g., Keweenaw Bay Indian Cmty. v. Michigan, II F.3d 1341, 1346-47 (6th Cir. 
1993). 
132. Id at 1341. 
133. Id at 1343-44. 
134. See id. at 1343. 
135. See id. at 1344. 
136. See Keweenaw Bay Indian Cmty., II F.3d at 1346-48. 
137. Id. at 1347. 
138. Id (citing Shennoen v. United States, 982 F.2d 1312, 1317-18 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. 
denied, 509 U.S. 903 (1993)). 
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the absent bands' interests would be impaired or impeded by a judgment in this 
case, within the meaning of Rule 19(a)(2)(i), and that disposition of the case 
without the bands would leave the State defendants subject to substantial risk of 
incurring multiple or otherwise inconsistent obligations, within the meaning of 
Rule 19(a)(2)(ii).139 
A treaty is an agreement between parties, just like a contract, and the parties that 
expect continuin¥, benefits or that have continuing responsibilities should be treated 
as indispensable. 40 
Conversely, four other decisions regarding treaty rights held that the absent tribe 
141 In· th l·ed . f was not a necessary party. two mstances, e courts re 1 on an exceptIon 0 
sorts to the compulsory joinder rule in which the absent parties' interest may be 
adequately represented by the other parties. 142 The courts are more likely to fmd an 
absent Indian tribe is not indispensable where the federal government, which has an 
amorphous trust relationship to the Indian tribes/ 43 is a party.l44 In State of 
Washington v. Daley,145 the Ninth Circuit held the absent tribes were not necessary 
parties to a challenge to federal regulations governing the allocation of groundfish 
catches off the Washington coast because the United States could adequately defend 
the tribes' interests. 146 The court agreed that the absent tribes were necessary parties 
because, should the challengers prevail, ''the [t]ribes will lose their rights to harvest 
whiting specifically and groundfish generally.,,147 However, the court applied the rule 
that "[t]he United States can adequately represent an Indian tribe unless there exists a 
conflict of interest between the United States and the tribe.,,148 The court stated: 
The government and the [t]ribes do not disagree on the issues at hand: the 
[s]ecretary and the [t]ribes agree that the [t]ribes have a treaty right to whiting 
within the area defined by the regulation and that the [t]ribes are co-managers 
with the federal government of the resources within those regions. Furthermore, 
139. Id. 
140. See POMMERSHEIM, supra note 1, at 17. 
141. See Washington v. Daley, 173 F.3d 1158, 1167 (9th Cir. 1999); Cassidy v. United States, 
875 F. Supp. 1438, 1445 (E.D. Wash. 1994); Wisconsin v. Baker, 464 F. Supp. 1377, 1387 (W.D. 
Wis. 1978). 
142. See Daley, 173 F.3d at 1167; Cassidy, 875 F. Supp. at 1445. 
143. See generally Nell Jessup Newton, Enforcing the Federal-Indian Trost Relationship 
After Mitchell, 31 CAlH. U. L. REv. 635, 63545 (1982) (describing the trust relationship as 
''tmcertain''). 
144. See Cassidy, 875 F. Supp. at 1445. 
145. 173 F.3d 1158 (9th Cir. 1999). 
146. See id. at 1167. 
147. Id. 
148. Id. (quoting S.w. Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Babbitt, 150 F.3d 1152, 1154 (9th Cir. 
1998). 
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the federal government, including the [s ]ecretary, has a trust responsibility to the 
[t]ribeS.149 
19 
Moreover, the court concluded, there was no conflict between the tribes themselves 
because the level of allocations were not at issue, as in Verity. I 50 
Daley creates problems for Indian tribes that do not trust their trustee or that take 
a different position than the United States. 15 I The Secretary of the Interior, usually 
regarded as the physical embodiment of the trustee,152 is a political appointee.153 
Depending on the politics, the secretary might not advance positions the tribes would 
espouse.154 In the event there is a conflict between the Secretary of the Interior and 
another federal agency, the outcome of the inter-agency mediation by the Department 
of Justice might not be supportive of the tribes' interest.155 Because federallitigators 
are busy people, they might not dedicate the time and resources that the tribes would 
devote to representing their own interests, especially considering the fact that the 
tribes' right to harvest any whiting and groundfish were at issue. I 56 
A court will take into consideration factors other than the possible representation 
of the tribal interests by the federal government, such as the absent tribe's opportunity 
to intervene.157 In Cassidy v. United States/ 58 non-Indian fishers brought a claim for 
declaratory relief stating that the United States did not have the authority to prosecute 
them for fishing activities on the waters of Lake Roosevelt, which was created by the 
149. Id. at 1168 (citing Parravano v. Babbitt, 70 F.3d 539, 546 (9th Cir. 1995)). 
150. Daley, 173 F.3d at 1168 (citing Makah Indian Tribe v. Verity, 910 F.2d 555,556-57,559 
(9th Cir. 1990)). 
151. See generally id at 1167. 
152. Cj 25 U.S.c. § 2 (2002). 
153. See Office of the Press Secretary, Nominations Sent to the Senate (Jan. 20, 2001) White 
House News Release, http://www.whitehouse.gov/newsireleasesl2oo10123-1.html. 
154. A classic anecdote involving the competing interests of the Indian tribes and their trustee 
is the Secretary of the Interior's alleged reaction to the "Boldt decision" in United States v. 
Washington, 520 F.2d 676 (9th Cir. 1975). Vme Deloria wrote, "Interior SecretaJy Morton, allegedly 
the Indians' trustee, when told that the Indians had won, wanted to appeal the decision lliltil infonned 
that Interior had been supporting the tribes." Vme Deloria, Jr., Legislation and Litigation Concerning 
American Indians, in 436 THE ANNALS OF THE AMERICAN ACADEMY OF POLfJ1CAL AND SOCIAL 
SCIENCE 93 (Richard D. Lambert ed., 1978) (citing United States v. Washington, 520 F.2d 676 (9th 
Cir. 1975)). 
155. See generally Ann C. Juliano, Conflicted Justice: The Department of Justice s Conflict of 
Interest in Representing Native American Tribes, 37 GA. L. REv. 1307, 1326 (2003) ("[A]lthough 
language from the Department of Justice may suggest that Native American tribes themselves are the 
clients, the Department of Justice is adamant that the client is the United States as trustee for the 
tribes."). 
156. See Daley, 173 F.3d at 1162-63. 
157. Cj Cassidy v. United States, 875 F. Supp. 1438, 1445 nA (ED. Wash. 1994). 
158. Id at 1438. 
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commissioning of the Grand Coulee Dam on Indian reseIVation land. 159 The United 
States brought its claim under federal law which prohibits fishing activities on Indian 
land. 160 The fishers argued that tribes did not have authority to regulate their fishing 
activities in the zone of the lake set aside for the tribes' fishers. 161 The federal 
defendants argued that two absent tribes, the Spokane and Colville Tribes, were 
indispensable parties. 162 The district court found that the absent tribes were not 
necessary parties because despite the fact that they had hunting and fishing rights at 
stake, regulatory authority delegated to them by the federal government, and a 
general interest in preserving their own sovereignty, their interests could be 
adequately represented 163 The court concluded that the United States could 
adequately represent their interests for two reasons. l64 First, the court noted that the 
United States's position on the tribes' fishing rights "does not appear to be 
inconsistent with the likely position of the [t)ribes.,,165 Second, since the United States 
allegedly delegated regulatory authority to the tribes in their zone, the government's 
interest there was "not in conflict with the [t)ribes.,,166 The court noted that "[t]he fact 
that the [t]ribes could inteIVene, but have chosen not to, is not a factor that necessarily 
lessens the prejudice they might suffer if this case were resolved in their absence.,,167 
Here, the court made a determination of what the tribes would do if they were 
present, deciding the tribes' actions would not be any different than the federal 
government's position.168 Perhaps, however, the tribes would have made a strategic 
decision to advocate for a much broader right or expanded regulatory authority. This 
strategy is similar to environmental cases in which the federal government issues 
regulations that are challenged by either the re~lated industry or citizens for being 
either too lenient or too harsh on a polluter.16 In American Iron and Steel Inst. v. 
Environmental Protection Agency170 for example, the EPA promulgated regulations 
on source point pollution that were immediately challenged by the regulated 
159. Id at 1441-42. 
160. See id. at 1440-42 (citing 18 V.S.c. § 1165 (2002)). 
161. See id. at 1442. 
162. See Cassidy, 374 F. Supp. at 1443. 
163. See id at 1444-45 (citing Shennoen v. United States, 982 F.2d 1312, 1317 (9th Cir. 
1992), eert. denied, 509 U.S. 903 (1993)). 
164. Id at 1445. 
165. Id. 
166. !d. 
167. Cassidy, 375 F. Supp. at 1445 n.4 (citing Confederated Tribes of the Chehalis 
Reservation v. Lujan, 928 F.2d 1496, 1500 (9th Cir. 1991), citing in turn Makah Indian Tribe v. 
Verity, 910 F.2d 555, 560 (9th Cir. 1990)). 
168. Seeid at 1445. 
169. See, e.g., Am. Iron and Stee1lnst v. EPA, 115 F.3d 979,985 (D.c. Cir. 1997). 
170. Id at 979. 
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industry.17l The National Wildlife Federation intervened and argued that the EPA had 
not gone far enough in reducing pollution. I 72 The federation's strategy was to espouse 
a more radical view in order to make the regulated industry's view appear to be more 
out of sync and to make the government's regulations look more reasonable.173 The 
strategy prevailed, even though the court rejected many of the federation's arguments, 
because the court did not strike down the regulations.174 More damaging for absent 
tribes, however, is the court's view of their refusal to intervene or file amicus 
briefs. 175 This hazard appears in other contexts,176 but is most especially damaging 
and misleading in the gaming compact cases, as discussed below. 
In two other instances, the courts relied on other, more case-specific factors. In 
WlSconsin v. Baker,177 the state of Wisconsin brought a claim that the tribal 
Governing Board of the Lac Courte Oreilles Band of Lake Superior Chippewa 
Indians had engaged in setting hunting, fishing, ricing, trapping, and boating 
regulations that infringed on the state's right to regulate and conduct such activities on 
its own property.178 The defendants, the individual tribal Board members, argued that 
both the absent tribe and the United States were indispensable parties.179 The district 
court noted it was aware the tribe was already engaged in the so-called Voigt litigation 
and other related treaty rights cases.180 It decided that "when the [bland is already a 
participant in one or more other cases presently pending in this court involving the 
status of the Chippewa in Wisconsin, there is no reasonable basis for dismissing this 
action.,,181 Here, the court forgot that efficieny is the basic purpose of the rules of 
171. Id at 985. 
172. Id at 1001. 
173. Cj id. 
174. See Am. Iron and Steel inst., 115 F.3d at 1001, 1008 (upholding substantially the 
regulations promulgated by EPA). 
175. Cf Cassidy v. United States, 875 F. Supp. 1438, 1445 n.4 (ED. Wash. 1994). 
176. The recent United States Supreme Court case United States v. Lara, 124 S. Ct. 1628 
(2004), evidences the sharp divide that can arise when the federal government and tribal interests 
collide. Compare Brief of Amicus Curiae National Congress of American Indians in Support of 
Petitioner at 1-4, United States v. Lara, 124 S. Ct. 1628 (2003) (No. 03-107) (arguing that Congress 
has the power to reaffinn the inherent authority of Indian tribes to prosecute non-member Indians) 
with Brief for the United States at 34, 45-47, Lara (No. 03-107) (arguing that Congress has the power 
to reaffinn the inherent authority of Indian tribes to prosecute non-member Indians, but in the 
alternative arguing, in order to preserve the federal prosecution, that the tribal prosecution of the 
defendant was void). 
177. 464 F. Supp. 1377 (W.o. Wis. 1978). 
178. See id. at 1377-79. 
179. See id. at 1383. 
180. See id. at 1384 (citing United States v. Bouchard, 464 F. Supp. 1316 (W.o. Wis. 1978), 
rev'd, Lac Courte Oreilles Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians v. Voigt, 700 F.2d 341 (7th Cir.), 
eert. denied sub nom. Besadny v. Lac Courte Oreilles Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians, 464 
US. 805 (1983». 
181. Id 
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procedure. The state could easily have intervened in the other lawsuits.182 The court 
should have forced the state to show its hand. Nevertheless, the case was not 
particularly damaging to tribal parties as precedent because the tribe would most 
likely defend the individuals and participate in that manner. I 83 
Treaties were made between the tribes and the federal government because the 
states were prohibited from making treaties through the Commerce Clausel84 and the 
various trade and intercourse acts.18S In many of the treaty rights cases discussed in 
this subsection, the United States may be the absent party, especially when the state or 
an individual non-Indian brings a claim to adjudicate the rights of the parties.186 An 
example is the WlSconsin v. Baker case discussed above, in which the defendants 
argued the federal ~overnment was an absent party.187 In these cases, the treaty is a 
form of contract. I 8 However, the Baker case decided correctly that the federal 
government was not indispensable. 189 Unlike the gaming compact cases, the federal 
government's rights were not at issue in Baker. As in nearly all Indian treaties, the 
consideration that flowed from the tribes to the federal government was land and 
peace, both of which would be preserved regardless of the outcome of the treaty 
rights litigation. 19o In other words, the federal government had already received its 
consideration and had no other interest rernaining. 191 Conversely, in the gaming 
compact cases, the consideration due to the tribes is the continuing right to conduct 
gaming operations.192 An absent tribe's interest in the outcome of those cases is 
considerable and, most importantly, continuing. Courts would agree that a party to a 
contract that expects to receive onr0ing benefits is an indispensable party to a case 
brought to invalidate a contract. 19 Such was not the case in Baker, in which the 
absent federal government party had already received its consideration, consideration 
that was not threatened in the future. 194 
182. See Baker, 464 F. Supp. at 1384. 
183. See, e.g., South Dakota v. Bourland, 949 F.2d 984, 989 (8th Cir. 1991) (citing Larson v. 
Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682, 690 (1949)), rev 'd on other grounds, 508 U.S. 
679 (1993). 
184. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, c!. 3. 
185. See, e.g., An Act to Regulate Trade and Intercourse with the Indian Tribes, ch. 33, 1 Stat. 
137 (1790); see also FELIX S. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 109-17 (1982) 
(discussing the trade and intercourse acts). 
186. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Baker, 464F. Supp. 1377,1383 (W.O. Wis. 1978). 
187. See id. at 1379-83. 
188. See, e.g., id. at 1379-80. 
189. Seeidat1387. 
190. Seeidat1382-83. 
191. See Baker, 464 F. Supp. at 1383. 
192. See, e.g., Am. Greyhound Racing, Inc. v. Hull, 305 FJd 1015, 1023 (9th Cir. 2002). 
193. See, e.g., id 
194. See Baker, 464 F. Supp. at 1383-87. 
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2. Leases 
Many tribes, particularly in the western half of the countty, have a significant 
land base. 195 The land is mostly rural and non-arable, but many reservations have 
natural resources. 196 These tribes have the opportunity to lease their land to mining 
. 197 Wh 'b' I th th mterests. en a tn e IS a party to a contract, ease, or ano er agreement, e 
courts are more likely to find the absence of the tribe renders them indispensable.198 
Many of the decisions holding that absent tribes are indispensable parties arise out of 
leases of tribal land or mining leases.199 One of the first lease cases is Yazzie v. 
Morton?OO Yazzie arose when five members of the Navajo Tribe sued the Secretary of 
the Interior for approving coal-generated power plant leases on the Navajo 
Reservation?OI The plaintiffs alleged this violated the federal government's trust 
responsibility to the tribe due to air pollution created by the plant.202 The court 
characterized the suit as "a back door method of either asserting a class action or 
attempting to represent the [t]ribe without approval or authority,,,203 and determined 
the plaintiffs were "attempting to assert their will on the whole Navajo Tribe 
concerning the agreements involved.'.204 It appears these two statements revealed the 
court's bias as it headed into its actual discussion. First, the court noted that the 
plaintiffs were attempting to cancel certain portions of the leases, a remedy only the 
tribe could pursue under the lease agreements?05 Second, the court noted, "[ f]or this 
lawsuit to proceed without the [t]ribe would most likely cause a number of other 
lawsuits to be brought by either the [tJribe or the United States ... and lawsuits by the 
individual Indians against the [tJribe and/or the power companies.'.206 Third, the court 
stated that "[t]he [t]ribe has a vested economic interest in having the plant operate and 
not shut down even temporarily.'.207 Fourth, the court stated: 
Finally, the [t]ribe is an indispensable party because the land in question is 
part of the [t]ribe's [r]eservation, any decision reached concerning the land 
directly affects the [t]ribe. Plaintiffs have no vested interest in any of the land 
195. See, e.g., Yazzie v. Morton, 59 F.RD. 377, 378 (D. Ariz. 1973). 
196. See, e.g., id. 
197. See, e.g., id 
198. See, e.g., id at 383-85. 
199. See, e.g., id at 377-85. 
200. 59 ER.D. 377 (D. Ariz. 1973). 
201. Id at 379. 
202. Id. 
203. Id. 
204. Id. at 380. 
205. Yazzie, 59 F.RD. at 380-81. 
206. Id. at 381. 
207. Id. at 382. 
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involved, they are only penrutees of the [t]ribe; their pennits expire after a given 
period of time and at death. The [t]ribe has the superior and paramount interest 
in the land?08 
Fifth, the court maintained that the case was actually an intemal dispute and that the 
plaintiffs "may seek redress from or through the [t]ribe.,,209 
The court's very broad reading of the Navajo Nation's interests provides a great 
deal of support for later cases involving Indian lands and contractual interests. 
However, this case is an interesting microcosm of the judicial thought process when 
confronted with a compulsory joinder question. The court must know who the 
plaintiffs are and why they brought the case.2lO In Yazzie, the court knew the plaintiffs 
were disgruntled tribal members who disa~ with the decision of their leadership 
to enter into a deal with a large utility? 1 The plaintiffs' claims were valid, but 
perhaps the venue was inappropriate. Still, the court felt obligated to assert these 
plaintiffs were minority discontents, not worth the trouble except as maybe an 
example to others.212 The case was decided correctly, but the broad statement that any 
decision affecting Navajo land, in essence, makes the tribe a necessary partl l3 is not 
a statement that courts are likely to rely upon in later cases. 
In Lomayaktewa v. Hathaway,214 traditional Hopis brought a suit to void the 
Hopi Tribe's coal mining lease with Peabody Coal, which would allow the mining of 
Black Mesa.215 The court dismissed the action under the compulsory joinder rule 
because "[n]o procedural principle is more deeply imbedded in the common law than 
that, in an action to set aside a lease or a contract, all parties who may be affected by 
the determination of the action are indispensable.'.216 The court, characterizing the 
traditional Hopi plaintiffs as negatively as the court in Yazzie, found first that the Hopi 
Tribe's prejudice would be great, considering the $20 million in royalty payments it 
would receive and the employment opportunities for other Hopis that would be 
created.217 Second, the court weighed the millions of dollars the tribe would allegedly 
208. Id. at 383. 
209. Id. at 385. 
210. SeeFED.RCIv.P.19. 
211. See Yazzie, 59 F.RD. at 379. 
212. Seeid at 383. 
213. Seeid 
214. 520 F.2d 1324 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied sub nom. Susenkewa v. Kleppe, 425 U.S. 
903 (1976). 
215. Id. at 1324-25. 
216. Id. at 1325 (citing Broussard v. Columbia Gulf Transmission Co., 398 F.2d 885 (5th Cir. 
1968); Tucker v. Nat'l Linen Servo Corp., 200 F.2d 858 (5th Cir. 1953); Keegan v. Humble Oil & 
Refining Co., 155 F.2d 971 (5th Cir. 1946». 
217. Seeid. atl326. 
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lose against the fact that the plaintiffs had no other remedy and chose to dismiss the 
action.2lS 
The mining of Black Mesa is an extremely controversial subject for the members 
of the Hopi Tribe.219 As in Yazzie, the plaintiffs chose the wrong venue to bring this 
case, but the case exemplifies the incredible difference in the value judgments 
exhibited by the court in comparison to the plaintiffs?20 The court's values, of course, 
were the values that mattered in the end. The fact that the plaintiffs espoused a 
position that destroying the Black Mesa should not be done, no matter what the 
economic benefits afforded the tribe, was completely outside the scope of what the 
court would have considered equitable.221 
In 1974, the Tenth Circuit decided Tewa Tesuque v. MOr/on,222 a suit brought by 
members of the Tesuque Pueblo against the federal government to cancel a lease 
between the pueblo and the Sangre de Cristo Development Company.223 The court 
concluded that as a party to the lease, the pueblo would be prejudiced by a judgment 
in its absence?24 Like the district court in Yazzie and the Ninth Circuit in 
Lomayaktewa, Tewa Tesque concluded that the plaintiffs had an adequate remedy by 
"bringing the dispute before the tribal council of the [p ]ueblo for determination.'.225 
Of these three cases brought by tribal members, this one most efficiently disposes of 
the matter by holding that the plaintiffs had an alternative forum and therefore would 
not be completely without remedy?26 
The Ninth Circuit continues to dismiss actions that require adjudication of tribal 
rights under leases in their absence.227 In American Land Development v. Babbitt,22S 
218. See id. at 1326-27. 
219. According to a complaint: 
Carving up Black Mesa by the process known as strip mining is a desecration, a sacrilege, 
contrllly to the instruction of the Great Spirit and to the essential relationship to the land 
that is embodied in Hopi culture, life and religion; contrllly, in short, to everything that 
Hopi culture and religion mean. 
DAVID H. GETCHES ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 84-85 (1979) (quoting 
Appellant's Comp\., Lomayaktewa v. Hathaway, 520 F.2d 1324 (9th Cir. 1975) (No. 73-2132)). See 
generally Charles F. Wilkinson, Home Dance, the Hopi, and Black Mesa Coal: Conquest and 
Endurance in the American Southwest, 1996 B.Y.U. L. REv. 449 (describing the spiritual and 
monetary losses suffered by the Hopi Tribe in the course of the mining of the Black Mesa). 
220. See Lomayaktewa, 520 F.2d at 1326-27. 
221. See Yazzie v. Morton, 59 FRO. 377, 385 (D. Ariz. 1973) (dismissing plaintiff's claims 
not for their merit, but for failure to join all dispensable parties). 
222. 498 F.2d 240 (lOth Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 962 (1975). 
223. See id. at 242. 
224. Seeid. 
225. Id. at 243 (citing Motah V. United States, 402 F.2d I (10th Cir. 1968); Prairie Band of 
PottawatornieTribe oflndians V. Pukkee, 321 F.2d 767 (10th Cir. 1963)). 
226. See id. at 243. 
227. See, e.g., Am. Land Dev. Corp. V. Babbitt, No. 96-15654, 1998WL3195 (9th Cir. Jan. 6, 
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the Ninth Circuit dismissed the case because the Fort Mojave Indian tribe was an 
indispensable party.229 The court dismissed the action under the compulsory joinder 
rule relying on Lomayektewa.230 The court rejected the plaintiff's argument that it 
would have no remedy because, ''when a necessary party is immune from suit, there 
may be very little need for balancing Rule 19(b) factors because immunity itself may 
be viewed as the compelling factor.',231 In McClendon v. United States,232 the court 
dismissed an action by a leaseholder of land owned by the Colorado River Indian 
Tribe against the United States, alleging that the tribe had breached the lease.233 The 
court dismissed the case, relying on Lomayektewa?34 The Tenth Circuit also relied on 
Lomayektewa in Jicarilla Apache Tribe v. Hodel.235 Dome Petroleum Corporation 
sued the federal government in an attempt to reduce the amount it would have to pay 
under oil and gas leases with the Jicarilla Apache Tribe?36 The court dismissed the 
case, applying Lomayektewa and holding that "[t]he Tribe's interest in the oil leases 
is ... at the heart of the controversy.',237 
The court's analysis in these cases is summary. The plaintiffs were mining 
companies who wanted to get around tribal immunity by suing other parties, usually 
the federal government, for relier.Z38 These were not sympathetic plaintiffs, relatively 
speaking. Presumably, there is a lot of competition in these business fields and the 
tribes were within their right as competitors to seek the greatest yield. This area 
seems to fit squarely within the sort of interest most courts identify with and 
understand. 
Conversely, in Kescoli v. Babbitt,239 the Ninth Circuit revisited the Black Mesa 
coal mines.240 There, a member of the Navajo Nation sued the Secretary of the 
Interior because he approved a special condition to Peabody Coal's mining permits, 
which plaintiff alleged did not "guarantee adequate protection of sacred burial 
1998). 
228. 1d 
229. See id. at *2. 
230. Seeid. 
231. 1d. (quoting Confederated Tribes of the Chehalis Indian ReseIVation v. Lujan, 928 F.2d 
1496, 1499 (9th Cir. 1991». 
232. 885 F.2d 627 (9th Cir. 1989). 
233. See id. at 628. 
234. See id. at 633 (citing Lomayaktewa v. Hathaway, 520 F.2d 1324, 1325-26 (9th Cir. 
1975), cer!. denied, 425 U.S. 903 (1976); and Jicarilla Apache Tribe v. Hodel, 821 F.2d 537, 540 
(10th Cir. 1987». 
235. 821 F.2d 537 (10th Cir. 1987). 
236. See id at 538. 
237. 1d at 540. 
238. See McClendon, 885 F.2d at 628-30; Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 821 F.2d at 538-39. 
239. 101 F.3d 1304 (9th Cir. 1996). 
240. 1d. at 1307. 
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siteS.'.241 The court agreed with the federal defendants that the Navajo and Hopi 
Tribes were indispensable parties to the litigation and dismissed the action?42 First, 
the court found the absent tribes economic interests, namely royalties for the tribes 
and reservation jobs for the tribal memberships, would be prejudiced by the 
adjudication of the mining leases in their absence.243 Second, the court weighed the 
absent tribes' "interest in determining what is in their best interests by striking an 
appropriate balance between receiving royalties from the mining and protection from 
their sacred sites.'.244 Third, the court held the tribes' interest in their immunity was 
the "'compelling factor'" in dismissing the claim for failure to join the tribes?45 
Specifically, the court stated, "[T]he litigation also threatens the Navajo Nation's and 
the Hopi Tribe's sovereignty by attempting to disrupt their ability to govern 
themselves and to determine what is in their best interests in balancing potential harm 
caused by the mining operations against the benefits of the royalty payments.'.246 
Fourth, the court rejected the plaintiff's attempt to invoke the ''public rights" 
exception, stating: 
As the district court determined, Kescoli's claim "is a private one focused on 
the merits of her dispute rather than on vindicating a larger public interest." 
Although Kescoli purports to represent others who believe the burial sites should 
receive maximum protection, the essence of her dispute is her disagreement with 
the Tribal leaders over what is in the best interests of the Navajo Nation and the 
Hopi Tribe. She believes additional protection for the burial sites is necessary. 
The Navajo Nation and the Hopi Tribe, however, by agreeing to the settlement 
have decided this protection is sufficient and the settlement agreement should be 
implemented so that they will receive the desired royalties. Kescoli's action is 
essentially private in nature, limited to a disagreement over the appropriate 
direction the Navajo Nation and the Hopi Tribe should take in relation to the 
.. 247 
mmmg. 
All of these factors exist whenever a plaintiff brings a claim to invalidate a modem 
contract or compact in which a tribe is a party?48 
241. Seeid. 
242. See id. at 1311-12. 
243. See id. at 1310. 
244. Kescoli, 101 F.3d at 1310 (citing Pit River Home and Agric. Coop. Ass'n v. United 
States, 30 F.3d 1088,1099,1101 (9th Cir. 1994)). 
245. Id. at 1311 (citing Confederated Tribes of the Chehalis Indian Reservation v. Lujan, 928 
F.2d 1496, 1499 (9th Cir. 1991)). 
246. Id. at 1312. 
247. Id. at 1311. 
248. See, e.g., id at 1309-12. 
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Kescoli is another case brought by a dissident tribal member?49 Here, the court 
returns to tribal politics and the continuing struggle over the Black Mesa.25o This is 
not an area the courts feel comfortable making equity decisions. For the court, the 
plaintiffs' rights are "private" and limited, and the importance of the Black Mesa to 
the plaintiffs is lost on the court.251 Interestingly, the court almost seems to be 
lecturing the plaintiffs on the best manner in which to run an Indian tribe with natural 
resources to exploit.252 When an Indian tribe is willing to allow outsiders to take 
valuable resources off tribal land for a fee, the courts understand and agree with this 
exercise of tribal sovereignty over its land.253 The court strongly su!'!'?rts the Hopi 
Tribe's exercise of sovereignty and its decision to exploit resources?5 Missing in this 
case, and in the older cases brought by tribal members, are the external political and 
economic factors that may have placed the tribal governments in a position to sign 
these leases?55 
In the strongest recognition of the interests of an absent tribe, the Second Circuit 
dismissed an action involving the interests of the Seneca Nation in Fluent v. 
Salamanca Indian Lease Authority.256 The plaintiffs in Fluent were leaseholders of 
the Seneca Tribe's "Congressional Villages," living on tnbal land leased to non-
Indians with the approval of Congress.257 The plaintiffs sued to compel the federal 
government to renew the leases before they were due to expire in 1992 and also 
challenged the constitutionality of the Seneca Nation Settlement Act of 1990, which 
allowed for rental payments of millions of dollars to be made to the tribe.258 The court 
dismissed the lease renewal case because only Congress could provide the relief 
requested by the plaintiffs.259 The court did likewise with the constitutional challenge 
because the tribe was ''the beneficiary of a substantial sum of money from the federal 
government" under the settlement act, making the tribe a necessary party?60 The 
court then found that "'society has consciously opted to shield Indian tribes from suit 
without congressional or tribal consent. ",261 The tnbe's immunity was adequate to 
justify dismissal of the suit.262 
249. SeeKeseoli, 101 F.3dat 1307-08. 
250. Seeid 
251. Id. at 1311. 
252. Seeid 
253. Seeid at 1311-12. 
254. SeeKeseoli, 101 F.3dat 1311-12. 
255. See generally Wilkinson, supra note 219, at 450 (describing how tribes began to assert 
control over their own natural resources in the I 970s). 
256. 928 F.29 542 (2nd Cir. 1991), eert. denied, 502 U.S. 818 (1991). 
257. Id. at 543-44. 
258. Id. at 543. 
259. Id. at 547. 
260. Id. 
261. Fluent, 928 F.2d at 548 (quoting Wichita &AffiIiated Tribes v. Hodel, 788 F.2d 765, 777 
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The Second Circuit's annunciation of tribal sovereign rights is the strongest of 
the circuits confronted with the issue of the compulsory joinder rule?63 In Fluent, 
Congress took direct action in a dispute between the tribe and non-Indian property 
interests and did nothing to abrogate tribal sovereignty?64 Only through congressional 
mandate could the court provide relief to the appellants.265 
State courts have followed the federal courts in cases involving tribal natural 
resource leases?66 In Lyon, the Colorado Court of Appeals dismissed an action 
alleging that gas wells and drilling operations had caused air, water, and soil 
contamination.267 The defendants argued that since at least some of the allegations 
involved operations taking place on land owned by the Southern Ute Indian 
Reservation, the case should be dismissed under the state compulsory joinder rule.268 
The court agreed the tribe was a necessary party that would be prejudiced by an 
injunction ceasing production, "significantly impact[ing] production and in tum 
would directly affect the [t]ribe's right to receive money under the leases.',269 The 
court found the tribe was also an indispensable party because the plaintiffs could seek 
a remedy in tribal or federal COurt?70 In Golden Oil Co. v. Chace Oil Co., Inc.,271 one 
oil company sued another for breach of leases, of which the Iicarilla Apache Tribe 
was a party.272 The New Mexico Court of Appeals dismissed the case, holding that 
the tribe was a necessary party under the state compulsory joinder rule because it had 
"an interest not only in deriving economic benefits from the operation of oil and gas 
leases on its lands but also in protecting its sovereign right to litigate on its own behalf 
and in the forum of its choice.',273 
It appears to be a question of political disposition on the state courts as to 
whether they will defer to an Indian tribe's choice to stay out of a case.274 New 
Mexico courts appear to follow the rule that a tribe has a strong interest in choosing 
when and where to be sued. The Colorado court held that there was an alternative 
(D.C. Cir. 1986)). 
262. Id. 
263. Cf id. at 546-48. 
264. Cf id. at 544. 
265. Id. at 547. 
266. See, e.g., Lyon v. Amoco Prod. Co., 923 P.2d 350 (Colo. Ct. App. 1996). 
267. Id at 352. 
268. Seeid. 
269. Id. at 356. 
270. See id. at 357 (citing Yazzie v. Morton, 59 ER.D. 377 (D. Ariz. 1973)). 
271. 994 P.2d 772 (N.M. Ct. App. 1999). 
272. Id. at 773. 
273. Id. at 775 (citing Sraderv. Verant, 964 P.2d 82, 91 (N.M. 1998)). 
274. Cfid 
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forum in which to bring the breach of contract case, that bein~ tribal court.275 Other 
courts ignore these factors, especially in gaming compact cases. 76 
Only two cases found that the absence of a tribe during the adjudication of a 
natural resources or land lease was insufficient to dismiss the matter under the 
compulsory counterclaim rule?77 In Lear Petroleum Corp. v. Wilson, a split Tenth 
Circuit panel held the absent tribe was not an indispensable party in a suit between 
operators of a gas well on Cherokee, Chickasaw, and Choctaw land in Oklahoma.278 
The suit was to determine the owner of royalty payments owed by the operators?79 
Without much discussion, the court rejected a defense that the case should be 
dismissed on the grounds that the three absent tribes might have a claim to the 
royalties?80 The court found the other parties' lack of remedy to be dispositive over 
the absent tribes' sovereignty?81 The dissent noted that the court's lack of analysis left 
it "impossible to determine why the appellants' need for a remedy should outweigh 
any rights the tribes may have.,,282 
The second case is more complex, unusual, and for tribal interests, 
unfortunate.283 In Comstock Oil & Gas, Inc. v. Alabama and Coushatta Indian Tribes 
of Texas, oil companies sued the Alabama and Coushatta Indian Tnbes of Texas and 
members of the tribal council, the governing body of the tribe, in an action for a 
declaration that the companies' oil and gas leases remained valid, even after the tribe 
asked for them to be declared null and void by the secretary.284 The court held that the 
tribe was not an indispensable party for several reasons?85 First, the court found that 
the presence of the individual council members and the Secretary of the Interior 
diluted the prejudice to the tribe;286 Second, in the presence of the council members 
and the secretary, the relief granted would be adequate to settle the case as to the 
tribe.287 Third, the court heavily weighed the lack of an available forum for the 
275. SeeLyon, 923 P.2d at 357. 
276. See generally Am. Greyhound Racing, Inc. v. Hull, 305 F.3d 1015 (9th Cir. 2002). 
277. See Lear Petroleum Corp. v. WIlson, 730 F.2d 1363, 1364-65 (lOth Cir. 1984); 
Comstock Oil & Gas, Inc. v. Ala. & Coushatta Indian Tribes, 78 F. Supp. 2d 589, 601-03 (E.D. Tex. 
1999), aff'd in relevant part, 261 F.3d 567 (5th Cir. 2001), reh'g denied, 275 FJd 1034 (5th Cir. 
2001). 
278. 730 F.2d 1363, 1364 (10th Cir. 1984). 
279. Id. at 1363. 
280. See id. at 1364. 
281. See id. at 1364-65. 
282. /d. at 1366 (Doyle, 1., dissenting). 
283. See Comstock Oil & Gas, Inc. v. Ala. & Coushatta Indian Tribes, 78 F. Supp. 2d 589 
(E.D. Tex. 1999). 
284. Id. at 590-91. 
285. Id. at 601-03. 
286. Id. at 601. 
287. Id. (citing Provident Tradesmens Bank & Trust Co. v. Patterson, 390 U.S. 102 (1968)). 
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plaintiffs if the case were dismissed?88 The court had already determined that the 
Alabama and Coushatta Tribal Court did not properly exist,289 so no tribal court 
forum was available.290 Strangely, though the court had stated that the individual 
council members were not immune from suit in an action for declaratory relief 
because they may have been acting outside the scope of their authority,291 the court 
held in the compulsory joinder analysis that the plaintiffs would not have a remedy in 
state court because the tribe retained its immunity.292 Like the New Mexico court in 
Golden Oil, the court identified the tribe's own court as an alternative venue, but, 
unlike Golden Oil, this court undermined the tribe's court altogether.293 Thus, the 
district court effectively litigated the validity of the tribal court in a forum that was not 
sanctioned by the tribe and in the absence of the tribe?94 The case should be confined 
to its unusual facts and unusual analysis, but it is a good example of bringing the tribe 
b . . ffi 295 . to court y sumg Its 0 cers. 
Other parties, besides sovereigns, that argue they are indispensable, with varying 
degrees of success. In Pan American Petroleum Corp. v. Udall/96 the district court 
held that an individual Indian, a third party beneficiary of a lease, was not an 
indispensable party in an action brought by an oil company lessee of the Fort 
Berthold Indian Tribe.297 The court held that the Secretary of the Interior, the 
defendant in the action, was capable of defending the absent Indian's interests?98 
The Eighth Circuit later relied upon Pan American in Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe of 
Indians v. United Statei99 for the proposition that an Indian tribe was not an 
indispensable party when the federal government brought a condemnation action 
against a tribal member.30o These two cases are sometimes, though rarely, cited for 
the proposition that the federal government can adequately represent Indian or tribal 
interests.301 Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe, however, was an unusual circumstance 
288. Comstock Oil & Gas, Inc. 78 F. Supp. 2d at 602. 
289. Id. at 598-601. 
290. Id. at 596. 
291. Id. at 593-94. 
292. See id. at 601-02. 
293. Compare Golden Oil Co. v. Chace Oil Co., Inc., 994 P.2d 772 (N.M. Ct. App. 1999), 
with Comstock Oil & Gas, Inc., 78 F. Supp. 2d at 589. 
294. See Comstock Oil & Gas, Inc., 78 F. Supp. 2d at 603. 
295. Cf id. at 591. 
296. 192 F. Supp. 626 (D.D.C. 1961). 
297. Id. at 627-28. 
298. Id. at 628 (citing Kerrison v. Stewart, 93 U.S. 155 (1876); Green v. Brophy, 110 F.2d 
539 (D.c. Cir. 1940». 
299. 338 F.2d 906 (8th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 815 (1964). 
300. See id. at 910 (citing Pan Am. Petroleum Corp., 192 F. Supp. at 628). 
301. See, e.g., Connecticut ex- rei. Blumenthal v. Babbitt, 889 F. Supp. 80, 83 (D. Conn. 
1995); City of Sault Ste. Marie v. Andrus, 458 F. Supp. 465, 473 (D.D.C. 1978). 
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because there was a tribal agreement that the federal government would proceed with 
condemnation actions, thereby providing a more com~elling argument that the 
federal government could adequately represent the tribe.3 2 Other cases in which the 
federal government's angle was one of the trust relationship are not as compelling. 
3. Settlement or Judgment Proceeds 
Individual Indians and Indian tribes are often the beneficiaries of settlements 
arising out ofland claims303 and trust breach claims.304 In many instances, more than 
one tribe is the beneficiary of a trust corpus and naturally, conflict may arise.305 The 
more unambiguous cases in this field are cases involving a limited fund or 
distribution, such as when the federal government holds funds in trust for a tribe or 
tribal membe?06 or where the absent tribe is a beneficiary of a settlement or judgment 
trust fund.307 Pemaps the most influential decision in the field is the D.C. Circuit's 
opinion in Wichita and Affiliated Tribes of Oklahoma v. Hodel. With then-Judge 
Scalia on the panel, the court dismissed an action arising out of the distribution of 
land proceeds shared by three tribes, the Wichita and Affiliated Tribes of Oklahoma, 
the Caddo Tribe of Oklahoma, and the Delaware Tribe of We stem Oklahoma.308 The 
Wichita Tribe challenged an Interior Board of Indian Appeals decision that changed 
the distribution formula to the advantage of the Caddo Tribe.309 Since the Caddo 
Tribe would be receiving the largest payment, it cross-claimed that it should receive 
payment back-dated to the beginning of the arrangement in the 1960s?1O The 
Wichita argued it would not waive its immunity as to the Caddo Tribe's cross-claim 
302. See 338 F.2d at 910. 
303. See, e.g., Rhode Island Indian Claims Settlement Act, 25 U.S.c. § 1701 (2004); Maine 
Indian Claims Settlement Act, 25 U.S.C. § 1721 (2004). 
304. See, e.g., Hoopa-Yurok Settlement Act, 25 U.S.C. § 1300i-l (2004). 
305. See general?y Wichita and Affiliated Tribes v. Hodel, 788 F.2d 765 (D.c. Cir. 1986). 
306. See, e.g., Cogo v. Cent. Council of the Tlingit and Haida Indians, 465 F. Supp. 1286, 
1291 (D. Alaska 1979) ("The United States holds the judgment funds in trust for the Tlingit and 
Haida Tribes but could not be joined in this suit because of sovereign immunity. The United States is 
an indispensable party in a suit affecting property which it holds in trust for Indians or Indian tribes.") 
(citing Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe v. United States, 338 F.2d 906, 909-10 (8th Cir. 1964); Green v. 
Wilson, 331 F.2d 769 (9th Cir. 1964); Nicodemus v. Wash. Water Power Co., 264 F.2d 614 (9th Cir. 
1959); First Nat'l Bank of Holdenville v. Ickes, 154 F.2d 851 (D.c. Cir. 1946»). Cf Anderson & 
Middleton Lumber Co. v. Quinault Indian Nation, 929 P.2d 379,387 (Wash. 1996) (holding that the 
United States was not an indispensable party where it merely acted as trustee of mineral rights in 
action for the partition of a surface estate owned in part by an Indian tribe). 
307. See generally Wichita and Affiliated Tribes, 788 F.2d at 765. 
308. See id at 767. 
309. Id 
310. Id. 
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and further alleged that the claim could not be adjudicated in its absence or in the 
absence of the Delawares, an argument the court adopted.311 
The court first noted that the absent tribes were indispensable parties because 
they were "beneficiaries of the trust who stand to lose if the Caddos succeed in 
obtaining redistributions of future income to compensate for the past.',312 Using the 
four-part test to determine if the case should be dismissed, the court first found that 
the prejudice to the absent tribes could not be relieved by the presence of the United 
States because ''whatever allegiance the government owes to the tribes as trustee, is 
necessarily split among the three competing tribes involved in the case.',313 Second, 
the court rejected the argument that the Wichita's presence mitigated the prejudice: 
[W]e decline to hold that the de facto opportunity to file position papers with the 
court on a cross-claim is sufficient to mitigate the prejudice of non-joinder. If the 
opportunity to brief an issue as a non-party were enough to eliminate prejudice, 
non-joinder would never be a problem since the court could always allow the 
non-joinable party to file amicus briefs. Being party to a suit carries with it 
significant advantages beyond the amicus' opportunities, not the least of which 
is the ability to appeal an adverse judgment. 314 
Third, the court refused to abrogate the absent tribes' immunity, stating, "[t]o 
intervene, the Wichitas would have had to waive their tribal immunity. It is wholly at 
odds with the policy of tribal immunity to put the tribe to this Hobson's choice 
between waiving its immunity or waiving its right not to have a case proceed without 
it. ,,315 The court further wrote, "[T]he policy of tribal immunity ... accords to tribal 
sovereignty and autonomy a place in the hierarchy of values over society's interest in 
making tribes amenable to suit.',316 Fourth, the court could not find a method to shape 
the relief requested to avoid prejudicing the absent tribes, noting that "[i]t would 
elevate form over substance to allow tribal immunity to be avoided by proceeding 
against an absent, indispensable, tribe because the tribe has the opportunity to file a 
later suit attacking the plan.',317 Fifth, the court rejected the argument that the Caddo 
Tribe would have no other remedy.318 The court stated that "an action should [not] 
proceed solely because the plaintiff othetwise would not have an adequate remedy, as 
311. See id. at 774-78. 
312. Wichita and Affiliated Tribes, 788 F.2d at 774. 
313. ld. at 775 (citing Manygoats v. Kleppe, 558 F.2d 556,558 (1Oth Cir. 1977». 
314. ld. (citing Bender v. Williamsport Area Sch. Dist., 475 U.S. 534, 543 (1986); Washoe 
Tribe v. Greenley, 674 F.2d 816,818 (9th Cir. 1982); Moten v. Bricklayers, Masons & Plasterers Int'I 
Union, 543 F.2d 224,227 (D.c. Cir. 1976». 
315. ld. at 776. 
316. ld. (citing United States v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 309 U.s. 506, 513 
(1940». 
317. Wichita and Affiliated Tribes, 788 F.2d at 776. 
318. See id. at 777. 
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this would be a misconstruction of the rule and would contravene the established 
doctrine ofindispensability.,,319 The court concluded: 
Although we are sensitive to the problem of dismissing an action where there is 
no alternative forum, we think the result is less troublesome in this case than in 
some others. The dismissal of this suit is mandated by the policy of tribal 
immunity. This is not a case where some procedural defect such as venue 
precludes litigation of the case. Rather, the dismissal turns on the fact that 
society has consciously opted to shield Indian tribes from suit without 
congressional or tribal consent.320 
The D.C. Circuit, arguably the most influential and important of the federal 
circuits, relied on a public policy in favor of tribal irnmunity from suit, established 
and controlled by Congress.32I This appears to be the strongest statement in favor of 
dismissing a case when an absent tribe has an interest in the outcome. One could 
argue that, as in the Navajo and Hopi cases in which dissident tribal factions brought 
suit against their own tribe,322 Wichita and Affiliated Tribes was essentially a dispute 
between Indians. In this case, however, it was a dispute between tribes?23 The case 
involved a dispute over an agreement between three sovereigns, brokered by the 
federal government as a trustee for all three.324 
As in treaty claims and leases, courts generally dismiss challenges to the 
constitutionality of a land settlement act, absent the tribes affected by that act.325 In 
Shermoen, individual Indians and an Indian tribe sued the federal government, 
challenging the constitutionality of the Hoopa-Yurok Settlement Act of 1988.326 The 
court held that the two absent tribes, the Hoopa Valley Tribe and the Yurok Tribe, 
were indispensable parties and dismissed the action.327 The court rejected the 
plaintiffs' first argument that the absent tribes were not necessary parties because, if 
the act were unconstitutional, then the two tribes have no interest in the outcome.328 
319. ld. (internal quotation omitted) (quoting 3A Moore's Federal Practice 'If 19.07-2[4], at 
19-153 (1984)). 
320. ld. 
321. See id. 
322. See Yazzie v. Morton, 59 F.R.D. 377, 379 (D. Ariz. 1973); see also Lomayaklewa v. 
Hathaway, 520 F.2d 1324, 1325 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 903 (1976). 
323. Wichita andAffiliatedTribes, 778 F.2d at 767. 
324. ld. 
325. See generally Shennoen v. United States, 982 F.2d 1312 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 
509 U.S. 903, (1993), reh 'g denied, 509 U.S. 940 (1993). 
326. See id. at 1314. 
327. Seeid.atI319. 
328. See id. at 1317 ("Just adjudication of claims requires that courts protect a party's right to 
be heard and to participate in adjudication of a claimed interest, even if the dispute is ultimately 
resolved to the detriment of that party."). But cf Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe v. Collier, 17 
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The court also recognized the absent tribes' "interest in preserving their own 
sovereign immunity, with its comitant 'right not to have [their] legal duties judicially 
determined without consent. ",329 Moreover, since the conflict arose between tribes, 
the United States could not adequately represent the absent tribes' interests.330 The 
court noted the plaintiffs did not have a forum to air their grievances but stated, "[t]his 
case serves as one more illustration, however, that 'Congress' authority over Indian 
matters is extraordinarily broad, and the role of courts in adjusting relations between 
and among tribes and their members correspondingly restrained.,,,33l Finally, the 
court rejected the application of the "public rights" doctrine "[b ]ecause of the threat to 
the absent tribes' legal entitlements, and indeed to their sovereignty, posed by the 
present litigation.'.332 
This case highlights a few arguments that have arisen in other contexts. First, 
challengers argue that if a statute or compact is unconstitutional, then the tribe 
benefited by the statute or compact cannot have a legally protectable interest.333 The 
courts usually see through this argument, sometimes labeling it 'circular' and noting 
that the rule allows for any absent party to be necessary and indispensable if they 
have a non-frivolous claim to an interest.334 Second, the plaintiffs' attempt to invoke 
the 'public rights' exception was limited by the court.335 
In another judgment fund case, Pembina Treaty Committee v. LUjan,336 the 
Eighth Circuit dismissed an action by individual tribal members seeking an injunction 
that would require the Turtle Mountain Band of Pembina Chippewa Indians to 
present an annual budget to the federal government before the government would 
release funds from a judgment trust fund.337 The plaintiffs also asked the court to 
declare the tribe's spending plan invalid.338 The court agreed with the lower court that 
complete relief was unavailable absent the tribe, and that a judgment in its absence 
would affect the absentee's right to self-govemance.339 Moreover, the court found the 
FJd 1292, 1293-94 (10th Cir. 1994) (holding that absent tribe never acquired an interest in the statute 
at issue and therefore was not an indispensable party), on remand, 142 F.3d 1325 (lOth Cir. 1998), 
cert. denied sub nom. Absentee Shawnee Tribe v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe, 525 U.S. 
947 (1998». 
329. Shermoen, 982 F.2d at 1317 (quoting Enterprise Mgmt Consultants v. United States ex 
rei. Hodel, 883 F.2d 890, 894 (lOth Cir. 1989). 
330. See id. at 1318 (citing Confederated Tribes of the Chehalis Reservation v. Lujan, 928 
F.2d 1496, 1500 (9th Cir. 1991». 
331. Id at 1320-21 (quoting Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 72 (1978». 
332. Id. at 1319. 
333. Seeid. at 1317. 
334. See, e.g., Shermoen, 982 F.2d at 1317. 
335. See id at 1319. 
336. 980 F.2d 543 (8th Cir. 1992). 
337. Id. at 544. 
338. Id. 
339. See id at 545-46. 
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case amounted to no more than "a political difficulty that must be redressed, if at all, 
through tribal political processes or the tribal COurts.,,340 The main feature of this case 
is the internal political dispute that was at the heart of the matter?41 
Similarly, in Native American Mohegans v. United States,342 the district court 
dismissed a challenge by a faction of tribal members to the constitutionality of the 
Mohegan Nation of Connecticut Land Claims Settlement Act.343 The court held the 
absent Mohegan Tribe was an indispensable party because neither the federal 
government nor the state was "capable of representing [the absent tribe's] interest in 
ensuring that it alone receives the benefits of the casino proceeds and, while plaintiffs 
may lack an alternate forum for pursuit of this particular remedy, that factor does not 
carry the day here.,,344 This case was brought by a group of Mohe~an Indians who 
were attempting to achieve federal recognition through the courts? 5 The court was 
incorrect regarding the lack of alternate forum in one respect, because the group could 
have gone through the administrative recognition process.346 Cases in this category 
are usually dismissed on the grounds that the courts do not have jurisdiction over 
internal tribal matters.347 
Two cases arising out of the Navajo-Hopi land redistribution acts reached the 
same conclusion?48 In Clinton v. Babbi/t,349 the Ninth Circuit held that the Hopi 
Tribe was an indispensable party to an action challenging the Navajo-Hopi Land 
Dispute Settlement Act of 1996.350 The court found that the Hopi Tribe had a legally 
protected interest, because a declaration that the settlement act was unconstitutional 
would have a detrimental affect on the tribe's rights to $25 million in compensation 
from the United States and on the tribe's jurisdiction over the Hopi Partitioned 
Lands.351 It concluded that the Hopi Tribe was an indispensable party because "the 
Hopi Tribe's interest in maintaining its sovereign immunity outweighs the interest of 
340. Id. at 546. 
341. See generally Pembina Treaty Comm., 980 F.2d at 543. 
342. 184 F. Supp. 2d 198 (D. Conn. 2002). 
343. Seeid.at201-02. 
344. Id. at217. 
345. Seeid.at201-02. 
346. See generally 25 C.F.R pt 83. 
347. See, e.g., In re Sac & Fox Tribe, 340 F.3d 749, 763 (8th Cir. 2003) ("Jurisdiction to 
resolve internal tribal disputes, interpret tribal constitutions and laws, and issue tribal membership 
detenninations lies with Indian tribes and not in the district courts.") (citing United States v. Wheeler, 
435 U.S. 313, 323-26 (1978). 
348. See generally Manybeads v. United States, 209 F.3d 1164 (9th Cir. 2000); Clinton v. 
Babbitt, 180 FJd 1081 (9th Cir. 1999). 
349. 180F.3d 1081 (9thCir. 1999). 
350. Id. at 1083. 
351. Id. at 1089. 
HeinOnline -- 40 Gonz. L. Rev. 37 2004-2005
2004/05] INDISPENSABLE SOVEREIGNS 37 
the plaintiffs in litigating their claim.',352 In a related case, Marrybeads v. United 
States,353 the Ninth Circuit dismissed a First Amendment challenge to the settlement 
between the parties in Clinton v. Babbitt?54 The court rejected the argument that a 
constitutional violation to a fundamental right will go unredressed because ''this 
principle cannot be asserted when a sovereign, not a party to the case, will suffer 
substantially from its vindication.',355 This principle finds its way into the compulsory 
joinder cases only when the plaintiff is an individual Indian or Indian tribe.356 
Two courts refused to dismiss cases in the face of a clear tribal government 
interest in property.357 First, in the Ninth Circuit's opinion in Youpee v. Babbitt,358 
without discussing the issue, the court proceeded without the tribes.359 That case 
involved a challenge to the constitutionality of provisions of the Indian Land 
Consolidation Act,36o a statute that allowed highly fractionated individual Indian land 
interests to escheat to the individual's tribe.361 Certainly, the affected tribes would 
have had an interest in the litigation over the constitutionality of the statute, but they 
were never joined.362 In a second case, somewhat similar to Youpee, a district court 
held that the interest in an Indian Claims Commission judgment fund implicates tribal 
interests that are insufficient to satisfy the interest required to invoke the compulsory 
joinder rule?63 In Lebeau v. United States,364 individual Indians sued the United 
States, challenging a statute that would transfer a portion of the Indians's settlement 
funds from the individuals to the Sisseton and Wahpeton Sioux Tribe.365 The court 
ruled that the case should not be dismissed under the compulsory joinder rule because 
the United States could adequately represent the absent tribe's interest.366 Labeau is 
similar to Shermoen and the challenges to the Hopi-Navajo land settlement acts 
because the absent tribes were, in effect, parties to an agreement brokered and, 
sponsored by the United States. However, the decision in Labeau is more justifiable 
352. Id. at 1090 (citing Quileute Indian Tribe v. Babbitt, 18 FJd 1456, 1460-61 (9th Cir. 
1994)). 
353. 209 F.3d 1164 (9th Cir. 2000), eert. denied, 532 U.S. 966 (2001). 
354. Id. at 1166-67. 
355. Id. at 1166. 
356. See, e.g., id at 1166-67. 
357. See generally Youpee v. Babbitt, 67 F.3d 194 (9th Cir. 1995); Lebeau v. United States, 
115 F. Supp. 2d 1172 (D. S.D. 2000). 
358. 67 F.3d 194 (9th Cir. 1995), aff'don other grounds, 519 U.S. 234 (1997). 
359. See generally id 
360. Id at 195-96. 
361. 25 U.S.c. §§ 2201-2219 (2000). 
362. SeeYoupee, 67 F.3d at 194. 
363. See Lebeau v. United States, 115 F. Supp. 2d 1172, 1176 (D.S.D. 2000). 
364. Id 
365. See id. at 1173. 
366. See id. at 1176-77 (citing Babbitt v. Youpee, 519 U.S. 234, 236-45 (1997)). 
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because the United States, as a literal trustee to the Indian Claims Commission 
judgment fund, could better represent the tribe.367 
4. Disputes Over Land 
Due to colonization, many tribes have to share a land base?68 As in the 
settlement fund distribution cases where more than one tribe has an interest, disputes 
often arise.369 When a plaintiff brings an action claiming an interest in land owned by 
an Indian tribe without joining that tribe, the case will be dismissed.370 In the 
characteristic case, Quileute Indian Tribe v. Babbitt,371 the Ninth Circuit dismissed a 
case brought by the Quileute Indian Tribe against the federal government and the 
Quinault Indian Tribe.372 The two tribes shared a reservation, and the Department of 
Interior decided that some fractional property interests within the Quinault area would 
escheat to the Quinault Tribe instead of the Quileute Tribe.373 The court found that the 
Quinault Tribe's interest in its ability to govern was at stake374 and that the United 
States could not adequately represent either side in the litigation when the two tribes 
are at odds.375 The court concluded that the plaintiff's interest in litigating a claim is 
outweighed by society's interest in tribal irnmunity.376 The court's language in 
Quileute is a particularly strong statement in favor of the absent tribal government 
interests.377 The plaintiffs had already been given the opportunity to state their case to 
367. See id. 
368. See Padraic I. McCoy, The Land Must Hold the People: Native Modes of Territoriality 
and Contemporary Tribal Justifications for Placing Land into Trust Through 25 CF.R Part 51, 27 
AM.INDIANL. REv. 421, 422 (2002-03). 
369. See. e.g., Rosales v. United States, No. 02-55800, 2003 WL 21920015, at *1 (9th Cir. 
Aug. 11,2003). 
370. See, e.g., id (dismissing quiet title claim against United States where Indian tribe owner 
was not joined). 
371. 18 F.3d 1456 (9th Cir. 1994). 
372. See id. at 1457, 1461. 
373. Id. at 1457. 
374. See id. at 1459 (citing Shennoen v. United States, 982 F.2d 1312,1317 (9th Cir. 1992); 
Confederated Tribes of the Chehalis Reservation v. Lujan, 928 F.2d 1496, 1498 (9th Cir. 1991); 
Makah Indian Tribe v. Verity, 910 F.2d 555,559 (9th Cir. 1990); McClendon v. United States, 885 
F.2d 627, 633 (9th Cir. 1989)). 
375. Id at 1460 (citing Confederated Tribes of the Chehalis Reservation, 928 F.2d at 1500; 
Makah Indian Tribe, 910 F.2d at 560). 
376. See Quileute Indian Tribe, at 1460-61 (citing Confederated Tribes of the Chehalis 
Reservation, 928 F.2d at 1500; Enter. Mgmt. Consultants, Inc. v. United States ex rei. Hodel, 883 F.2d 
890,894 (10th Cir. 1989)). 
377. See id at 1460. 
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the federal government during the administrative process leading up to the decision 
h d th . 378 Th kin d h 379 on w 0 governe e reservatIon. ey were see g a secon s ot. 
In Pit River Home and Agricultural Cooperative Association v. United States/80 
the Ninth Circuit dismissed a lawsuit by a tribal faction against the Secretary of the 
Interior after the Bureau of Indian Affairs ("BIA") determined that Pit River Tribal 
Council, and not the plaintiff, was the governing body of the tribe?81 The dissenting 
faction asked the court to reverse the secretary's decision, but the court would not 
hear the case, holding that "[ w]e cannot address these claims without prejudicing the 
rights of the Council to govern the [t]ribe, which the [s]ecretary has designated as the 
beneficial owner of the ranch.'.382 Pit River is similar to Quileute because the 
plaintiff, here a group of Indians claiming to be the real tribe, had been given an 
opportunity to state their case to the Secretary of the Interior.383 Once a tribal group 
becomes vested with the rights and responsibilities of being a federall~ recognized 
tribe, their interests are the kind that the rule was designed to protect. 3 4 These two 
cases, however, continue to show that the courts appear to most strongly vindicate 
tribal interests when tribal members, rebel factions, and other tribes attempt to litigate 
. th b fth'b .. 385 mea sence 0 e tn e m mterest. 
A damages action brought against individual officers of an Indian tribe over 
actions taken in a land dispute might be dismissed under the compulsory joinder 
rule?86 In Turley v. Eddy,387 plaintiffs sued officers of the Colorado River Indian 
Tribe for evicting them from the reservation?88 Since the absent tribe had a legitimate 
claim to the establishment of the boundaries of its reservation and, despite the fact 
their claim was far from dispositive, the tribe was deemed an indispensable party.389 
This case amounted to a quiet title action against the tribe, without their presence.390 
As in contract claims, courts are most likely to find that an absent party is 
indispensable in quiet title actions?91 In this case, the plaintiff properly sued the 
378. See id at 1458. 
379. Seeid 
380. 30 F.3d 1088 (9th Cir. 1994). 
381. See id. at 1092. 
382. Id. at 1102 (citing Shennoen v. United States, 982 F.2d 1312, 1320 (9th Cir. 1992)). 
383. See id at 1088. 
384. See, e.g., id. at 1102. 
385. See, e.g., Pit River Home & Agric. Coop. Ass'n, 30 F.3d at 1096. 
386. See, e.g., Turley v. Eddy, No. 02-56782,2003 WL 21675511 (9th Cir. July 16, 2003). 
387. Id 
388. Id. at *1. 
389. See id. (citing Imperial Granite Co. v. Pala Band of Mission Indians, 940 F.2d 1269, 
1272 n.4 (9th Cir. 1991)); Carlson v. Tula1ip Tribes, 510 F.2d 1337, 1339 (9th Cir. 1975)). 
390. See id. 
391. See, e.g., Carlson, 510 F.2d at 1339. 
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individual officers, but the court agreed with the affirmative defense of official 
immunity because the officers had not acted outside the scope of their authority. 392 
There is a category of rulings running through the compulsory joinder 
jurisprudence where a non-Indian party, often the classic bad actor, tries to invoke the 
absence of a tribe in order to avoid Suit.393 In Trans-Canada Enterprises, Ltd v. King 
County/94 the Court of Appeals of Washington held that when relief can be modified 
to preserve the interests of the absent party, the case may continue despite the 
absence.395 The court adjudicated a claim by a non-Indian property owner against a 
public utility charged with maintaining a river dike that had broken?96 The defendant 
argued that the Muckleshoot Tribe, which claimed ownership of the riverbed, was an 
indispensable party.397 The court solved the problem by amending the lower court's 
order to preserve the tribe's future claim, if any?98 The case involved an attempt by a 
defendant to avoid liability and judgment by trying to invoke the com£ulsory joinder 
rule.399 With good reason, courts do not look kindly upon this strategy. 00 Rarely is an 
absent tribe protected by the court's modification of the relief requested.401 In cases 
where the relief is all or nothing, such as when a party claims title to real property, 
relief usually cannot be shaped to preserve the absent party's interests.402 
5. National Environmental Policy Act 
In most cases where the action of a federal agency in conjunction with an Indian 
tribe is challenged under the National Environmental Policy Act (''NEPA''),403 courts 
will not dismiss the action upon the failure of the plaintiff to join the absent tribe.404 
NEPA creates responsibilities for federal agencies.405 The courts treat these cases as 
those in which the agency alone is in interest.406 For example, in Manygoats v. 
392. See Turley, 2003 WL21675511, at *1. 
393. See, e.g., Trans-Canada Enter., Ltd. v. King County, 628 P.2d 493, 497 (Wash. Ct. App. 
1981), review denied, 96 Wash.2d 1002 (1981). 
394. ld 
395. See id. at 497-98. 
396. See id. at 494-95. 
397. ld. at 497. 
398. See Trans-Canada Enter., 628 P.2d at 497-98. 
399. See id. at 496-97. 
400. See id. at 499. 
401. See id. at 496-97. 
402. See id. at 497. 
403. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321,4331-4335,4341-4347 (2000). 
404. See, e.g., Manygoats v. Kleppe, 558 F.2d 556, 559 (10th Cir. 1977). 
405. See 42 U.S.C. § 4321. 
406. See Manygoats, 558 F.2d at 559. 
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Kleppe,407 the Tenth Circuit refused to dismiss an action brought by members of the 
Navajo Tribe seeking an injunction to stop the implementation of an agreement 
between the tribe and Exxon to explore for uranium.408 The court noted that, when 
the United States has obligations under NEPA, "the national interest is not necessarily 
coincidental with the interest of the [t]ribe in the benefits which the Exxon agreement 
provides," and therefore the federal government did not adequately represent the 
absent tribe's interest.409 The court asserted that "[a] holding that the [Environmental 
Impact Statement ("EIS")] is inadequate does not necessarily result in prejudice to the 
Tribe [because t]he only result will be a new EIS for consideration by the 
[S]ecretary.',410 The court also concluded that, though "[t]ribal interests may not 
coincide with national interests ... [n]othing in NEPA ... excepts Indian lands from 
national environmental pOlicy.',411 This case more accuratelr: describes the trust 
relationship between the federal government and the tribes.4 2 Unless the federal 
government is administering property directly on behalf of the tribe, the argument 
that they could otherwise represent the tribes' interest is unconvincing.413 The court 
states, in relation to NEPA, that the tribal interest is not always the national interest.414 
There should be nothing to stop a court from making that holding in most other cases 
where it holds the tribe is not necessary or indispensable because its trustee is a party. 
More recently, in Southwest Center for Biological Diversity v. Babbitt, the Ninth 
Circuit held that the absent tribe was not a necessary party in a NEPA action.415 The 
NEPA action at issue challenged the completion of the Additional Active 
Conservation Capacity ("AACC") behind the Roosevelt Dam, claiming the 
defendants did not adequately take into account the fate of the Southwestern Willow 
Flycatcher.416 The defendants argued that the Salt River Pima-Maricopa Indian 
Community was an indispensable party and asked the court to dismiss the action.417 
The court agreed that the absent tribe was a necessary party because it had a strong 
interest in making the AACC available as soon as possible, however the court did not 
407. ld at 556. 
408. ld. at 557. 
409. ld. at 558 (citing New Mexico v. Aamodt, 537 F.2d 1102, 1106 (lOth Cir. 1976), cert. 
denied, 429 U.S. 1121 (1977». 
410. ld Given the more recent litigation involving tribal projects bogged down due to NEPA 
constraints, this statement is now wildly inaccurate. See, e.g., TOMAC v. Norton, 240 F. Supp. 2d 45, 
50-52 (D.D.C. 2003) (holding that the Bureau of Indian Affairs failed to analyze potential impacts of 
a proposed casino for the Pokagon Band ofPotawatorni Indians). 
411. Manygoats, 558 F.2d at 559. 
412. See id at 557-59. 
413. See id at 559. 
414. ld 
415. 150 F.3d 1152 (9th Cir. 1998). 
416. ld. at 1153. 
417. See id. 
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dismiss the case.418 It held that the United States could adequately represent the 
absent tribe's interests:419 
The district court did not question the ability or willingness of the United States 
to represent the Community adequately in the adjudication of the underlying 
merits of the suit, but the court concluded the government would not represent 
the Community adequately because the government did not support the 
Community's motion to dismiss the suit under Rule 19. The district court's 
approach is circular: a non-party is "necessary" even though its interests are 
adequately represented on the underlying merits by an existing party, simply 
because that existing party has correctly concluded that it is an adequate 
representative of the non-party, and therefore opposes the non-party's 
preliminary motion to dismiss. The district court's approach would preclude the 
United States from opposing frivolous motions to dismiss out of fear that its 
opposition would render it an inadequate representative.420 
The court held that dismissing the case ''would also create a serious risk that non-
parties clothed with sovereign immunity, such as the Community, whose interests in 
the underlying merits are adequately represented could defeat meritorious suits 
simply because the existing parties representing their interest opposed their motion to 
dismisS.'.421 
The Southwest Center court raised two very important issues but decided them 
both poorly. First, the court allowed the federal government to prevent the absent tribe 
from even participating in the suit when the government changed sides against the 
tribe.422 The court went too far when it tried to logically extend the district court's 
holding to include opposition to frivolous motions to dismiss when the absent tribe's 
motion was far from frivolous.423 The court left open the question of what constitutes 
"adequate" representation.424 Does that mean representation that does not violate the 
rules of professional responsibility? It could be a very low standard. The court simply 
ran roughshod over the tribe's sovereign right to defend itself by choosing in which 
forum to litigate. 
Second, the court extended its holding in an effort to create a one-trick parade of 
horribles whereby the tribes can stop what the plaintiffs and the court consider 
"meritorious suits" at any time, simply by showing up at the courthouse with a copy 
418. Seeid.at1154. 
419. See id. (citing Shennoen v. United States, 982 F.2d 1312, 1318 (9th Cir. 1992); Makah 
Indian Tribe v. Verity, 910 F.2d 555,558 (9th Cir. 1990)). 
420. S.w. Ctr. for Biological Diversityv. Babbitt, 150 F.3d 1152,1154 (9th Cir. 1998). 
42l. Id. 
422. See id. at 1153. 
423. See id. at 1154. 
424. See id. at 1153-54. 
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of Rule 19.425 The court could have easily relied upon the national public policy of 
NEPA, as it did in Manygoats.426 Instead, the court relied upon a very tenuous and 
clearly conflicted representation by the federal govemment.427 Here, the case was 
probably decided correctly, but the reasoning was faulty and overly complex. 
Moreover, the court seemed to characterize the tribe as a Grendel-like sovereign 
monster, attempting to uproot federal law and take the federal courthouse away from 
sympathetic plaintiffs. 
The exception to the trend in NEPA cases is Village of Hotvela Traditional 
Elders v. Indian Health Services.428 A group of Hopi elders challenged the installation 
of a sewer line on NEPA grounds because the construction desecrated religious 
shrines, burial sites, ancient ruins, and prayer feathers.429 The court held the Hopi 
Tribe was an indispensable party.430 First, the court concluded the elders' request for 
an injunction would stop only the federal defendants from installing the sewer; the 
tribe could still use non-federal funds to continue the project.431 Second, the tribe 
made a showing that the sewer system was critically important to combat ''the 
increased number of cases of gastroenteritis, shigella, hepatitis and other similar 
diseases attacking the Hopi popUlation within Hotvilla.'.432 Third, the court noted that 
fourteen tribal members employed on the project stood to lose their jobs if the project 
were shut down.433 Finally, and most importantly for the court, the suit infringed on 
the Hopi Tribe's ''right to decide internal matters concerning cultural issues.'.434 
Again, the courts appear to be more likely to dismiss an action on the basis of tribal 
sovereignty when the plaintiffs are tribal members.435 The court couches its language 
in terms of supporting the decisions of the tribal government policymakers-a 
justified rationale--but it remains to be seen if the courts will do so consistently when 
the plaintiffs are not raising claims based on tribal culture and tradition. 
425. See generally S. W. Ctr.for Biological Diversity, 150 F.3d at 1154. 
426. Manygoats v. Kleppe, 558 F.2d 556 (1Oth Cir. 1997). 
427. See generally S. W. Ctr.for Biological Diversity, 150 FJd at 1154. 
428. 1 F. Supp.2d 1022 (D. Ariz. 1997),qff'd, 141 F.3d 1182 (9th Cir. 1998),cen. deniedsub 
nom. Evehema v. Indian Health Servs., 525 U.S. 1107 (1999). 
429. ld. at 1024. 
430. ld. at 1026. 
431. See id. (citing Pit River Home & Agric. Coop. Ass'n v. United States, 30 F.3d 1088, 
1099 (9th Cir. 1994); McClendon v. United States, 885 F.2d 627, 633 (9th Cir. 1989)). 
432. ld. 
433. See ViII. ofHotvela Traditional Elders, 1 F. Supp. 2d at 1026. 
434. ld. 
435. Seeid.atI031. 
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6. Secretarial Trust Acquisitions 
The Indian Reorganization Act grants the Secretary of the Interior discretionary 
authority to acquire land and to hold that land for the benefit of individual Indians and 
Indian tribes in trust 436 Because the land is held by the federal government, it is not 
subject to state taxation or regulation.437 Conflicts arise when the state or local 
government objects to the secretary's decision or authority to take land into trust for 
Indians and Indian tribes.438 In cases where a plaintiff challenges the authority of the 
Secretary of the Interior to take land into trust on behalf of an Indian tribe, the courts 
will not dismiss the claim for failure to join the absent tribe.439 In City of Sault Ste., 
Marie v. Andrns,440 the City of Sault Ste. Marie argued that the secretary's decision to 
take land into trust on behalf of the Sault Ste. Marie Tribe of Chippewa Indians 
amounted to an unconstitutional taking without due process.441 The district court 
noted that the statute under which the secretary could take land into trust for Indian 
tribes, was a manifestation of the govemment-to-government trust relationship 
between the United States and the tribe.442 The federal defendants were adequate to 
defend the absent tribe's interests.443 
Considering the obvious property interest the absent tribe has in having its land 
taken into trust, 444 it is strange for the courts to dismiss the tribal interest so easily. A 
tribe's legal authority, if nothing else, is defined by its land base.445 Since many tribes 
have so few acres of trust and reservation land, each parcel is a critical piece of 
restoring that tribe's sovereignty.446 Arguably the current national and local politics 
regarding placing land into trust make it difficult for tribes to accomplish anything in 
this area. Leaving the tribes out in an area in which the tribes have such a 
monumental stake is disappointing and puzzling. Moreover, given some of the 
statements made by the current Secretary of the Interior,447 it is certain that national 
politics do not always square with the absent tribe's interest448 
436. 25 U.S.c. § 465 (2000); 25 C.F.R pt. 151 (2004). 
437. 25 C.F.R § l.4(a) (2004). 
438. See, e.g., City of Sault Ste. Marie v. Andrus, 458 F. Supp. 465 (D.D.C. 1978). 
439. See id. at 472-73. 
440. Id at 465. 
441. ld. at 467-68. 
442. See id at 473. 
443. See City of Sault Ste. Marie, 458 F. Supp. at 472-73 (citing Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe 
v. United States, 338 F.2d 906,910 (8th Cir.), eert. denied, 382 U.S. 815 (1964); Pan Am. Petroleum 
Corp. v. Udall, 192 F. Supp. 626, 628 (D.D.C. 1961». Two other federal district court decisions have 
followed the same reasoning. Lincoln City v. United States Dep't of Interior, 229 F. Supp. 2d 1109 
(D. Or. 2002); Connecticut ex- rei. Blumenthal v. Babbitt, 899 F. Supp. 80 (D. Conn. 1995). 
444. See generally McCoy, supra note 368. 
445. See id. at 443. 
446. See generally id at 44445. 
447. "While I do not intend to signal an absolute bar on off-reservation gaming, I am 
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B. Indian Land Claims 
In the last thirty years many tribes have begun the slow process of researching 
and preparing claims to their ancestral and treaty lands.449 While the tribes often have 
a strong legal case on the merits, they have to wade through a high barrier of 
procedural problems, such as federal and state sovereign immunity, statutes of 
limitations, laches, and others.450 Significant in this respect is the compulsory joinder 
rule, coupled with the federal or state immunity from suit, because when the federal 
government, acting as trustee of the tribes, brings a suit or participates on behalf of 
the tribe, most of these problems disappear.451 When the United States has an interest 
in real property subject to land claims made by Indian tribes and the government has 
not consented to such claims, courts generally hold that the United States is an 
indispensable party.452 In Spirit Lake Tribe v. North Dakota,453 for example, the tribe 
sued the state for title to the Devils Lake lakebed.454 The United States had a claim to 
the lake bed and was not a party to the case.455 The court dismissed the case, holding 
that ''when the government claims an interest in land that squarely conflicts with the 
interest of a Tribe, the government's presence in litigation is nearly always required to 
assure the proper and effective adjudication of the dispute.''''56 
Only in the last few decades, have courts allowed tribes to bring a land claim suit 
without the participation of the federal govemment.457 In Puyallup Indian Tribe v. 
extremely concerned that the principles underlying the enactment of lORA are being stretched in 
ways Congress never imagined when enacting lORA." Letter from Oale Norton, SecretaIy of the 
Interior, to Cyrus Schindler, President, Seneca Nation of Indians 3 (Nov. 12, 2(02) (on file with 
author). 
448. See, e.g., id. 
449. See generally McCoy, supra note 368. 
450. See generally id. 
451. But see, e.g., Carlson v. Tulalip Tribes, 510 F.2d 1337,1339 (9th Cir. 1975). 
452. See, e.g., Spirit Lake Tribe v. North Dakota, 262 F.3d 732, 746-47 (8th Cir. 2(01) cert 
denied, 535 U.S. 988 (2002). 
453. Id at 732. 
454. Id. at 735-36. 
455. Id. at 736. 
456. Id. at 747 (citing Manypenny v. United States, 948 F.2d 1057, 1061 (8th Cir. 1991); 
Navajo Tribe of Indians v. New Mexico, 809 F.2d 1455, 1473 (10th Cir. 1989». 
457. See Choctaw & Chickasaw Nations v. Seitz, 193 F.2d 456,461 (lOth Cir. 1951), cert. 
denied, 343 U.S. 919 (1952); see also Skokomish Indian Tribe v. France, 269 F.2d 555, 560 (9th Cir. 
1959); Red Lake Band of Chippewas v. City of Baudette, 730 F. Supp. 972, 978 (D. Minn. 1990); 
Mashpee Tribe v. New SeabUI)' Corp., 427 F. Supp. 899, 904 (D. Mass. 1977); Olinger v. City of 
Palm Springs, 425 F. Supp. 174, 176 (C.D. Cal. 1977); Salt River Pima-Maricopa Indian Cmty. v. 
Ariz. Sand & Rock Co., 353 F. Supp. 1098, 1101 (D. Ariz. 1972). Cf Antoine v. United States, 637 
F.2d 1177, 1181 (8th Cir. 1981) ("In our view, detennining whether an Indian should have received a 
patent for an allotment of land under [25 U.S.c. §] 345 requires the presence of no party other than 
the United States."). 
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Port ofTacoma,458 the tribe sued to quiet title to the fonner riverbed of the Puyallup 
River.459 The Port of Tacoma argued that the state of Washington was a necessary 
party because it had received title to all navigable streams when it entered the Union 
and may have had superior title.460 The court disagreed, however, holding that an 
action for ejectment would affect the state's rights if it brought a subsequent action 
against the tribe.46I 
The absence of the federal government on the side of the tribe creates procedural 
problems for the tribe, even when the federal government has no direct stake in the 
land claim. In a trio of cases decided months from each other in 1987,462 the three 
circuits with jurisdiction over the vast majority of Indian country held that even when 
the United States does not claim a competing interest in the land at issue, Indian land 
claims should nevertheless be dismissed under Rille 19 because the actions of the 
United States may be implicated.463 The Eighth Circuit, in Nichols v. RYSavy,464 held 
that Indian land claims must be dismissed even when the United States does not 
claim an interest in whether the merits of the case "would depend entirely on whether 
the United States acted legally or illegally in granting fee patents under the blood 
quantum policy.,,465 The court noted two other interests the United States had in the 
outcome of the case: first, future liability for claims made by the present owners; and 
second, the "resumption of fiduciary responsibility" over the land if the tribe 
prevailed in showing that the land never went out of trust.466 Similarly, in Lee v. 
United States,467 the Ninth Circuit dismissed a claim brought by non-Indians against 
Alaskan native corporations, alleging the United States never delivered proper land 
patents to the Alaskan natives because the United States was absent.468 And in Navajo 
Tribe of Indians v. State of New Mexico,469 the Tenth Circuit dismissed Indian land 
claims where the claims depended on proving the acts of the absent federal 
defendants were null and void.470 The court relied heavily on the maxim: "It is a 
458. 717 F.2d 1251 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1049, reh 'g denied, 466 U.S. 954 
(1984). 
459. Id. at 1253. 
460. !d. at 1254. 
461. See id. at 1256. 
462. Navajo Tribe of Indians v. New Mexico, 809 F.2d 1455 (10th Cir. 1987); Nichols v. 
Rysavy, 809 F.2d 1317 (8th Cir. 1987); Lee v. United States, 809 F.2d 1406 (9th Cir. 1987). 
463. See, e.g., Navajo Tribe of Indians, 805 F.2dat 1472-73. 
464. 809 F.2d 1317 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 848 (l987). 
465. Id. at 1333. 
466. Id. 
467. 809 F.2d 1406 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied sub nom. Lee v. Eklutna, Inc., 484 U.S. 1041 
(1988). 
468. See id. at 1410-11. 
469. 809 F.2d 1455 (lOth Cir. 1987). 
470. Seeid.atI471-73. 
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fundamental principle of the law that an instrument may not be cancelled by a [c ]ourt 
unless the parties to the instrument are before the [c ]ourt.'.4 71 Individual Indians 
bringing land claims may suffer the same fate.472 
The Seventh Circuit criticized the trio of cases in Sokaogon Chippewa 
Community v. WlSconsin.473 The tribe brought suit to recover a twelve square mile 
parcel of land that included state and federal lands, as well as private landowners.474 
The court extended the earlier trio of cases' logic and argued: 
To exaggerate slightly (because the U.S. appears to be in occupation of some of 
the land, although the extent of that occupation is entirely unclear on the skimpy 
record of this case), it is as if every time someone claimed that someone else was 
encroaching on his property he would have to sue not only the alleged 
encroacher (here Exxon) but also the alleged encroacher's predecessors in title 
right back to King James or Lord Baltimore (here the U.S.). So far as can be 
determined from an utterly inadequate record, the relationship of the U.S. to the 
Indians' controversy with Exxon and the other occupiers of the land in 
derogation of the Indians' alleged occupancy right is that of a predecessor in title 
(to Exxon), no more.475 
Interestingly, the court further noted that its examination of Rule 19 would be 
"analyzed in relation to Indian claims.'.476 The court reversed the lower court's 
decision finding that the case should be dismissed because of the absence of the 
United States, holding: 
We understand the anxieties of the American Land Title Association (which 
has filed a brief amicus curiae in support of the defendants) about a suit that 
could unsettle titles throughout a large tract of land. But on the other hand many 
legal wrongs were done to the Indians, and the Supreme Court recently held that 
an Indian tribe could bring a suit to recover land conveyed to the [s]tate of New 
Yi k 1m . 477 or a ost two centunes ago. 
Judge Posner's opinion takes the necessary case-by-case analysis to heart and rejects 
the summary analysis of the compulsory joinder rule employed by the lower COurt.478 
471. Id. at 1472 (quoting Tewa Tesuque v. Morton, 360 F. Supp. 452, 452 (D.N.M. 1973), 
aff'd, 498 F.2d240 (lOth Cir. 1974)). 
472. See Manypenny v. United States, 125 FRD. 497, 50()"'{)3 (D. Minn. 1989). 
473. 879 F.2d 300, 304-05 (7th Cir. 1989). 
474. Id.at301. 
475. Id.at304. 
476. Id. at 303 (citing Wichita & Affiliated Tribes v. Hodel, 788 F.2d 765, 774-78 (D.c. Cir. 
1986)). 
477. Id. at 305 (citing County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation, 470 U.S. 226 (1985)). 
478. See Sokaogon Chippewa Cmty., 879 F.2d at 304-05. 
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The continued validity of the trio of cases decided in 1987 has been undennined 
by more recent cases. In fJYandotte Nation v. City of Kansas City,479 the tribe brought 
a land claim against the city.48o The court found that ''there is a long-standing policy 
in favor of federal adjudication of suits brought by Indians if federal jurisdiction is 
available. ,.48\ The state of Kansas moved for dismissal, arguing that the state was an 
indispensable party.482 The court agreed that Kansas was a necessary party with 
significant interests in the outcome,483 but held that the presence of other defendants 
"lessened" that prejudice.484 Because the "lack of an alternative forum for plaintiff 
weighs against dismissal," the court declined to dismiss on the basis that the state was 
absent and indispensable.485 The landowner defendant argued that the United States 
was an indispensable party.486 As in Nichols, the court noted, "Should the tribe 
prevail, the court would order that the land be restored to Indian trust status. The court 
would therefore require the federal government to hold the land in trust for the 
tribe.'.487 However, the United States had agreed to a voluntary dismissal with 
prejudice of all claims and the court held that the federal government would suffer no 
prejudice, so long as the case proceeded without its presence.488 The court refused to 
hold that the United States was a necessary and indispensable party.489 In Red Lake 
Band of Chippewas v. City of Baudette, Minnesota,490 the tribe brought suit against 
the state and others to quiet title to a parcel of land between forty and sixty acres in 
Size.49 \ Though the court found that a judgment in favor of the tribe would have 
"practical consequences for the United States,'.492 the court refused to dismiss the 
action, distinguishing Nichols on the basis that the case would not threaten to cloud 
479. 200 F. Supp. 2d 1279 (D. Kan. 2(02). 
480. ld. at 1282. 
481. Id. at 1293 (citing Arizona v. San Carlos Apache Tribe, 463 U.S. 545, 561 n.lO (1983)). 
482. ld. at 1289. 
483. ld at 1292 ("[T]he court has recognized that Kansas has asserted taxation, regulatOly, 
and jurisdictional interests in the lands which currently are not held in trust for the tribe.''). 
484. Wyandotte Nation, 200 F. Supp. 2d at 1292. ("Although there is not a precise alignment 
of interests between the defendant landowners and Kansas, the court finds that the potential prejudice 
to the state is lessened by the fact that the defendant landowners seek the same outcome, if for 
different reasons.") (citing Sac & Fox Nation v. Norton, 240 F.3d 1250, 1259 (10th eir. 2001), cert. 
denied sub nom. Wyandotte Nation v. Sac & Fox Nation, 534 U.S. 1078 (2002)). 
485. ld. at 1293. 
486. ld. at 1294. 
487. ld. 
488. See id. at 1295-96. 
489. Wyandotte Nation, 200 F. Supp. 2d at 1296. 
490. 730 F. Supp. 972 (D. Minn. 1990). 
491. Id. at 974. 
492. ld. at 980. 
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title to millions of acres of land.493 Few, if any Indian Ian.} claims may be accurately 
characterized as threatening to cloud title to thousands or millions of acres of land.494 
Tribes that bring claims must research each parcel back to the time it was frrst 
alienated and the causes of that first alienation are rarely uniform.495 
Claims to land held by the federal government in trust for tribes are subject to 
dismissa1.496 When individuals attempt to sue an Indian tribe to settle boundaries or 
quiet title, the United States is an indispensable party.497 In Carlson v. Tulalip 
Tribes,498 property owners neighboring the tribe sued to quiet title to waterfront lands 
controlled by the tribe, but legally owned by the United States.499 The court noted that 
the ''United States is a necessary party to any action which the relief sought might 
interfere with its obligation to protect Indian lands against alienation. ,.500 If two or 
more tribes claim the same parcel of land in land claims litigation, the case cannot 
proceed without all the tribes present.50l In Oneida Tribe of Indians v. AGB 
Properties, Inc.,502 the tribe brought a land claim against private landowners.503 The 
tribe and two absent tribes, the Oneida Nation of New York and the Oneida of the 
Thames, had the same claim to the same parcels of land.504 The court found the two 
absent tribes would be prejudiced if the suit proceeded because "[i]f the Tribe were to 
prevail and obtain possession of the land and/or monetary damages, the Absent 
Parties' ability to pursue the same remedies based on their claims to the land would 
be impaired.'.505 Moreover, the court found that the defendant landowners would be 
prejudiced because they "could be liable to all three successor tribes for separate 
damages on the same piece of land.'.506 The district court dismissed the suit.507 
Similarly, in Bay Mills Indian Community v. Western United Life Assurance CO.,50S 
493. See id. ("The claim in this case is restricted to a single parcel between forty and sixty 
acres in size. "). 
494. See, e.g., id 
495. See, e.g., Oneida Indian Nation v. County of Oneida, 434 F. Supp. 527, 537-38 
(N.D.N.Y. 1977). 
496. See, e.g., Carlson v. Tulalip Tribes, 510 F.2d 1337, 1339 (9th Cir. 1975). 
497. Seeid 
498. Id at 1337. 
499. Id. at 1138-39. 
500. Id. at 1339 (citing Jackson v. Sims, 201 F.2d 259, 262 (lOth Cir. 1953». 
501. See, e.g., Oneida Tribe of Indians v. AGB Props., Inc., Nos. 02-CV-233LEKDRH, 02-
C"~233,02~"~235,02-CV~236,02~"~237,02-CV~235,02-CV~236,02-CV~237,02-CV-
0238, 02-CV~239, 02~"~240, 02-CV~241, 2002 WL31OO5165, at *3 (N.D.N.Y. Sept 5,2002). 
502. Id at *1. 
503. Id. 
504. /d. at *3. 
505. /d. 
506. Oneida Tribe a/Indians, 2002 WL 31005165, at *4. 
507. See id at *5. 
508. No. 99-1036, 2000 WL282455, at *1 (6th Cir. Mar. 8, 2000). 
HeinOnline -- 40 Gonz. L. Rev. 50 2004-2005
50 GONZAGA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 40:1 
the Bay Mills Tribe sought title to a parcel called "Charlotte Beach," a parcel that the 
Sault Ste. Marie Tribe of Chippewa Indians also claimed.509 The court dismissed the 
action on the grounds that the Sault Tribe was indispensable, noting that the Bay 
Mills Tribe had an alternative forum510 in its concurrent case against the state of 
Michigan in the Michigan Court of Claims. 51 I 
C. Government Operations and Trust Relationship 
Cases challenging the government opemtions of Indian tribes sometimes tread 
into areas fedeml courts usually fear to tread: intrarnuml tribal disputes.512 These are 
often political disputes in which a dissenting tribal political group takes a tribal matter 
to fedeml court for relief.513 The tribes have their strongest interest in their own 
opemtions and sovereignty, and many of the cases reflect that interest.514 Again, it 
must be noted that these cases are often brought by tribal members, a group the courts 
have not favored in the compulsory joinder analysis.515 
1. Governance 
The most important compulsory joinder case involving tribes in the area of tribal 
government opemtions is Dawavendewa v. Salt River Project Agricultural 
Improvement and Power District.516 Harold Dawavendewa was a Hopi Indian 
looking for work on the Navajo Reservation, seeking a job with the Salt River Project 
("SRP,,).517 The Navajo Nation required the project to employ a tribal hiring 
preference policy, and Dawavendewa was never interviewed.518 The Ninth Circuit 
held in 1998 that the hiring preference policy violated Title VII and then remanded 
509. Id 
510. See id. 
511. See Bay Mills Indian Cmty. v. State, 626 N.W.2d 169 (Mich. Ct. App. 2001). 
512. See B.J. Jones, Welcoming Tribal Courts Into the Judicial Fraternity: Emerging Issues in 
Tribal-State and Tribal-Federal Court Relations, 24 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 457, 492 (1998). 
513. See, e.g., John C. Miller & Christopher P. Guzelian, A Spectrum Revolution: Deploying 
Ultrawideband Technology on Native American Lands, II COMMLAW CONSPEcnJS 227, 291 (2003) 
(discussing intramural tribal disputes in the context of federal regulation of tribal telecommunication 
services). 
514. See generalry David B. Wiles, Taxation: Tribal Taxation, Secretarial Approval, and State 
Taxation--Merrion and Beyond, 10 AM. INDIAN L. REv. 167, 183 (1983) (demonstrating that Indian 
tribes inherent interest is also strongest in the context of revenues for essential governmental 
programs). 
515. See, e.g.. ViII. of Hotvela Traditional Elders v. Indian Health Servs., IF. Supp. 2d 1022 
(D. Ariz. 1997). 
516. 276 F.3d 1150 (9th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 820 (2002). 
517. See id. at 1153. 
518. See id. at 1153-54. 
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the case.519 On remand, the project moved to dismiss the case for failure to join the 
Navajo Nation and the Ninth Circuit granted the motion.520 The court first found the 
Navajo Nation was a necessary party because the project was required under the 
terms of its lease to adopt the hiring preference.521 The court believed the project 
subject to multiple and inconsistent obligations, stating, "The district court correctly 
observed that 'if SRP were to ignore [the] injunction, [Dawavendewa] and others like 
him would not receive the employment they seek,' whereas '[i]fSRP were to comply 
with the injunction, the Navajo Nation would be likely to take action against SRP 
under its lease. ",522 The court found the absent tribe would be prejudiced in the 
litigation, which ''threatens to impair the [n]ation's contractual interests, and thus, its 
fundamental economic relationship with SRP. The [n]ation strenuously emphasizes 
the importance of the hiring preference policy to its economic well_being.,,523 The 
court fOlll1d that "a judgement rendered in the [n]ation[']s absence will impair its 
sovereign capacity to negotiate contracts and, in general, to govern the Navajo 
reservation.,,s24 The court noted the same factors in determining whether the Navajo 
Nation was an indispensable party and found that they were in equipoise.525 The 
court noted, however, that the Ninth Circuit determined that plaintiffs in prior cases 
had been denied a forum for airing their grievances, but nevertheless had their claims 
dismissed under the compulsory joinder rule on several occasions.526 
Dawavendewa intersects another area of federal Indian law currently under 
attack: the political status of Indians and Indian tribes.527 The plaintiff was very 
519. See id. at 1154 (citing Dawavendewa v. Salt River Project Agric. Improvement & Power 
Dist., 154 F.3d Ill7, 1120 (9th Cir. 1998), cerl. denied, 528 U.S. 1098 (2000)). 
520. ld at ll63. 
521. See Dawavendewa, 276 F.3d at 1156 (citing Pit River Home & Agric. Coop. Ass'n v. 
United States, 30 F.3d 1088, 1092-99 (9th Cir. 1994)). 
522. ld at ll55. 
523. ld. at ll57; see also Kescoli v. Babbitt, 101 F.3d 1304, 1310 (9th Cir. 1996); 
Lomayaktewa v. Hathaway, 520 F.2d 1324, 1326 (9th Cir. 1975). 
524. Dawavendewa, 276F.3dat ll57;seealsoKescoli, 101 F.3dat 1310. 
525. Dawavendewa, 276 F.3d at ll63. 
526. See id. at 1162 (citing Lomayaktewa, 520 F.2d at 1327; Confederated Tribes of the 
Chehalis Reservation v. Lujan, 928 F.2d 1496, 1498 (9th Cir. 1991); Shermoen v. United States, 982 
F.2d 1312, 1320-21 (9th Cir. 1992); Pit River Home, 30 F.3d at 1102; Quileute Indian Tribe v. 
Babbitt, 18 F.3d 1456, 1460-61 (9th Cir. 1994); Kescoli, 101 F.3d at 13ll; Clinton v. Babbitt, 180 
F.3d 1081, 1090 (9th Cir. 1999)). 
527. See generally Williams v. Babbitt, ll5 F.3d 657 (9th Cir. 1997) (arguing in dicta that 
recent Supreme Court cases undermine Indian preference), cerl. denied sub nom. Kawerak Reindeer 
Herders Ass'n v. Williams, 523 U.S. 1117 (1998). But see United States Air Tour Ass'n v. FAA, 298 
FJd 997, 1012 n.8 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (noting that the Court would not overrule Indian preference until 
the Supreme Court expressly does so) (citing Narragansett Indian Tribe v. Nat'\ Indian Gaming 
Comm'n, 158 F.3d 1335, 1340 (D.c. Cir. 1998), cerl. denied sub nom. AirStar Helicopters, Inc. v. 
FAA, 538 U.S. 977 (2003)). 
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sympathetic on one hand, but had a very poor factual situation on the other.528 He 
challenged an employment preference that might have been unconstitutional but for 
the fact that Congress and the courts have determined that Indians are not treated 
differently based on their race, but because of their political status as citizens and 
members of the third sovereign.529 The court largely ruled in favor of the plaintiff on 
the merits, but could not shape the relief to avoid conflicting obligations for the 
relatively "innocent" Salt River Project, which chose not to adO})t the allegedly 
discriminatory policy, but was forced into it by the Navajo Nation.53o It should be 
noted that the first Ninth Circuit decision placed this adjudication in the context of the 
so-called land dispute between the Hopi Tribe and the Navajo Nation,531 a dispute 
largely created and exaggerated by state and federal officials and private actors.532 
What this case is really about is the fact that the plaintiff tested ninth out of twenty 
applicants.533 It is unlikely he could have proven that he would have been hired but 
for the allegedly discriminatory employment practice.534 Since the case never 
proceeded on the merits, it is impossible to know for sure. 
Occasionally, a separate and unique tribal group located on another tribe's land 
may attempt to assert its own jurisdiction or avoid the recognized tribe's jurisdiction. 
In United Keetoowah Band of Cherokee Indians v. Mankiller,535 the Tenth Circuit 
dismissed an action against individual officers and agents of the Cherokee Tribe for 
failure to join the Cherokee Nation.536 The absent tribe had seized unstamped tobacco 
products from the plaintiffs' homes.537 Since the Cherokee Nation was the only 
federally recognized tribe with jurisdiction over the individual Indians, the absent 
tribe was a necessary party.538 The court dismissed the case, holding, "Since the relief 
requested by the Plaintiff herein directly affects the sovereignty and fundamental 
jurisdiction of the Cherokee Nation, the court concludes the Cherokee Nation's 
interests are substantial and the case cannot be completely and efficiently resolved 
without the presence of the Cherokee Nation.,,s39 This case involves the intersection 
528. See generally Dawavendewa, 276 F.3d at 1156. 
529. See Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 553-54 (1974). 
530. See generally Dawavendewa, 276 FJd at 1157-62. 
531. See Dawavendewa v. Salt River Project Agric. hnprovement & Power Dist., 154 F.3d 
1117, 1118 n.3 (9th Cir. 1998) (citing Hopi Tribe v. Navajo Tnbe, 46 F.3d 908 (9th Cir. 1995); 
Masayesva v. Hale, 118 F.3d 1371 (9th Cir. 1997)). 
532. See Peter C. Astor, Greed, Goons and Genocide: The Essays of Ward Churchill, 21 AM. 
INDIAN L. REv. 425, 425-27 (1997). 
533. See Dawavendewa, 276 F.3d at 1153-54. 
534. See generally id at 1163. 
535. No. 93-5064, 1993 WL 307937 (10th Cir. Aug. 12, 1993). 
536. ld. at *5-6. 
537. ld at *3. 
538. ld. at *4. 
539. Jd. at *5. 
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of several unstated interests. First, the plaintiff unsuccessfully attempted to achieve 
federal recognition for several years and separate themselves from the Cherokee 
Nation.54o Second, the plaintiff brought an internal dispute to the federal COurts.54 ! 
Both factors appear to have made it easier for the court to dismiss the action. The 
plaintiff tried to avoid the immunity problem by suing the individual tribal officers 
directly.542 The court would have better decided the case on the basis of whether the 
defendants had the authority to act, deciding whether to dismiss using the Ex parte 
Young analysis.543 
One of the main purposes of the doctrine of sovereign immunity is to preserve 
the limited finances of tribal govemments.544 This underlying policy, as well as the 
due process policy of not imposing financing obligations on absent parties without 
their participation, has importance in this context.545 In Guthrie v. Circle of Lije,546 
the court dismissed an action brought by parents of a disabled child for attorney fees 
against a school located on tribal trust land and operated by the White Earth Band of 
Chippewa Indians.547 Since the fees would be paid out of fimds controlled by the 
White Earth Business Committee, the absent tribe had an interest in ensuring that the 
judgment was satisfied548 and "the tribal fisc would be compromised without the tribe 
having the opportunity to protect its interests.,,549 By contrast, the court in Bitsilly v. 
Bureau of Indian Affairs,55o relied on the fact that the Tenth Circuit, and other courts, 
had held that the Individuals with Disabilities Act allowed the parents to sue 
jurisdictional educational agencies in lieu of suing the schools.551 The court did not 
dismiss the case for failure to join the tribally operated schools, distinguishing 
540. See United Keetowah Band o/Cherokee Indians, 1993 WL 307937, at *4 (noting that 
intervening plaintiff's assertion that "they are members of the UKB, not the Cherokee tribe"). 
541. See id at *3. 
542. Cf id at *5 (noting that "[a] forthright analysis of Plaintiff's complaint compels the 
conclusion that the action is against the Cherokee Nation itselfbecause the individual ... Defendants 
were acting within their official capacities."). 
543. See generally 209 U.S. 123 (1908). 
544. See Johnson v. Navajo Nation, 14 Indian L. Rptr. 6037, 6040 (Navajo Nation Sup. Ct. 
1987) ("[T]he funds of the Navajo Nation are not unlimited. Each year the funds maintained by the 
Navajo Nation for the operation of the Navajo tribal government are exceeded by the people's 
demand for more governmental services."). 
545. Cf id. at 6040 (noting that "[t]he Navajo people are entitled to a representative and 
accountable Navajo tribal government. For this reason, important decisions having direct 
consequences on the Navajo tribal treasury should be made by the elected representatives of the 
Navajo people."). 
546. 176 F. Supp. 2d 919 (D. Minn. 2001). 
547. Id. at 921. 
548. Id. at 923. 
549. Id. 
550. 253 F. Supp. 2d 1257 (D.N.M. 2003). 
551. Id. at 1271 (citing Beard v. Teska, 31 F.3d 942, 953-54 (10th Cir. 1994)). 
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Guthrie on the grounds that the schools in Bitsilly would not be subject to a judgment 
against the BIA.552 
Claims arising out of utility contracts in which the absent tribe has exclusive 
regulatory jurisdiction will likely be dismissed.553 In Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. 
v. Tonawanda Band of Seneca Indians,554 the district court dismissed an action by a 
utility against an Indian tribe.555 The utility argued that a counterclaim brought 
against the utility for failure to provide electrical service should be decided in the 
tribe's absence.556 The court found that the absent tribe was a necessary party because 
"[t]he interest of the Tonawanda Band which is at the center of this dispute is its 
claimed right under the agreement to prior approval of Niagara Mohawk's provision 
of electrical power to [r]eservation residents.,,557 As such, 
the very issue precipitating this action-i.e., whether the franchise agreement 
requires the tribe's approval prior to Niagara Mohawk's provision of electrical 
service to a user on the [r]eservation---could be decided adversely to the tribe 
without its ever having had the opportunity to protect its interest as a party to the 
agreement. 558 
The court relied on the Second Circuit precedent, and ruled that "[i]n light of the 
'paramount importance' of sovereign immunity, and in light of the ... potential 
prejudice to the tribe's interests as a party to the franchise agreement if this action 
proceeds in its absence ... [the case should be dismissed] pursuant to Rule 19 for 
failure to join an indespensable party.,,559 This case has a very complicated procedural 
history and is an example of how a sovereign might become involved in a lawsuit as 
a plaintiff, but is not amenable to counterclaims due to its sovereign immunity.56o The 
Second Circuit reaffirmed its strong rulings in favor of tribal sovereign immunity.561 
Underlying this case is the fact that the dispute, in most part, was an intemal tribal 
matter that, unfortunately, involved the utility company as well.562 The court would, 
correctly, defer to tribal political and judicial processes for resolution of the dispute. 
552. See id. at 1271-72. 
553. See generally Niagara Mohawk Power COIp. v. Tonawanda Band of Seneca Indians, 
826 F. Supp. 995,1001-02 (W.D.N.Y. 1994). 
554. ld. 
555. See id. at 1004. 
556. See id. at 999. 
557. ld. at 1003. 
558. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., 826 F. Supp. at 1004. 
559. ld. (quoting Fluent v. Salamanca Indian Lease Auth., 928 F.2d 542, 548 (2nd Cir. 1991). 
560. See generally id. at 998-1004. 
561. See id. at 1001-03. 
562. See id. at 998-99. 
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Courts will also dismiss suits against banks that hold an Indian tribe's money for 
failure to join the tribe.563 In Round Valley Nation v. Caiijornia,564 the Round Valley 
Nation sued the banks, the state, and the Secretary of the Interior, asking the court to 
freeze the accounts of the federal recognized Round Valley Indian Tribes and declare 
the Round Valley Nation the legitimate representative of the Round Valley Indian 
Tribes.565 First, the court found that the attack on the accounts held by the absent tribe 
would impair its interests.566 The court held that the prejudice to the tribe's "ability 
and power to govern" and the absent tribe's immunity favored dismissal.567 The 
strategy of going after tribal funds without the tribe's participation ensures a 
dismissal. 568 This appears in tribal power struggles, such as the Meskwai Casino 
litigation.569 
Dismissal appears likely in inter-tribal conflicts when tribes compete for limited 
federal dollars.570 In Citizen Potawatomi Nation v. Norton,571 the tribe brought suit 
against the Secretary of the Interior, challengin~ her methods for calculating federal 
funding to the plaintiff and four absent tribes.57 Because the absent tribes would be 
affected by an outcome favoring the plaintiff, the Tenth Circuit found the absent tribes 
to be necessary parties.573 Because one tribe would gain over the absent four, the 
United States could not adequately represent the absent tribes' ''varied and potentially 
conflicting interests.',574 The court dismissed the action, in large part relying on ''the 
'strong policy favoring dismissal when a court cannot join a tribe because of 
sovereign immunity. ",575 This case highlights the one clear situation where the courts 
will not allow the federal government to represent the interests of absent tribes, that is 
h th . di b 'b 576 W en ere IS a spute etween tn es. 
563. See generally Round Valley Nation v. California, No. COO-3329 SC, 2000 WL 1810211 
(N.D. Cal. Dec. 8, 2000). 
564. Id 
565. Id. at *1. 
566. Id. at *3 (citing Confederated Tribes of the Chehalis Reservation v. Lujan, 928 F.2d 
1496, 1499 (9th Cir. 1991); Quileute Indian Tribe v. Babbitt, 18 F.3d 1456, 1459 (9th Cir. 1994». 
567. See id at *4. 
568. Cf. Round Valley Nation, 2000 WL 1810211, at *4. 
569. See In re Sac & Fox Tribe, 340 F.3d 749, 752 (8th Cir. 2003). 
570. See generally Citizen Potawatomi Nation v. Norton, 248 F.3d 993 (10th Cir. 2001). 
571. Id 
572. Id. at 995. 
573. Id. at 998-99. 
574. Id. at 999 (citing Cherokee Nation v. Babbitt, 117 F.3d 1489, 1497 (D.c. Cir. 1997); 
Makah Indian Tribe v. Verity, 910 F.2d 555, 560 (9th Cir. 1990». 
575. Citizen Potawatomi Nation, 248 F.3d at 1001 (quoting Davis v. United States, 192 F.3d 
951,960 (lOth Cir. 1999». 
576. Seeid at 999. 
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Suits challenging the jurisdiction of a tribe's court, however, may proceed 
without joining the absent tribe.577 In Yellowstone County v. Pease,578 the Ninth 
Circuit detennined that a Crow Tribal Court did not have jurisdiction over an action 
challenging a county's right to impose property taxes on reservation land held in fee 
by a tribal member.579 The tribal member argued that the Crow Tribe and the Crow 
Tribal Court were indispensable parties, but the court rejected the argument.580 The 
court turned down the plaintiff's contention for two reasons: first, the question was a 
federal question, justiciable in federal COurts;581 and second, tribal courts and judges 
are expected to follow applicable federal court precedent.582 The court held that, 
unlike cases in which the tribe's right to tax was at issue or the tribe is a party to an 
agreement, lease, or treaty, here the tribe and its court are not indispensable.583 This 
case is poor precedent for Indian tribes. First, the plaintiff was a tribal member trying 
to bring a claim that the local government had no jurisdiction over him; a case he 
rightfully tried to bring in his tribe's COurt.584 The Montana,585 Strate,586 and Hicks587 
line of cases have effectively foreclosed tribal court jurisdiction over non-members in 
most cases.588 Second, the plaintiff may have had a good claim against the local 
government.589 The tribe has an interest in whether their members on the reservation 
must pay property tax to local governments.590 Because the tribal court jurisdiction 
issue took over the litigation, however, the case proceeded without the tribe.591 
Courts generally do not dismiss tort claims under the compulsory joinder rule 
when the defendants are jointly and severally liable.592 Like casino-related tort cases, 
577. See generally Yellowstone County v. Pease, 96 F.3d 1169 (9th Cir. 1996). 
578. Id 
579. See id. at 1176-77. 
580. !d. at 1172. 
581. Id 
582. Yellowstone County, 96 F.3d at 1173. 
583. Id 
584. See generally id at 1170-71. 
585. Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981). 
586. Strate v. A-I Contractors, 520 U.S. 438 (1997). 
587. Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353 (2001). 
588. See generally Kimberly Radennacher, Constitutional Law-Indian Law: The Ongoing 
Divestiture by the Supreme Court of Tribal Jurisdiction over Non-Members, On and Off the 
Reservation, Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353 (2001), 78 N.D. L. REv. 125 (2002); Thomas P. 
Schlosser, Tribal Civil Jurisdiction over Nonmembers, 37 TuLsAL. REv. 573 (2001). 
589. See generally Oneida Indian Nation v. City of Sherrill, 337 FJd 139, 150-53 (2nd Cir. 
2003) (holding that where a tribe purchased land within its reservation and Congress never changed 
the status of the land--that is, where Congress never authorized the alienation of the reservation 
land--that land is not taxable by the state), rev'd, 2005 WL 70 I 058 (March 29, 2005). 
590. But see Yellowstone County v. Pease, 96 F.3d 1169, 1173 (9th Cir. 1996). 
591. See generally id at 1173-76. 
592. See generally Bassett v. Mashantucket Pequot Tribe, 204 F.3d 343, 358 (2nd Cir. 2000). 
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tort claims against a tribe or an instrument of a tribe and other defendants are not 
likely to be dismissed on the basis that the immune and absent tribe is 
indispensable.593 In Bassett v. Mashantucket Pequot Tribe,594 the Second Circuit 
refused to dismiss a tort claim and copyright infringement case against the 
Mashantucket Pequot Tribe, its museum, and its agents.595 Because copyright 
infringers are jointly and severally liable, dismissal of the suit would prevent the 
plaintiff from going after the other defendants or preventing further infringement.596 
The same was true for the tort claim.597 Because of the nature of the torts alleged, the 
court did not find the tribe indispensable.598 
2. Federal Recognition 
The courts will dismiss actions that challenge the federal government's 
recognition of a tribe in the absence of the recognized tribe.599 Federal recognition 
creates and vests property and liberty interests in a particular groUp.600 An outside, or 
even inside, attempt to redistribute those interests is a model dispute ripe for dismissal 
under the compulsory tinder rule.601 In Confederated Tribes of the Chehalis Indian 
Reservation v. Lujan, 02 the tribes sued the Secretary of the Interior because he 
recognized the Quinault Indian Nation as the sole governing body of the Quinault 
Indian Reservation.603 The Ninth Circuit determined the absent Quinault Indian 
Nation was a necessary party for several reasons.604 First, a decision against the 
secretary would not bind the absent tribe, which could be expected to continue to 
assert "sovereign powers and management responsibilities over the reservation.'.605 
Second, the tribes sought a declaration that the Quinault Indian Nation was not the 
exclusive governing body in the Quinault Indian Reservation, a direct threat to the 
593. Id. at 360. 
594. Id. at 343. 
595. Id.at360. 
596. Id. 
597. Bassett, 204 F.3d at 360. 
598. See id. 
599. See generally Confederated Tribes of the Chehalis Indian Reservation v. Lujan, 928 F.2d 
1496(9thCir.199l). 
600. See id. at 1498-99. 
601. See generally The Distorted Adversarial Posture of Title VII Affirmative Action 
Challenges, 128 U. PA. L. REv. 1543, 1560-62 (l980) (discussing the relationship between 
compulsory joinder and due process rights). 
602. 928 F.2d 1496 (9th Cir. 1991). 
603. Id. at 1497. 
604. Id. at 1498-99. 
60S. Id. at 1498. 
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absent tribe's interests.606 The court found the absent tribe was an indispensable party, 
even though there was a lack of an alternative forum for the plaintiff to air its 
grievance, holding that "a plaintiff's interest in litigating a claim may be outweighed 
by a tribe's interest in maintaining its sovereign immunity.',607 The court could have 
noted the plaintiffs either participated or could have participated in the federal 
recognition process completed by the federal agency. While there may not have been 
an alternative prospective forum, there was certainly an alternative forum, provided 
the plaintiffs could have entered.608 
The Tenth Circuit recently reiterated the same rule in the Seminole Nation's 
continuing dispute with bands of the nation, whose tribal members are descendants of 
escaped slaves.609 This decision eviscerated dicta created by an earlier panel of the 
same court in the same case.610 In Davis v. United States,611 the Dosar Barkus and the 
Burner Bands sued the federal government for allowing the Seminole Tribe to 
exclude them from participation in some tribal assistance programs funded by federal 
dollars and from a judgment fund established by a lands claims suit.612 They also 
sued for refusing to certify their degree of Indian blood.613 The court dismissed the 
judgment fund claim, ruling that the absent tribe was indispensable.614 The court held 
first that the absent tribe would most certainly react swiftly with a suit of its own if 
the instant case went against their interests.615 Second, the court found the absent 
tribe's interest in its sovereign immunity outweighed the less weighty interest of the 
plaintiff in having a forum.616 Finally, the court considered other equitable factors 
raised by the plaintiff,617 but rejected them as mere restatements of other 
606. Id. 
607. Confederated Tribes of the Chehalis Reservation, 928 F.2d at 1500 (citing Enter. Mgmt. 
Consultants, Inc. v. United States ex rei. Hode~ 883 F.2d 890, 894 (lOth Cir. 1989) (quoting Wichita 
and Affiliated Tribes v. Hodel, 788 F.2d 765, 777 (D.c. Cir. 1986))). 
608. See generally id. 
609. See generally Davis v. United States, 343 F.3d 1282 (lOth Cir. 2003). 
610. See id. at 1285-86. 
611. Id at 1282. 
612. Id. at 1285. 
613. Id. 
614. See Davis, 343 F.3d at 1288-94. 
615. Id. at 1292 ("Plaintiffs themselves recognize the substantial likelihood of subsequent 
litigation when they state (while addressing another issue): '[T]he Tribe reacts swiftly when the BIA 
cuts off federal funding .... The notion that [the] Tribe will not react to losing access to the $56 
million Judgment Fund is absurd"') (quoting Appellant's Opening Brief at 26, Davis v. United 
States, 343 F.3d 1282 (lOth Cir. 2003) (No. 02-6198)). 
616. Id at 1293-94 ("What it means is that the plaintiff's inability to obtain relief in an 
alternative forum is not as weighty a factor when the source of that inability is a public policy that 
inununizes the absent party from suit."). 
617. See id. at 1294 (citing Wichita and Affiliated Tribes v. Hode~ 788 F.2d 765, 774 (D.C. 
Cir. 1986); 7 WRIGHfET AL., supra note 35, at 91). 
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618 In . I ed d .. I . d D . T r. . d C1 619 arguments. a prevIOus re at eCISlon, a so capbone avIS V. vnlte .:Jtates, 
the Tenth Circuit refused to hold that the absent tribe was an indispensable party 
where the secretary allegedly failed to certify the plaintiffs' Indian blood quantum.620 
The court first found that the absent tribe was a necessary party because "[a) ruling on 
the merits in favor of Plaintiffs on their Judgment Fund Award claim will have the 
practical effect of modifying the [t]ribal ordinances containing the Eligibility 
Requirement.,,621 While considering whether the absent tribe was an indispensable 
party, the court asserted that an absent tribe's immunity is not a compelling factor to 
consider: 
[T]he Supreme Court's recent statement that the judicial concept of tribal 
sovereign immunity developed 'almost by accident' and the Court's admonition 
that, at least in the commercial context, the doctrine should be curtailed by 
Congress, casts doubt on any past notion that tribal sovereign immunity could be 
an interest compelling in itself for purposes of Rule 19(b ).622 
The court noted "there [was] a dearth of factual findings on the issue of whether the 
suit can proceed in equity and good conscience in the absence of the Tribe.,,623 The 
court remanded the case in the absence of those factual findingS.624 
The Tenth Circuit appears conflicted on the issue of the continued vitality of 
tribal sovereign immunity. In the first opinion, the court properly remanded the case 
for factual findings on whether the suit should be dismissed due to the absence of the 
tribe. Given the high Court's criticism, 625 the court appeared to be saying that the 
weight given tribal immunity was drastically reduced, in comparison with the weight 
given federal or state immunity.626 The second opinion, however, strongly reaffinned 
the public policy of immunity; generally when the tribes have the strongest argument 
in favor of immunity, it boils down to their pocketbooks.627 These two opinions serve 
to establish an important possibility for absent tribal parties. First, the absent tribes 
618. Id 
619. 192F.3d951 (lOthCir.1999). 
620. Seeidat951-54. 
621. Id. at 959. 
622. Id. at 960 (citing Kiowa Tribe v. Mfg. Techs., Inc., 523 U.s. 751, 756 (1998». The court 
also asserted that Justice Harlan's assertion in Provident Tradesmens that there were interests 
"compelling by themselves" was mere dicta and that he never would have assumed tribal immunity 
was one of those factors. See id at 960 n.9 (citing Provident Tradesmens Band & Trust Co. v. 
Patterson, 390 U.S. 102, 119 (1968»). 
623. Id. at 96l. 
624. Davis. 192 F.3d at 961. 
625. See generally id at 960. 
626. See id. 
627. See generally Davis v. United States, 343 FJd 1282, 1293-94 (lOth Cir. 2003). 
HeinOnline -- 40 Gonz. L. Rev. 60 2004-2005
60 GONZAGA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 40:1 
should push for factual findings supporting their arguments on the equity issues.628 
Both the relative importance of immunity and dismissal for the tribe, and the 
importance of the litigation, for the plaintiffs, should be fleshed out a great deal 
more.
629 Second, the court stated that the list of four factors is not exclusive and that 
additional factors could be considered.63o The advisory committee notes to the 1966 
amendment state, "The factors are to a certain extent overlapping, and they are not 
intended to exclude other considerations which may be applicable in particular 
situations. ,,631 The tribes should take advantage of this avenue. 
Two district court cases strongly support the proposition that courts will dismiss 
an action to contest the Secretary of the Interior's decision to recognize an Indian 
tribe when the challenger does not sue the newly recognized tribe. In Kickapoo Tribe 
v. LUjan,632 for example, the district court dismissed an action challenging the federal 
recognition of the Texas Band of Kickapoo Indians separately from the Oklahoma 
Band 633 First, the court held the secretary would be subjected to multiple litigation 
and possibly inconsistent obligations because, regardless of the instant case's 
disposition, the Texas Band ''would undoubtably continue to assert its separate 
existence.',634 Second, the court found that "[t]o allow this litigation to proceed in the 
[Texas] Band's absence would promote the worst kind ofpaterna1ism and seriously 
undermine the [bland's interest in its own survival.',635 In Masayevsa v. Zah,636 the 
district court dismissed an action brought by the Navajo Nation, claiming the 
secretary erred in recognizing the Southern Paiute Tribe.637 Quoting heavily from 
Kickapoo Tribe, the court concluded, "[t]he reasoning of the district court in 
Kickapoo Tribe is forceful.',638 
The areas of internal tribal governmental affairs and federal recognition of a tribe 
fundamentally affect the rights and responsibilities of those tribes.639 Disputes arising 
out of these areas without the participation of the affected tribe are usually dismissed 
628. See id at 1289. 
629. See generally id. at 1288-95 (analyzing the district court's decision to dismiss which 
involved the tribe's sovereign immunity as well as the relative importance of the litigation to the 
plaintiff). 
630. Id at 1289. 
631. FED. R. CIv. P. 19 advisory committee's note. 
632. 728 F. Supp. 791 (D.D.C. 1990). 
633. Id. at 792. 
634. Id at 796. 
635. Id. at 797. 
636. 792 F. Supp. 1178 (D. Ariz. 1992). 
637. See id. at 1186-87. 
638. Id. at 1186. 
639. See Melanie Reed, Native American Sovereignty Meets a Bend in the Road: Difficulties 
in Nevada v. Hicks, 2002 BYU L. REv. 137, 138-39 (2002) (discussing Indian tribal authority over 
non-members). 
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Wlder the compulsory joinder rule.64o Similarly, disputes arising out of tribal gaming 
operations are also dismissed. 
D. Gaming Operations 
Indian gaming started in the 1970s in Florida and Califomia when Indian tribes 
began operating bingo halls and other gaming activities.641 It is likely that every 
aspect of Indian gaming operations have been litigated. Several forms of disputes 
arose as Indian gaming became more prevalent. 642 First, since many tribes had no 
experience in rWlOing their own operations, they entered into management 
agreements with companies claiming experience in these matters.643 Second, gaming 
opponents from within and without the tribe attempted various novel strategies to 
attack gaming vendors and contractors in order to stop or control Indian gaming.644 
Third, sli& and fall claims at Indian gaming facilities and other torts arose in greater 
numbers. 5 Fourth, the federal government, states, and the tribes litigated whether 
Indian lands were eligible for gaming, whether the Secretary of the Interior should 
take land into trust, and other federal gaming issues.646 As a general rule, Indian 
gaming is an internal matter.647 Most of the fimctions and activities associated with 
gaming are outside of the jurisdiction of state and federal COurts.648 In virtually every 
one of the cases discussed in this section, the tribal court may be an alternative forum 
for remedy. 
640. See Nicholas V. Merldey, Compulsory Party Joinder and Tribal Sovereign Immunity: A 
Proposal to Modify Federal Courts' Application of Rule 19 to Cases Involving Absent Tribes as 
"Necessary" Parties, 56 OKlA. L. REv. 931, 943-44 (2003). 
641. Kevin K. Washburn, Recurring Problems in Indian Gaming, 1 WYO. L. REv. 427, 427 
(2001). 
642. See Washburn, supra note 641, at 436. 
643. Michael D. Cox, The Indian Gaming Regulatory Act: An Overview, 7 ST. THOMAS L. 
REv. 769, 771 (1995). 
644. See generally Christian C. Bedortha, The House Always Wins: A Look at the Federal 
Governments Role in Indian Gaming & the Long Search for Autonomy, 6 SCHOLAR 261, 284-85 
(2004) (noting that Indian gaming has met significant challenges in the past ten years). 
645. See generally Andrea M. Seie\stad, The Recognition and Evolution of Tribal Sovereign 
Immunity Under Federal Law: Legal, Historical, and Normative Reflections on a Fundamental 
Aspect of American Indian Sovereignty, 37 TuLsA L. REv. 661, 776 n.332 (2002) (discussing tribal 
sovereign immunity and referring to a recent case where a client slipped and fell on gaming 
property). 
646. See generally Sheny M. Thompson, The Return of the Buffalo: An Historical Survey of 
Reservation Gaming in the United States and Canada, 11 ARIz. J.JNT'L & COMPo L. 520, 528 (1994) 
(noting that Indian gaming conflicts often arise over government authority to regulate tribal 
enterprises in Indian land). 
647. See Davids v. Coyhis, 869 F. Supp. 1401, 1405-06 (E.D. Wis. 1994). 
648. Id 
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1. Contract Claims 
It is safe to say that when a party to a contract involving gaming-related activities 
attempts to adjudicate their alleged rights and responsibilities under that agreement 
without the gaming tribe's participation, the case will be dismissed in accordance 
with the compulsory joinder rule.649 The prototype case is Enterprise Management 
Consultants, Inc. v. United States ex rei. Hodel.6so Federal law required the Secretary 
of the Interior's approval of important contracts with Indian tribes, including gaming 
management contracts, before they could be considered valid and enforceable.6S1 
After the tribe and Enterprise Management entered into contracts, wherein the 
contractor would operate the tribe's bingo activities, several disputes arose and the 
tribe asked the federal agency not to approve the contracts.652 Once the federal 
agency disapproved the contracts through the proper administrative review, the 
contractor sued the government to stop the agency from disapproving the 
contracts.653 The court raised sua sponte the issue of whether the compulsory joinder 
rule compelled the dismissal of the case because the tribe, as an indispensable party, 
could not be joined by the contractor.654 The court acknowledged the general rule that 
when "a necessary party under Rule 19(a) is immune from suit, 'there is very little 
room for balancing of other factors' set out in Rule 19(b), because 'immunity may be 
viewed as one of those interests 'compelling by themseives.',,655 Since there was no 
649. See, e.g., World Touch Gaming, Inc. v. Massena Mgmt, LLC, 117 F. Supp. 2d 271, 277 
(N.D.N.Y. 2000). The court concluded: 
Id 
The basis for this action is the Lease and Sales Agreements between World Touch 
and the Casino. The Management Company was not a party to the agreements, as 
Walter Hom signed merely as the agent of the Casino. Moreover, it was the Casino, 
not the Management Company, that allegedly breached the agreements and defaulted 
on the required payments and purchases. Accordingly, based upon a review of the 
record in this matter, a consideration of the requirements set forth in Fed.RCiv.P. 
19(b), and plaintiff's failure to oppose dismissal under Rule 19(b), it is determined 
that the Tribe and the Casino are indispensable parties and in equity and good 
conscience the action should not proceed with the Management Company as the sole 
remaining defendant. Thus, the action is dismissed as against the Management 
Company. 
650. 883 F.2d 890 (10th Cir. 1989) .. 
651. See id. at 891 n.!. 
652. See id. at 891 (citing United States ex rei. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe v. 
Enter. Mgmt. Consultants, Inc., 883 F.2d 886, 887-89 (10th Cir. 1989». 
653. Id at 892. 
654. Id. at 892-93 (citing Wichita and Affiliated Tribes v. Hodel, 788 F.2d 765, 772 n.6 (D.C. 
Cir. 1986)( other citations omitted». 
655. Enter. Mgmt. Consultants, 883 F.2d at 894 (quoting Wichita and Affiliated Tribes, 788 
F.2d at 777 n.13 (quoting 3AMooRE'S FEDERALPRAcnCE ~ 19.15, at 19-226 n.6 (1984»). 
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question that adjudication of the validity of the contract to which the tribe was a party 
would affect the tribe's interest, the court weighed the effect of the suit on the tribe's 
sovereignty in compliance with the general rule.656 The court held that the suit 
''would also effectively abrogate the tribe's sovereign immunity by adjudicating its 
interest in that contract without consent" and dismissed the suit.657 Enterprise 
Management correctly weighed the significance of tribal sovereignty in the gaming 
arena and in its contractual relations. The sovereign immunity factors and contractual 
relations factors should weigh heavily in favor of dismissing a case where the tribe is 
absent.658 
Other cases follow the Enterprise Management prototype. In related qui tam 
actions, United States ex reI. Hall v. Tribal Development Corp. ("Hall IIf'/59 and 
United States ex rei. Hall v. Creative Games Technology, Inc., ("Hall 11')660 the 
Seventh and Eighth Circuits held that challenges to the validity of contracts 
governing Indian gaming activities must be dismissed if the gaming tribe is not 
joined.661 The circuits handled a total of forty-two actions, brought by individuals 
opposed to Indian gaming, against merchants and vendors doing business with 
gaming tribes.662 In HalllII, the Seventh Circuit dismissed the plaintiffs' claims 
against the outside vendors of the Menominee Tribe's gaming activities under the 
compulsory joinder rule.663 The court easily found that since the tribe was a party to 
the contracts challenged by the plaintiffs, it was a necessary party under Rule 
19(a).664 The plaintiffs advanced the novel argument that since they were suing on 
behalf of the United States, and since the United States is the trustee of the gaming 
tribe, the tribe's interests were adequately represented in the suit.665 The court 
disagreed, noting that although there are some circumstances when the federal 
government can adequately represent an absent tribe, in these circumstances the tribe 
would likely align itself against the plaintiffs' attempts to have their gaming vendors' 
contracts nullified.666 Applying the "equity and good conscience" standard, the court 
656. Seeid 
657. Id. (citing JicarillaApacheTribe v. Hodel, 821 F.2d537,54041 (IOthCir.1987)). 
658. See generally id at 893-94. 
659. 100 F.3d 476 (7th Cir. 1996) [hereinafter Hall IIlJ. 
660. Nos. 93-2903MN, 93-3089MN, 1994 WL 320296 (8th Cir. July 5, 1994) [hereinafter 
HallIl]. 
661. See Hall ill, 100 F.3d at 478-79; Hall II, 1994 WL 320296, at * 1. 
662. Hall ill, 100 F.3d at 477; see also United States ex rei. Hall v. Tribal Dev. COlp., 49 FJd 
1208 (7th Cir. 1995). 
663. See Hall ill, 100 F.3d at 478. 
664. Id at 479. 
665. Seeid. 
666. Id. (citing Confederated Tribes v. Lujan, 928 F.2d 1496, 1500 (9th Cir. 1991); Makah 
Indian Tribe v. Verity, 910 F.2d 555,558 (9th Cir. 1990)). 
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found the tribe an indispensable party for two main reasons.667 First, the court applied 
the blackletter contract principle that, "[n]o procedural principle is more deeply 
imbedded in the common law than that, in an action to set aside a lease or a contract, 
all parties who may be affected by the determination of the action are 
indispensable.',668 Second, the tribe's economic interest in the contracts outweighed 
the plaintiffs' limited interest in having the contracts nullified.669 The court left open 
the possibility in which "a qui tam action involving different circumstances [ where] a 
sovereign tribe might not be indispensable under Rule 19.,,670 
In a very similar set of facts involving the same plaintiffs and a number of 
gaming tribes in Wisconsin and Minnesota, the Eighth Circuit, in an unpublished 
opinion affirming the district court opinion,671 found in Hall II that "[i]t is 
inconceivable to us that a suit claiming that a contract is invalid should be allowed to 
proceed in the absence of all parties to the contract.',672 Like the Seventh Circuit's 
view of the absent tribes, the district court in Hall I noted that none of the affected 
absent tribes attempted to intervene, suggesting to the court "that the tribes 
themselves have a different view of the merit and wisdom of the contracts and 
transactions at issue in the matter.',673 The lower court went into much more detail 
than either circuit court did in regard to the amount of prejudice the gaming tribes 
would suffer.674 The court stated: 
The plaintiffs essentially seek rescission of the contracts and disgorgement of 
money paid for goods and services rendered pursuant to those contracts. The 
message such a judgment would send to outside vendors would be that 
transactions with hldian gaming enterprises are subject to cancellation at any 
time and without regard to whether the contracts were freely and fairly 
negotiated, the extent to which the parties have perfOmled their duties under the 
contracts or the settled expectations and reliance of the parties. Very few 
merchants would be willing to transact business with Indian casinos under such 
risky conditions. This might well signal the end of fudian gaming in the Upper 
Midwest. Regardless of whether such ajudgment would otherwise constitute the 
667. Id. at 481. 
668. Hall III, 100 F.3d at 479 (quoting Lornayaktewa v. Hathaway, 520 F.2d 1324, 1325 (9th 
Cir. 1975), em. denied, 425 U.S. 903 (1976» (other citations omitted). 
669. See id. at 480 (citing Wichita and Affiliated Tribes v. Hodel, 788 F.2d 765, 777 (D.c. Cir. 
1986». 
670. Id.at481. 
671. See generally In re United States ex rei. Hall, 825 F. Supp. 1422 (D. Minn. 1993) 
[hereinafter Hall 1]. 
672. Hall II, Nos. 93-2903MN, 93-3089MN, 1994 WL 320296, at *1 (8th Cir. July 5,1994». 
673. Hall 1,825 F. Supp. at 1429 n.6. 
674. Id. at 1429. 
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correct application of the law, it would undeniably be prejudicial to the interests 
of the Indian tribes.675 
65 
The court also noted that no case has ever required the return of money, paid to an 
Indian tribe, back to an outside source without a waiver of immunity.676 Finally, the 
court held that "where a necessary party is immune from suit, there may be 'very 
little room for balancing of other factors' because immunity may be considered a 
compelling interest. ,,677 These cases highlight areas the tribes in the gaming compact 
cases should develop factually. First, the tribe's reliance on certainty in developing its 
gaming operations is critical and should not be subject to backdoor attacks without 
the tribe's participation.678 Second, and more importantly, the tribes should develop 
the economic interests of non-Indian contractors, vendors, and em~loyees that would 
be denigrated or eliminated if Indian gaming is eliminated 6 The Hall cases 
effectivel~ strengthened the gaming tribes' ability to demand certainty in their 
relations. 80 Moreover, the court likely took into consideration, without stating so, that 
the plaintiffs were individuals opposed to gaming for whatever reason. They were 
arguably bringing an action to uphold a private interest, posing as a community or 
societal interest. 
An exception of sorts to the general trend of qui tam cases arising out of 
contracts that involve gaming tribes arose in United States ex rei. Steele v. Tum Key 
Gaming, Inc.681 The leader of the Oglala Sioux Tribe brought a qui tam action to 
invalidate a gaming management contract with Turn Key Gaming.682 The tribe sued 
in its own tribal court to invalidate the contracts.683 The court held that since the tribal 
leader's interests were the same as the tribe's (they both wanted the contracts 
invalidated), the tribe was not an indispensable party.684 Moreover, the court reasoned 
that the tribe had alternative remedies in tribal court and would suffer no prejudice.685 
In Gallegos v. Pueblo of Tesuque, most important to the court, however, was the 
Pueblo's "compelling interest 'in protecting its sovereign right to litigate on its own 
675. Id. 
676. See id. at 1429-30 (citing Pembina Treaty Comm. v. Lujan, 980 F.2d 543,545 (8th Cir: 
1992». 
677. Id. at 1430 (quoting Wichita and Affiliated Tribes v. Hodel, 788 F.2d 765, 777 n.13 
(D.C. Cir. 1986). 
678. Hall/, 825 F. Supp. at 1429. 
679. Id 
680. Id.; Hallll, Nos. 93-2903MN, 93-3089MN, 1994 WL 320296, at *1 (8th Cir. July 5, 
1994); Hall Ill, 100 F.3d 476, 481 (7thCir.1996). 
681. 135 F.3d 1249 (8th Cir. 1998). 
682. Id at 1250. 
683. Id. at 1252. 
684. Seeid. 
685. See id. 
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behalf and in the forum of its choice. ",686 The court acknowledged the plaintiff's 
right to bring a suit and expect a remedy.687 The court held that, "[a]s a matter of 
public policy, the public interest in protecting tribal sovereign immunity surpasses a 
plaintiffI']s interest in having an available forum for suit.',688 The court added, ''the 
dismissal turns on the fact that society has consciously opted to shield Indian tribes 
from suit without congressional or tribal consent.',689 This case is an example of an 
impermissible attempt to use compulsory joinder as a method of avoiding suit when a 
non-tribaI8arty, adverse to the tribe, literally attempts to hide behind the tribe's own 
immunity. 90 Contrast this strategy with a defendant on the same side of the litigation 
as the tribe that is attempting to use the compulsory joinder rule to shield the absent 
tribe from litigation initiated without its consent. Here, the tribe's interests were 
represented by the plaintiff and not the defendant presenting the defense.691 
The Eighth Circuit came to the same conclusion while adopting a different 
procedural stance in Anvw v. Gambler s Supply, Inc.692 The yankton Sioux Tribe 
hired Gambler's Supply as its management company, but terminated the relationship 
before the Secretary of the Interior approved the agreement693 as required by federal 
law.694 After the tribe agreed to pay Gambler's Supply a sum that would wind down 
the agreement, a tribal member sued the company to recover all funds expended by 
the tribe in its arrangement.695 The absent tribe attempted to file a motion for 
dismissal under Rule 19, but the court treated it as a Rule 24 motion to intervene.696 
The court rejected the tribe's argument that it was an indispensable party, holding that 
Gambler's Supply and the tribe had identical interests and Gambler's Supply could 
adequately represent the absentee's interests.697 This case is further out of line when 
686. 46 PJd 668, 685 (N.M. 2002), cert. denied, 536 U.S. 990 (2002) (quoting Golden Oil 
Co. v. Chace Oil Co., 994 P.2d 772, 775 (N.M. Ct. App. 1999). 
687. Id. at 686 ("While we are 'sympathetic to [Gallegos'] fiustration at [her] inability to 
achieve jurisdiction over the party at the heart of the dispute, [we] cannot ignore the rule of law on 
joinder of parties. ",) (quoting Confederated Tribes of the Chehalis Indian Reservation v. Lujan, 129 
F.R.D. 171, 175 (W.D. Wash. 1990)). 
688. Id. (quoting Sraderv. Verant, 964 P.2d 82, 91 (N.M. 1998)). 
689. Id. (quoting Enter. Mgmt. Consultants, Inc. v. United States ex reI. Hodel, 883 F.2d 890, 
894 (10th Cir. 1989) (quoting in turn Wichita and Affiliated Tribes v. Hodel, 788 F.2d 765, 777 (D.c. 
Cir. 1986))). 
690. See id at 672. 
691. Gallegos, 46 PJd at 672. 
692. 55 F.3d 407 (8th Cir. 1995). 
693. Id. at 408-09. 
694. 25 U.S.C. § 81(b)(2002). 
695. Arrow, 55 F.3d at 409. 
696. Seeid. 
697. See id. at 409-10 (citing Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians v. Minnesota, 989 F.2d 
994, 999 (8th Cir. 1993); Purnell v. City of Akron, 925 F.2d 941, 950 (6th Cir. 1991); Bottoms v. 
Dresser, 797 F.2d 869,872 (10th Cir. 1986)). 
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compared to cases where the court finds that the federal government may adequately 
represent the absent tribe. The tribe attempted to intervene for the limited purpose of 
filing its motion to dismiss, and the court refused to allow the tribe even to 
intervene.698 There can be no serious disfcute that the defendant and the tribe had 
radically different interests in the matter.6 9 Just ~rior to the filing of the litigation, 
they had terminated their contractual agreements. 0 The absent tribe tried to stop the 
litigation in favor of its fonner contractor.701 Perhaps, the tribe wanted to ensure that 
future contractors would not view contractual relationships disfavorably because, 
although the tribe may not have wanted its contract with Gambler's Supply, it did 
want to contract with other vendors and management contractors?02 The tribe's 
interest appeared to be to protect its reputation as a business partner. 
In instances where a tribe purchases insurance to cover a potential liability 
exposure created by a limited waiver of sovereign immunity, the courts will dismiss a 
claim intended to thwart the limited waiver?03 The Supreme Court of New Mexico, 
possibly the state court now most receptive of a claim that a tribe is an indispensable 
party, held in Gallegos v. Pueblo ofTesuque704 that the pueblo was an indispensable 
party in a suit against its insurer.705 In Gallegos, the plaintiff was a patron of the 
pueblo's gaming facility when she suffered an injury on the grounds.706 She sued the 
insurance company in state court, and the insurance company moved to dismiss the 
claim, arguing that her exclusive remedy was in tribal court and that the pueblo had 
not waived its immunity in state COurt.707 The insurer also moved to dismiss on the 
basis that the pueblo was an indispensable party.708 One of the plaintiff's claims was 
that the insurance company had breached its contract with the pueblo by asserting the 
pueblo's immunity from suit in state COurt,709 a fatal strategic mistake?1O The court 
first stated that it could not "ignore that Plaintiff asks the court to pass judgment on 
the conduct of [the insurer] under the policy pursuant to her claims ... ," effectively 
implicating the tribe's interest.711 Further, because the plaintiff attempted to split the 
698. ld 
699. Seeid at411. 
700. Anvw, 55 F.3d at 408-09. 
701. Seeid at 409. 
702. See id at 408. 
703. See, e.g., Gallegos v. Pueblo of Tesuque, 46 P.3d 668 (N.M. 2002), cert. denied, 536 
U.S. 990 (2002). 
704. ld 
705. ld. at 686. 
706. ld. at 671. 
707. ld. at 672. 
708. Gal/egos, 46 P.3d at 672. 
709. See id. at 681. 
710. Seeid. 
711. ld. at 684. 
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insurer from the pueblo, the court was able to find that, in tribal court, the insurer "can 
or will fully represent the interests of Tesuque under the policy, and thus, Tesuque is 
necessary to the litigation" in state or federal court.7I2 Here, there was an alternative 
forum for the plaintiff-in fact, the only forum available under the insurance 
contract-and since the insurance company was not a tortfeasor, the tribe was the 
only possible defendant. 713 
2. Tort Claims 
Tort cases arising out of Indian gaming facilities where the defendant asserts 
compulsory joinder as a defense are more likely to find the tribes indespensible 
parties. Three cases holding that the tribes were indispensable came out of 
Louisiana?14 Yet, two other cases out of Louisiana had a different result.715 Whether 
the absent tribe will be considered indispensable depends on the form of the tort 
alleged. If the defendants are jointly and severally liable, then the absent tribe likely 
will not be considered indispensable?16 In Gore v. Grand Casinos ofLouisiana,717 an 
accident victim sued the management company of the Tunica-Biloxi Indian Tribe, 
alleging violations of state law.718 That case was removed to federal district court.719 
The management company argued that the gaming tribe was its employer, as defined 
by the state law of respondeat superior, and the company was therefore a possible 
defendant under a vicarious liability theory.720 The court agreed the tribe was a 
necessary party because of the control exercised by the tribe over the gaming 
operations.721 The court noted that the plaintiff had a remedy in tribal court, if she 
chose to pursue it, and dismissed the action.722 In Havekost v. Grand Casinos of 
Louisiana,723 on the exact same set of facts and the same defendant management 
company, the victim of an accident at a gaming facility owned by the Coushatta Tribe 
of Louisiana and operated by Grand Casinos of Louisiana, sued in federal district 
712. [d. 
713. Cf Gallegos, 46 P.3d at 671. 
714. See generally Havekost v. Grand Casinos of La., Inc., No. 00-CV-2204, 2000 WL 
33909243 (W.D. La. Dec. 8,2000); Gore v. Grand Casinos of La. , Inc., No. CIV-A.98-1253A, 1998 
WL 1990523 (W.D. La. Sept. 29, 1998); Bonnette v. Tunica-Biloxi Indians, 873 So. 2d 1 (La. Ct. 
App.2003). 
715. See generally Hines v. Grand Casinos of La., L.L.c., 140 F. Supp. 2d 701 (W.D. La. 
2001); Atwood v. Grand Casinos of La., Inc., 819 So. 2d 440 (La. Ct. App. 2002). 
716. See Atwood, 819 So. 2d. at 443. 
717. No. CIV.A.98-1253A, 1998 WL 1990523 (W.D. La. Sept. 29,1998). 
718. [d. at *1. 
719. [d. 
720. See id. at *4. 
721. [d. 
722. Gore, 1998 WL 1990523, at *5. 
723. No. 00-CV-2204, 2000 WL 33909243 (W.D. La. Dec. 8,2000). 
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court. 724 The court, noting that the plaintiff sued the tribe in tribal court, agreed that 
tribal court was the proper venue and dismissed the action for the same reasons as 
stated in Gore.725 
Then, in Bonnette v. Tunica-Biloxi Indians,726 the Louisiana Court of Appeals 
dismissed a toxic mold tort action against the tribe and several others who were 
involved in constructing the tribe's gaming facility.727 The plaintiffs, exposed to toxic 
mold at the Paragon Casino Resort, sued in state COurt.728 The tribe's immunity from 
suit in state court necessitated its dismissal.729 The remaining defendants moved to 
dismiss the claim due to the absence of the tribe.730 The court applied the state law 
and determined that the tribe and the remaining defendants were not vicariously 
liable.731 In fact, under the relevant state statute, the defendants would be liable only 
for their degree of fault. 732 The court agreed with the remaining defendants that, 
absent the tribe, the litigation would not settle the percentage of fault attributable to 
each defendant. 733 Moreover, because the plaintiffs had a tribal court remedy, the 
court agreed with the defendants that they might be subject to multiple and 
inconsistent obligations.734 
The Bonnette court was obliged to distinguish an earlier Louisiana Court of 
Appeals case, Atwood v. Grand Casinos of Louisiana, Inc. 735 In this instance a 
blackjack dealer at the gaming facility, owned by the Coushatta Tribe of Louisiana 
and operated by Grand Casinos, was accused of cheating, stripped of his gaming 
license, and escorted by guards out of the casinO.736 The dealer sued for defamation in 
state court against the management company, a tribal gaming commission 
investigator, and a state police officer.737 The management company and the other 
defendants argued the tribe was an indispensable party and moved for dismissal.738 
The court disagreed, holding that under state law the defendants' liability, if proven, 
724. See id. at * 1. 
725. See id. at *1-2. 
726. 873 So. 2d 1, (La. Ct App. 2(03). 
727. See id. at 3. 
728. Seeid. 
729. See id. at 4-5 (citing Kiowa Tribe v. Mfg. Techs., Inc., 523 U.S. 751, 754 (1998); C&L 
Enters. Inc. v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe, 532 U.S. 411 (2001); Ute Dist. Corp. v. Ute 
Indian Tribe, 149F.3d 1260 (1OthCir. 1998)). 
730. See id. at 7. 
731. Bonnette, 873 So. 2d at 8. 
732. See id. (citing LA. avo CODE ANN. art. 2324(A) (West 2(02)). 
733. See id. at 8-9. 
734. See id. at 9. 
735. 819 So. 2d440 (La. O. App.), writ denied, 827 So.2d426 (La. 2(02). 
736. Id. at 441. 
737. Id. 
738. Id. at 441-42. 
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was joint and several, rendering the tribe an unnecessary party.739 In Hines v. Grand 
Casinos of Louisiana, L.L. c.,740 a fonner casino employee brought a Title VII claim 
of sexual harassment and discrimination against a gaming tribe's management 
company in state COurt.741 Arguing that Gore was apposite, the management 
company moved to dismiss.742 The court disagreed and distinguished Gore on the 
basis that the tribe had there "retained a sufficient indicia of control over the casino 
such that the Tribe was an indispensable party to the Suit.,,743 The court further noted 
that the management agreement expressly disclaimed liability for the tribe.744 
The Louisiana cases demonstrate that absent tribes might not be indispensable 
based on tort law. The result often depends on state law.745 Unfortunately, even when 
the management company is sued and the tribe is not considered indispensable, the 
absent tribe's interests are still implicated. The tribe suffers the bad public relations 
from a civil rights claim or a badly handled slip and fall case, even if it is not directly 
liable. The tribes should attempt to develop the factual basis for their interests outside 
of the scope of the state law on the alleged tort. 
Following Atwood and Hines, temporally if not doctrinally, courts find that 
gaming tribes are generally not indispensable when their co-defendants in tort actions 
are jointly and severally liable. One highly publicized tort case where the court found 
that the gaming tribe was not an indispensable party, was Frazier v. Turning Stone 
Casino.746 The management company for a former professional boxer sued the 
gaming tribe, the tribal officials, and the tribe's boxing promoter for misappropriating 
his image and likeness.747 The court dismissed the tribe and tribal officials on 
immunity grounds.748 The court did not find that the dismissed tribe was an 
indispensable party, mainly because the liability of the remaining defendants was 
joint and several.749 This case exemplifies the potential bad publicity a tribe might 
experience if a celebrity sues the tribe and its gaming operations staff and 
contractors.750 Other cases follow the same rationale. In Multimedia Games, Inc. v. 
WLGC Acquisition COrp.,751 a gaming supply company sued the Miami Tribe of 
739. See id. at 443 (citing LA. Crv. CODE ANN. art. 1789 (West 2002». 
740. 140 F. Supp. 2d 701 (W.D. La. 2001). 
741. Seeid.at702. 
742. Id. at 705. 
743. Id. 
744. Id. 
745. See, e.g., Hines, 140 F. Supp. 2d at 705. 
746. 254 F. Supp. 2d 295 (N.D.N.Y. 2003). 
747. Id. at 300. 
748. Id. at 305, 31O-1l. 
749. See id. at 306-07 (citing Bassett v. Mashantucket Pequot Tribe, 204 F.3d 343, 360 (2nd 
Cir. 2000». 
750. Cf id. at 300. 
751. 214 F. Supp. 2d 1131 (N.D. Okla. 2001). 
HeinOnline -- 40 Gonz. L. Rev. 71 2004-2005
2004/05] INDISPENSABLE SOVEREIGNS 71 
Oklahoma Business Development Authority and two others affiliated with the 
authority for copyright infringement and other business tOrts.752 The court concluded 
the authority was immune from suit as an instrumentality of the tribe.753 The court 
concluded the remaining two defendants were joint tortfeasors as to the business torts 
and copyright infringement allegations and allowed the case to continue?54 
3. Gaming Lands and Gaming Enforcement Cases 
The eligibility of tribes to conduct gaming on particular parcels of land or to 
conduct particular forms of gaming has created a large body of precedent regarding 
the compulsory joinder rule. In two important cases involving attempts by two tribes 
to establish off-reservation gaming, the Tenth Circuit held the absent tribe was not an 
indispensable party, in large part, because the federal government defendants were 
adequate to defend the absent tribe's interest.755 First, in Sac & Fox Nation v. 
Norton/56 three tribes and the governor of the state of Kansas sued the Secretary of 
the Interior to prevent him from taking land in downtown Kansas City, Missouri for 
gaming purposes on behalf of the Wyandotte Tribe ofOklahoma.757 After the district 
court relied upon arguments made by the Wyandotte Tribe and the secretary 
regarding the tribe being a necessary party, the secretary reversed her position before 
the Tenth Circuit.758 The court agreed with the Wyandotte Tribe that the tribe would 
suffer great prejudice if their ability to conduct gaming in Kansas City were lost in the 
adjudication, but found the prejudice was "greatly reduced" by the secretary's interest 
in her own defense, holding that their interests were ''virtually identical.,,759 The court 
also noted the Wyandotte Tribe "has filed pleadings at virtually all stages of this 
litigation and has consistently offered its views regarding why the Secretary's actions 
752. Id. at 1132-33. 
753. See id. at 1135 ("A tribe's sovereign status is directly related to its ability to generate 
revenues through the regulation of commercial activities on the reservation. The ability to contract as 
an economic entity impacts the tribe's fiscal resources by binding or obligating the funds of the tribe. 
It follows that corporate contractual provisions are actually economic matters which directly affect a 
sovereign's right of self government. In this way, the business entity is simply the tribe's alter ego; 
and thus, the real party in interest is the tribe because the vulnerability of the tribe's coffer is at issue 
when contracting in a commercial environment."). 
754. Seeid.at1141-44. 
755. See generally Kansas v. United States, 249 F.3d 1213 (lOth Cir. 2001); Sac & Fox 
Nation v. Norton, 240 F.3d 1250 (lOth Cir. 2001) cert. denied sub nom., Wyandotte Nation v. Sac 
& Fox Nation, 534 U.S. 1078 (2002). 
756. 240 F.3d 1250 (lOth Cir. 2001), cert. denied sub nom. Wyandotte Nation v. Sac 
& Fox Nation, 534 U.S. 1078 (2002). 
757. Id. at 1253. 
758. Id. at 1258 n.9. 
759. !d. at 1259 (quoting Rishell v. Jane Phillips Episcopal Mem'l Med. Ctr., 94 F.3d 1407, 
1412 (10th Cir. 1996)). 
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were appropriate.,,760 The court found the likelihood that plaintiffs would lack an 
alternative forum for their claims to be most important.761 Similarly, in Kansas v. 
United States/62 the state of Kansas sued the National Indian Gaming Commission to 
prevent the agency from making a decision that would declare land in Kansas eligible 
for Indian gaming on behalf of the Miami Tribe of Oklahoma?63 After the Miami 
Tribe argued that it was an indispensable party to the suit, the court disagreed, relying 
on Sac & Fox Nation, which had been decided a few months earlier.764 
Two other gaming-related cases involved claims, by the defendants, that the 
United States was an indispensable party, and in both cases, the court rejected the 
argument. In Forest County Potawatomi Community v. Doyle,765 the tribe sued state 
and local government officials after local officials threatened to prevent the tribe from 
engaging in gaming operations.766 The Redevelopment Authority of the City of 
Milwaukee transferred land to the tribe leading the Secretary of the Interior to take the 
land into trust for gaming pwposes.767 After the tribe sued, the defendants argued that 
both the United States and the Redevelopment Authority were indispensable parties 
and asked the court to dismiss the action under the compulsory joinder rule.768 The 
defendants argued the Redevelopment Authority could bring a quiet title action 
against the United States as a result of the litigation.769 The court disagreed, noting 
that the authority could always intervene if it chose.77o In Texas v. Ysleta del Sur 
Pueblo,771 the court held that the United States was not an indispensable party when a 
state brings an enforcement action to shut down a tribal casino on reservation land.772 
The tribe argued that even if the tribe prevailed against the state, the United States 
would eventually bring its own legal action to shut down the gaming facility, creating 
the possibility of multiple and inconsistent obligations for the tribe.773 The court 
rejected the argument, reasoning that since the United States was never joined in 
California v. Cabazon Band of MISsion Indians,774 another case in which a state 
760. Id. at 1260. 
761. Sac & Fox Nation, 240 F.3d at 1260. 
762. 249 F.3d 1213 (10th CiT. 2001). 
763. See id. atl218. 
764. Id. at 1225-26 (citing Sac & Fox Nation, 240 F.3d at 1250). 
765. 828 F. Supp. 1401 (W.D. Wis. 1993). 
766. Id. at 1404. 
767. Id. at 1406. 
768. Id. at 1412. 
769. Id. 
770. Forest County Potawatomi Cmty., 828 F. Supp. at 1413. 
771. 79 F. Supp. 2d 708 (W.D. Tex. 1999), ajf'd, 237 F.3d 631 (5th CiT. 2000), cert. denied, 
532 U.S. lO66 (2001). 
772. See id. at 711-12. 
773. Id.at711. 
774. 480 U.S. 202 (1987). 
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brought an enforcement action to shut down tribal gaming on reselVation land, it did 
not need to be joined in the Texas matter either.775 
Non-Indians are not likely to be indispensable parties in litigation involving tribal 
gaming interests. In United States ex rei. Morongo Band of Mission Indians v. 
Rose/76 the court threw out a former tribal bingo operations contractor's argument 
that the owner of land where the bingo facility was located was an indispensable 
party.777 The court reasoned, "[T]he pleadings cannot mean that every non-Indian 
who might play bingo on the Band's land or every person who might associate 
himself with Rose in the future is a necessary party.,,778 
IV. THE GAMING COMPACT CASES--A GENRE CASE STUDY 
Indian gaming is a national multi-billion dollar ente~rise and growing.779 Some 
tribes acquire unimaginable wealth as a result of gaming. 80 While fewer than half of 
the federally recognized tribes operate successful gaming facilities; of those that do, 
gaming is, for the time being, the life blood of many tribes' finances, supporting all 
manner of governmental services, environmental protection, employment of tribal 
members and non-Indians, and feeding hope and capital for future non-gaming 
economic development.781 Unlike federal, state, or local governments, most Indian 
775. See generally Yselta del Sur Pueblo, 79 F. Supp. 2d at 711 n.4. 
776. 34 F.3d 901 (9th Cir. 1994). 
777. See id. at 907-09. 
778. Id. at 908. 
779. See In re Kedrowski, 284 B.R. 439, 440 n.2 (W.D. Wis. 2002) ("For example, according 
to the National Indian Gaming Commission, in 1997 Indian gaming revenues totaled about $7.4 
billion. They have increased steadily, and in 200 1 tribal gaming revenues totaled $12.7 billion, an 
increase of almost 16% from the previous year. These revenues were based on reports from 290 tribal 
gaming operations nationwide."); Cy Ryan, Study: Indian Casinos Win $14.1 Bil. in 2002, LAs 
VEGAS SUN, May 20, 2003, available at 
www.lasvegasstm.comlstmbinlgamingistoriesitextl2oo3IMayI201515106057.hun!. 
780. In re Kedrowski, 284 B.R. at 440 n.2; Ryan, supra note 779. 
781. See, e.g., Grand Traverse Band of Ottawa and Chippewa Indians v. United States 
Attorney for the W. Dist of Mich., 198 F. Supp. 2d 920, 926 (W.D. Mich. 2002), ajf'd, 369 F.3d 960 
(6th Cir. 2004): 
In fiscal year 2001, Twtle Creek provided approximately 8<)010 of the Band's gaming 
revenue. The casino now employs approximately 500 persons, approximately half of 
whom are tribal members. Revenues from the Twtle Creek Casino also fimd 
approximately 270 additional tribal government positions, which administer a variety of 
governmental programs, including health care, elder care, child care, youth services, 
education, housing, economic development and law enforcement The casino also 
provides some of the best employment opportunities in the region, and all of its employees 
are eligible for health insurance benefits, disability benefits and 401(k) benefit plans. The 
casino also provides revenues to regional governmental entities and provides significant 
side benefits to the local tourist economy. 
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tribes do not have a property tax or income tax upon which to draw from in a 
financial pinch.782 The Supreme Court noted in California v. Cabazon Band of 
A,{: • T d' 783 lV11SSlon 1n lans: 
The Cabazon and Morongo Reservations contain no natural resources which 
can be exploited. The tribal games at present provide the sole source of revenues 
for the operation of the tribal governments and the provision of tribal services. 
They are also the major sources of employment on the reservations. Self-
detennination and economic development are not within reach if the Tribes 
cannot mise revenues and provide employment for their members.784 
However, gambling is gambling, and it comes with drawbacks. Some opponents 
to gambling label Indian gaming as a regressive tax on the poor,785 and accuse Indian 
gaming of creating or perpetuating a gateway to organized crime, gambling addiction, 
and attendant societal problems.786 Opponents also assert that the expansion of 
boo ' II '1 787 gam g 1S mom y wrong or eVl . 
And Indi . . b 788 bli h . 789 yet, an gammg creates JO s, esta s es a reservahon economy, 
and brings Indian and non-Indian governments together in ways never before 
imagined.79o If placed in the context of other forms of economic development that 
Id. (citations to record omitted). 
782. See, e.g., Pueblo of Santa Ana v. Hodel, 663 F. Supp. 1300, 1314 n.21 (D.D.C. 1987) 
("(TJhe Indians have no viable tax base and a weak economic infrastructure. Therefore they, even 
more than the states, need to develop creative ways to generate revenue."). 
783. 480 U.S. 202 (1987). 
784. Id at 218-19. 
785. See Daniel Twetten, Public Law 280 and the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act: Could Two 
Wrongs Ever be Made into a Right?, 90 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMlNOLOGY 1317, 1350 (2000); Paul H. 
Brietzke & Teresa L. Kline, The Law and Economics 0/ Native American Casinos, 78 NEB. L. REv. 
263,287 (1999). 
786. Brietzke & Kline, supra note 785, at 290-91. 
787. Cf Mich. Gaming Inst., Inc. v. Bd of Educ., 536 N,W,2d 289, 292 (Mich. Ct. App. 
1995) (Corrigan, J., dissenting) ("With limited exceptions, the purpose of the current scheme of 
criminal laws remains to suppress gambling as an activity injurious to public morals and welfare.'') 
(citing State ~ reI. Comm'r of State Police v. Nine Money Falls Games, 343 N.W.2d 576, 578 
(Mich. Ct. App. 1983»; N. Bruce Duthu, Crow Dog and Oliphant Fistfight at the Tribal Casino: 
Political Power, Storytelling, and Games o/Chance, 29 ARIz. ST. LJ. 171, 185-87 (1997) (discussing 
history of moral antipathy toward gambling). 
788. See Kathryn RL. Rand & Steven A. Light, VIrtue or VIce?: How IGRA Shapes the 
Politics o/Native American Gaming, Sovereignty, and Identity, 4 VA. J. SOC. POL'y & L. 381, 403-04 
(1997). 
789. See Kathryn R.L. Rand, There are No Pequots on the Plains: Assessing the Success 0/ 
Indian Gaming, 5 CHAP. L. REv. 47, 81 & n.252 (2000). 
790. See Carole Goldberg-Ambrose, Pursuing Tribal Economic Development at the Bingo 
Palace, 29 ARIz. ST. L.J. 97, 98 (1997) ("[S]ome gaming tribes have been so successful that they are 
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pollutes the environment,791 kills workers/92 and generates malevolent corruption,793 
Indian gaming is relatively hann-free, even if there are challenges to Indian gaming 
and attacks on Indian tribes.794 Indian tribes are not-for-profit corporations that are 
interested only in maximizing dividends for investors.795 Without question, gaming 
revenues have brou~t many tribes back from a very desperate state of dependency 
and near-extinction. 96 As Congress has repeatedly declared improved tribal self-
determination to be its policy,797 court challenges to the validity of the gaming 
compacts between Indian tribes and states may tum on whether the Indian tribe is an 
indispensable party in accordance with the compulsory joinder rule.798 Typically, a 
taxpayer group, a state legislator, or a competing business or industry, such as a 
racetrack or card room, may sue the state or the governor to contest the validity of 
Class ill gaming compacts?99 The state government defendant or the relevant Indian 
contracting with local non-Indian governments to provide services such as fire protection."). 
791. See generally John C. Dernbach, Pollution Control and Sustainable Industry, 12 NAT. 
RESOURCES & ENv'T 101 (1997). 
792. See Marc Linder, Fatal Subtraction: Statistical MIAS on the Industrial Battlfjield, 20 J. 
LEGIS. 99, 99 (1994) ("A million workers in the United States have been killed in the line of duty 
alone since the 1920s. "). 
793. See generally Joseph M. Schwartz, Democracy Against the Free Market: The Enron 
Crisis and the Politics o/Global Deregulation, 35 CONN. L. REv. 1097 (2003). 
794. See, e.g., Gavle v. Little Six, Inc., 555 N.W.2d 284,294-95 (Minn. 1996); cf Texas v. 
Ysletadel Sur Pueblo, 19 F. Supp. 2d 708 (W.D. Tex. 1999). 
795. See, e.g., Trudgeon v Fantasy Springs Casino, 84 Cal. Rptr. 2d 65, 70 (Ct. App. 1999) 
(acknowledging that Indian casinos are "governmental in nature"); Gavle, 555 N.W.2d at 295 
(recognizing "the unique role that Indian gaming serves in the economic life of here-to-fore 
impoverished Indian communities across this coun1Iy"). 
796. Goldberg-Ambrose, supra note 790, at 97-98. 
797. Perhaps the most important example is the statement of Congressional pwpose 
contained in the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (lGRA), that IGRA was intended to promote "tribal 
economic development, self-sufficiency, and strong tribal governments." 25 U.S.c. § 2702(1) 
(2000); see also id § 450(a)(1) (finding that "self-governmenf' of Indian tribes would be served by 
additional tribal control of federal Indian programs); § 450(b)(1) (finding that "true self-
detennination" of Indian tribes would be served by improved educational opportunities); § 1902 
(declaring that it is the policy of Congress to "promote the stability and security of Indian tribes and 
families"); § 4101(7) (recognizing the "right of Indian self-determination and tribal self-
governance"). 
798. This article will "use the familiar but confusing terminology, [where] the decision to 
proceed is a decision that the absent person is merely 'necessary' while the decision to dismiss is a 
decision that he is 'indispensable. '" Provident Tradesmens Bank & Trust Co. v. Patterson, 390 U.S. 
102, 118 (1968). 
799. See generally Pueblo of Santa Ana v. Kelly, 104 F.3d 1546 (10th Cir. 1997) (holding that 
governor lacked authority to bind state to gaming compacts); Sears v. Hull, 961 P.2d 1013 (Ariz. 
1998) (holding that citizens lacked standing to challenge gaming compacts' constitutionality); Flynt 
v. Cal. Gambling Control Comm'n, 129 Cal. Rptr. 2d 167 (Ct. App. 2003) (holding that gaming 
compacts did not violate challenger's equal protection rights); State ex rei. Stephan v. Finney, 867 
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tribe in intervention argue the tribe is an indispensable party to the suit and since the 
tribe is immune from suit in federal and state courts, the suit must be dismissed.80o 
There was a challenge to the 1997 and 1998 Michigan gaming compacts that could 
have turned on whether the absent tribes are indispensable.8ol Since the merits of the 
challenges turn on state law-separation of powers, the governor's state 
constitutional authority, the legislature's state constitutional authority, whether 
gambling is regulated versus prohibited under state law-the more recent trend is 
toward treating the Indian tribes as necessary, but not indispensable, parties.802 As one 
court noted, these cases present "an issue of civil procedure that may have wide-
ranging consequences for gaming activities operated on Native American lands.',s03 
The IGRA804 classified Indian gaming three ways.805 First, Class I gaming 
includes "social games solely for prizes of minimal value or traditional forms of 
Indian gaming engaged in by individuals as a part of, or in connection with, tribal 
ceremonies or celebrations. ,0806 Second, Class II gaming includes high-bingo and 
non-banking card games.807 Third, Class ill gaming includes all other forms of 
gaming and generally means Las Vegas-style casino gaming.80S Class ill gaming is 
lawful in accordance with IGRA, only if the gaming tribe meets three 
requirements.809 First, the gaming must be authorized by a tribal statute.810 Second, 
the state in which the tribe is located must be a state that "permits such gaming for 
P.2d 1034 (Kan. 1994) (discussing challenge to scope of gaming allowed under state law by state 
attorney general); State ex rei. Stephan v. Finney, 836 P.2d 1169 (Kan. 1992) (discussing challenge to 
governor's authority to execute gaming compact by state attorney general and holding governor 
lacked authority); Tiger Stadium Fan Club, Inc. v. Governor, 553 N.W.2d 7 (Mich. Ct App. 1996) 
(holding that state governor had authority to settle case with tribes over gaming and enter into 
compacts as a condition of the settlement); Narrangansett Indian Tribe v. State, 667 A.2d 280 (R.1. 
1995) (holding that governor lacked authority to enter into gaming compact); cf Baird v. Norton, 266 
FJd 408 (6th Cir. 2001) (holding that legislators did not have standing to challenge Michigan gaming 
compacts on the basis of vote nullification theory); Salt River Pima-Maricopa Indian Cmty. v. Hull, 
945 P.2d 818 (Ariz. 1997) (holding that statute requiring governor to sign gaming compact was not 
unconstitutional violation of state separation of powers). 
800. See generally Kansas v. U.S., 249 F.3d 1213, 1225-26 (10th Cir. 2001); Sac & Fox 
Nation v. Norton, 240 F.3d 1250 (10th Cir. 2001). 
801. See generally Taxpayers Against Casinos v. State, 657 N.W.2d 503 (Mich. O. App. 
2002), Iv. granted, 669 N.W.2d 816 (Mich. 2003), ajf'd, 685 N.W.2d 221 (Mich. 2004), cert. denied. 
125 S. Ct. 1298 (2005). 
802. Sac & Fox Nation, 240 F.3d at 1258. 
803. Pueblo of Sandia v. Babbitt, 47 F. Supp. 2d 49,49 (D.D.C. 1999). 
804. 25 U.S.C. § 2701 (2000). 
805. ld § 2703. 
806. ld § 2703(6). 
807. See id § 2703(7). 
808. See id § 2703(8). 
809. 25 U.S.C. § 271O(dXi). 
810. See id § 271O(d)(I)(A). 
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any purpose by any person, organization, or entity.',s II Third, the gaming must be 
"conducted in confonnance with a Tribal-State compact entered into by the Indian 
Tribe and the State.',s12 
The contours of Indian gaming originated in litill1ation, and the scope of Indian gaming continues to be fleshed out through litigation. 3 The litigation can be roughly 
described as developing in waves. In the first wave, the federal courts validated 
Indian gaming in two important cases, one of which reached the Supreme Court. In 
the first, Seminole Tribe v. Butterworth,814 the Fifth Circuit held that a state could not 
enforce its law regulating high stakes bingo on reservation land, creating the 
"civiVregulatory" and "criminaVprohibitory" descriptions of state gaming laws that 
are generally codified in 25 U.S.C. § 2703(d)(1)(C).815 The Supreme Court later 
adopted that construction in California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians.816 As a 
result of the Supreme Court's decision, Congress enacted IGRA ostensibly to protect 
tribes interested in gaming or already gaming, from states and others that objected.817 
After the passage of IGRA, the second wave of litigation began. After tribes 
began to negotiate with states for waming compacts in accordance with IGRA, many 
states refused to sign compacts.81 IGRA provided that, in such a circumstance, the 
recalcitrant state could be sued in federal district court and forced to enter into a 
compact.819 Many tribes did exactly that, with some success.820 Eventually, the 
Supreme Court held in Seminole Tribe v. Florida821 that the Eleventh Amendment 
immunized the states from suit in federal court; this decision effectively eradicates a 
significant feature of the gaming statute, and hands over most of the bargaining 
power the tribes had taken from Cabazon to the recalcitrant states.822 Seminole Tribe 
meant that states could negotiate terms much more favorable to them in their compact 
811. ld § 2710(d)(I)(B). 
812. ld § 2710(~)(l)(C). 
813. See generally Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996); Seminole Tribe v. 
Butterworth, 658 F.2d 310 (5th Cir. 1981). 
814. 658 F.2d 310, cm. denied, 455 U.S. 1020 (1982). 
815. Seeid.at315-16. 
816. 480 U.S. 202, 209-10 (1987) (citing Seminole Tribe, 658 F.2d at 310). 
817. See 25 U.S.c. § 2702(1) (2000) ("The purpose of this chapter is ... to provide a 
statutory basis for the operation of gaming by Indian tribes as a means of promoting tribal economic 
development, self-sufficiency, and strong tribal governments."). 
818. See, e.g., Ponca Tribe v. Oklahoma, 37 F.3d 1422, 1424-25 (10th Cir. 1994); Cheyenne 
River Sioux Tribe v. South Dakota. 3 F.3d 273,276-77 (8th Cir. 1993). 
819. See 25 U.S.c. § 271O(d)(7). 
820. See generally Ponca Tribe, 37 F.3d at 1422; Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe, 3 FJd at 273; 
Calvello v. yankton Sioux Tribe, 899 F. Supp. 431 (D.S.D. 1995). 
821. 517 U.S. 44 (1996). 
822. Id at 72-73; cf Nancy J. Bride, Seminole Tnbe v. Florida: The Supreme Courts Botched 
Surgery o/the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, 24 J. LEGIS. 149, 153-54 (1998) (arguing that the 
Supreme Court should have decided Seminole Tribe the other way). 
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negotiations.823 The third wave of Indian gaming 1itigation-the gaming compact 
cases-arose when state governors began signing gaming compacts with Indian 
tribes.824 Often, the compacts are challenged on state law grounds or on the grounds 
that the governor had no authority to bind the state to the compact.825 
Along with the gaming compact cases, a parallel wave of litigation has arisen 
regarding the gaming conducted on lands acquired after the passage of IGRA on 
October 17, 1988.826 IGRA generally prohibits gaming on Indian lands acquired after 
the passage of IGRA,827 but there are exceptions.828 In these cases, newly restored 
and recognized tribes, as well as tribes that acquired land for the purpose of restoring 
their reservation base, seek to gain these so-called "after-acquired lands.,,829 Often, 
the lands are outside the tribes' reservation boundaries-if the tribe even has a 
reservation at all-and are labeled, often incorrectly, "off-reservation gaming.',s30 
These last two waves of litigation have arisen in the context of a very serious 
backlash by the non-Indian public against Indian gaming.83l 
The body of this section of the article focuses on the gaming compact cases, 
which turn on an absent sovereign and the court's analysis of the "equity and good 
conscience" standard expressed in the compulsory joinder rule in most federal and 
state court rules. These cases provide a useful and current view of the compulsory 
joinder rule and its application by modem courts where the absent party is an Indian 
tribe. 
823. See Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 53. 
824. See, e.g., Am. Greyhound Racing, Inc. v. Hull, 305 F.3d 1015, 1017 (9th Cir. 2002); 
Saratoga County Chamber of Commerce, Inc. v. Pataki, 798 N.E.2d 1047, 1049 (N.Y. 2003); 
Dairyland Greyhound Park, Inc. v. McCallum, 655 N.W.2d 474,476-77 (Wis. Ct. App. 2002). 
825. See, e.g., Am. Greyhound Racing Inc., 305 F.3d at 1017; Saratoga County Chamber of 
Commerce, Inc., 798 N .E.2d at 1049; Dairyland Greyhound Park, Inc., 655 N. W.2d at 476-77. 
826. See, e.g., Oregon v. Norton, 271 F. Supp. 2d 1270, 1275 (D. Or. 2003). 
827. See 25 U.S.c. § 2719(a) (2000). 
828. See id. § 2719(b). 
829. See, e.g., Norton, 271 F. Supp. 2d at 1279; City of Roseville v. Norton, 219 F. Supp. 2d 
130, 158-59 (D.D.C. 2002), qff'd, 348 F.3d 1020 (D.c. Cir. Nov. 17,2003); Grand Traverse Band of 
Ottawa and Chippewa Indians v. United States Attorney for the W. Dist. of Mich., 198 F. Supp. 2d 
920, 935-36 (W.D. Mich. 2002), qff'd, 369 F.3d 960 (6th Cir. 2004); Confederated Tribes of Coos, 
Lower Upmqua & Suislaw Indians v. Babbitt, 116 F. Supp. 2d 155, 159 (D.D.C. 2000); Sault Ste. 
Marie Tribe of Chippewa Indians v. United States, 78 F. Supp. 2d 699, 703-04 (W.D. Mich. 1999); 
Grand Traverse Band of Ottawa and Chippewa Indians v. United States Attorney for the W. Dist. of 
Mich., 46 F. Supp. 2d 689, 702 (W.D. Mich. 1999). 
830. See, e.g, City of Roseville v. Norton, 348 F.3d 1020, 1030 (D.c. Cir. 2003). 
831. See, e.g., id at 1023. 
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A. American Greyhound Racing, Inc. v. Hull 
In American Greyhound Racing, Inc. v. Hull,832 the Ninth Circuit reversed a 
district court decision ordering the governor of the state of Arizona to give notice of 
intent to terminate the Arizona Indian gaming compacts upon their expiration in 2003 
and enjoin the governor from negotiating new compacts.833 The Ninth Circuit, per 
Judge Canby, first described the history of Indian gaming in Arizona, calling it 
"rocky.,,834 In 1992, the Arizona legislature enacted a statute that granted authority to 
the governor to "enter into negotiations and execute tribal-state compacts with the 
Indian tribes in this state pursuant to the Indian gaming regulatory act of 1988.'.835 
The governor entered into gaming compacts with sixteen Arizona tribes in 1993 and 
1994.836 One tribe, the Salt River Pima Maricopa Indian Community, did not sign a 
compact. 837 After the Salt River Community successfully sponsored an initiative 
campaign requiring the governor to enter into additional compacts,838 individuals 
who held anti-Indian gaming views sued the governor to enjoin her from entering 
into the compact.839 The Arizona Supreme Court rejected the claim on the grounds 
the plaintiffs did not have standing.840 
After discussing the history of Indian gaming in Arizona, the court turned to the 
compacts themselves.841 The Arizona gaming compacts had ten-year terms, the first 
generation of which would expire in 2003.842 The compacts would automatically 
renew unless either party gave 180 days notice oftermination.843 Since the governor 
had indicated an interest in moditying some of the terms of the compacts, the parties 
had already entered into negotiations by the time American Greyhound Racing, a 
company that competes with Indian gaming facilities, filed its complaint in 2000.844 
The district court held the Arizona gaming compacts violated Arizona's 
prohibition on casino-style gaming and the compact authorization statute violated the 
832. 305 F.3d 1015 (9th Cir. 2002) [hereinafter Am. Greyhound 11], rev'g, Am. Greyhound 
Racing, Inc. v. Hull, 146 F. Supp. 2d 1012 (D. Ariz. 2001) [hereinafter Am. Greyhound 1]. 
833. See Am. Greyhound II, 305 F.3d at 1018 (citing Am. Greyhound I, 146 F. Supp. 2d at 
1054-59). 
834. Id. at 1019. 
835. ARIz. REv. STAT. § 5-60 1 (A) (2002). 
836. SeeAm Greyhound 11,305 F.3d at 1019. 
837. See id. at 1020. 
838. See id. (citing ARIz. REv. STAT. § 5-601-01). 
839. Seeid. 
840. Id. (citing Sears v. Hull, 961 P.2d 1013 (Ariz. 1998». 
841. See Am Greyhound II, 305 F.3d at 1020. 
842. Id. 
843. Id. 
844. Seeid. 
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state's separation of powers.845 The district court also held the Arizona compacting 
tribes were not necessary parties to the litigation.846 First, the district court held the 
tribes were not necessary parties in accordance with Rule 19(a)(l) "because complete 
relief can be accorded among the Plaintiffs and Defendants in their absence.',847 The 
court believed it was significant that American Greyhound sought only prospective 
relief, that is "how the [s]tate decides what duties or rights are appropriate for 
prospective compacts.',848 It makes little sense to say that prospective relief 
effectively banning Indian gaming would not injure the compacting tribes because the 
compacts were to expire in a few short years.849 Perhaps the district court heard the 
footsteps of a property interest taking without due process claim brought by 
compacting tribes or a contract claim.85o Second, the district court held tribes were 
not necessary parties in accordance with Rule 19(a)(2) because they had no "legally 
protected interest. ,,851 Since the only issue involved ''the limits of state law" that 
affected ''what the Governor will present to the tribes and what she can agree to,',852 a 
decision in favor of the race track ''would not implicate the rights IGRA guarantees 
the tribes.',853 Third, the district court held that since the governor retained the 
unfettered right to terminate the compacts, the gaming tribes had no protectable 
interest.854 The district court stated, "If the right to terminate is unconstrained, the 
ongoing existence of an agreernent is merely speculative.',855 
Initially, the Ninth Circuit held that the Arizona compacting tribes met the 
provisions of Rule 19(a)(2)(i) and were therefore necessary parties, overruling the 
district COurt.856 Writing for the majority, Judge Canby stated that 
[a]lthough the Governor had indicated a desire to negotiate modified compacts, 
to take effect when the original ten-year compacts expired, it is by no means 
probable that the Governor, if unable to negotiate different agreements, would 
845. See id. at 1021. 
846. SeeAm. Greyhound 1,146 F. Supp. 2d 1012, 1042-1051 (D. Ariz. 2001). 
847. Id. at 1045. 
848. Id. 
849. Seeid. 
850. See, e.g., Brief of Amici Curiae Grand Traverse Band of Ottawa and Chippewa Indians 
et aL at 21 n.2, Taxpayers Against Casinos v. Michigan, 657 N. W.2d 503 (Mich. Ct. App. 2002) (No. 
12283), a./f'd, 685 N.W.2d 221 (Mich. 2004), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct 1298 (2005) (discussing 
possible contract breach claim against State of Michigan if Indian gaming compacts are declared 
invalid by court). 
851. Am. Greyhound!, 146 F. Supp. 2d at 1047. 
852. Id. 
853. Id. 
854. See id. at 1046-47. 
855. Id. at 1046. 
856. SeeAm. Greyhound II, 305 F.3d 1015, 1018 (9th Cir. 2002). 
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have elected to tenninate the present ones and shut down virtually the entire 
Indian gaming industry in Arizona.857 
81 
Since the district court had ordered an injunction requiring the governor to give notice 
of intent to terminate,858 the court held "there can be no question that automatic 
tennination renders the compacts less valuable to the tribes. ,,859 As a ''practical 
matter," the district court's injunction affected the compacting tribes' interests.860 
First, the possibility that the governor would renew the compacts was eliminated.861 
Second, the district court's injunction amounted to a ruling that the gaming compacts 
were illegal, raising the possibility that law enforcement authorities might be 
compelled to act against the tribes.862 Third, the "sovereign power of the tribes" to 
negotiate was adversely affected, both in tenns of bargaining power and interest of 
the very authority to bargain.863 The Ninth Circuit also rejected the district court's 
conclusion that the compacting tribes could have no interest in illegal gaming.864 The 
court held tha,t, under Rule 19(a), the absent party's claim of an interest makes its 
presence necessary.865 In other words, the merits of the claimed interest, unless 
completely frivolous, should not enter the Rule 19( a) equation. 866 
The Ninth Circuit's analysis highlights how the district court's opinion was 
almost unreal in its shelving of the compacting tribes' interest.867 Indian gaming is a 
multi-million dollar industIy in Arizona and the district court issued an order ending 
all Indian gaming upon the expiration of the compacts in 2003.868 It is likely that the 
vast majority of the governmental services budget for the compacting tribes-items 
that would have included housing, health care, employment, social services, and 
everything a state and local government provides its constituents-were derived from 
gaming revenues.869 Compacting tribes had been gaming six or seven years 
already.870 To say that the tribes were not interested parties was an incredible twisting 
oflogic. 
857. Id. at 1023. 
858. Id. 
859. Id. (citing Kescoli v. Babbitt, 101 F.3d 1304, 1309-10 (9th Cir. 1996». 
860. See id. at 1023 (quoting FED. R CIY. P. 19(a)(2)(i». 
861. See Am. Greyhowui II, 305 F.3d at 1023. 
862. See id. at 1024. 
863. See id. (citing Dawavendewa v. Salt River Project Agric. Improvement & Power Dist., 
276 F.3d 1150, 1157 (9th Cir. 2002». 
864. Seeid. 
865. See id. (citing Shennoen v. United States, 982 F.2d 1312, 1317 (9th Cir. 1992». 
866. See Am. Greyhound II, 305 F.3d at 1023. 
867. See id. at 1021. 
868. See id. at 1021-22. 
869. See, e.g., Rand & Light, supra note 788, at 382. 
870. See, e.g., Saratoga County Chamber of Commerce, Inc. v. Pataki, 798 N.E.2d 1047, 
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In the gaming com~act cases, the third party and defendant factors usually weigh 
in favor of dismissal. 71 Most gaming compact cases are all or nothing cases, 
meaning that either the compacts are valid or not. In American Greyhound, for 
example, the district court had granted an injunction precluding the governor of 
Arizona from renewing the gaming compacts with the compacting tribes and from 
negotiating new compacts.872 The Ninth Circuit found no way to ameliorate the 
prejudice to the absentee tribes.873 Even removing the injunction would not have 
"protect[ ed] the tribes from other potential effects of the declaration that the gaming 
conducted by tribes pursuant to their compacts is illegal.,,874 Moreover, the injunction 
was an "essential remedy" for the plaintiffs; without it, the victory was hollow.875 
This was an all-or-nothing case. The court cannot shape a remedy to limit either side's 
prejudice. The compulsory joinder rule was not meant to decide these cases. 
Importantly, the American Greyhound court rejected the application of the so-
called "public rights" exception to gaming compact cases.876 The doctrine arose in 
the Ninth Circuit case, Conner v. Bujord,877 in which the court held that 
environmental groups could challenge the application of environmental protection 
laws to oil and gas leases without joining all of the lessees.878 The American 
Greyhound plaintiffs argued that their case should not be dismissed because it would 
ensure the governor acted in accordance with state law, invoking the "public rights" 
exception.879 The court narrowly defined the exception, holding that to qualify for the 
exception, "the litigation must transcend the private interests of the litigants and seek 
to vindicate a public right.,,880 The court looked to the plaintiffs' interest in the matter 
in rejecting their argument; "[T]heir interest is in freeing themselves from the 
competition of Indian gaming, not in establishing for all the principle of separation of 
powers.,,881 The court further wrote, "This litigation does not incidentally affect the 
gaming tribes in the course of enforcing some public right. This litigation is aimed at 
the tribes and their gaming.',s82 Judging the plaintiffs on their motivation, the court 
1049 (N.Y. 2003); Daityland Greyhound Park, Inc. v. McCalltun, 655 N.W.2d 474, 477 (Wis. Ct. 
App.2002). 
87l. See, e.g., Am. Greyhound II, 305 F.3d at 1018; Dairy/and Greyhound Park, Inc., 655 
N.W.2dat476. 
872. See Am. Greyhound II, 305 F.3d at 1018. 
873. See id. at 1025. 
874. Id. 
875. See id. 
876. See id. at 1025-27. 
877. 848 F.2d 1441, 1458-59 (9th Cir. 1988). 
878. See id. at 1460-61. 
879. See Am. Greyhound II, 305 F.3d at 1025-26. 
880. Id.at 1026 (quotingKescoliv. Babbitt, 101 F.3d 1304,1311 (9thCir.1996)). 
881. Id. 
882. Id. 
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concluded, ''The plaintiffs sought this injunction to avoid competitive hann to their 
own operations. The general subject of gaming may be of great public interest, but 
the rights in issue between the plaintiffs in this case, the tribe and the state are more 
private than public.',s83 
The ''public rights" exception to the indispensable party rule aPRears to be a 
doctrine that has as much value as a substantive due process claim. 84 The Ninth 
Circuit might do so in extremely limited circumstances. However, the Wisconsin 
Court of Appeals and the New York Court of Appeals adopted a very similar rule 
with a much lower threshold for a plaintiff to pasS.885 The Ninth Circuit's analysis 
and its rejection of the doctrine in American Greyhound is persuasive when applied to 
those cases. The court found that American Greyhound Racing could not compete as 
well as they would have liked against the Arizona Indian gaming tribes and so they 
sought to undercut the legal basis for the compacting tribes' activities.886 This 
motivation, purely a private economic motivation, is an important factor to weigh in 
an analysis that relies on the ambiguous "in equity and good conscience" standard.887 
As seen elsewhere, the plaintiffs that bring gaming compact cases are not solely 
interested in the proper operation of state law; these plaintiffs are anti-Indian gaming, 
. Indi i'" tak 888 Th anh- an, or ave a pure y econormc pnvate mterest at s e. ere are no 
organizations devoted exclusively to state constitutional separation of powers and the 
typical organization wears its motivation on its sleeve, such as Taxpayers of Michigan 
Against Casinos,889 People Against a Casino Town,890 and National Coalition Against 
Gaming Expansion.891 Politicians and legislators also seem to state their position 
clearly, usually in their vote or in their public statements. 
American Greyhound was a federal court slam-dunk for the Arizona gaming 
tribes that asserted their rights as a sovereign.892 The New York and Wisconsin 
gaming tribes have not been so successful. 
883. Id 
884. SeeAm Greyhound 11,305 FJd at 1025-27. 
885. See, e.g., Saratoga County Chamber of Commerce v. Pataki, 798 N.E.2d 1047, 1058-59 
(N.Y. 2003); DaiIyland Greyhound Pruk, Inc. v. McCallum, 655 N.W.2d 474,486 & n.14 (Wis. Ct. 
App.2002). 
886. Am. Greyhound ll, 305 F.3d at 1026. 
887. Id at 1025 (quoting FED. R. CIv.P. 19(b». 
888. See, e.g., Saratoga County ChamberojCommerce, Inc., 798 N.E.2d at 1049; Dairyland 
Greyhound Park, Inc., 655 N.W.2d at 476-77. 
889. See TOMAC v. Norton, 193 F. Supp. 2d 182, 185 (D.D.C. 2002); Taxpayers Against 
Casinos v. State, 657 N.W.2d 503, 505 (Mich. Ct. App. 2003), Iv. granted, 669 N.W.2d 816 (Mich. 
2003), qff'd, 685 N.W.2d 221 (Mich. 2004), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 1298 (2005). 
890. See Susan Palmer, Casino Lawsuit in Wrong Court, State S0'S, EUGENE (OR.) REGISTER-
GUARD, Oct. 24, 2003, available at http://news.statesmanjournal.com/article.cfm?i=71426. 
891. See City of Roseville v. Norton, 348 F.3d 1020, 1021 (D.c. Cir. 2003). 
892. See, e.g., Am. Greyhound 11,305 F.3d at 1027. 
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B. Saratoga County Chamber of Commerce, Inc. v. Pataki 
The most recent clash between tribal sovereignty and anti-Indian gaming 
plaintiffs took place in Saratoga County Chamber of Commerce, Inc. v. Pataki, 
decided by the New York Court of Appeals.893 Saratoga County involved the 
authority of the governor of New York State to enter into gaming compacts with 
Indian tribes, specifically, the St. Regis Mohawk Tribe.894 The governor entered into a 
gaming compact with the tribe in 1993895 and executed an amendment to the 
compact in 1999 allowing the tribe to operate electronic Class III games for one 
year.896 Subsequently, the governor and the tribe executed two further 
amendments.897 The Department of Interior approved the compact and the first 
amendment, but not the latter amendments.898 As such, since the authorization to 
operate electronic Class III games had expired in 2000 and the department had not 
approved the extensions, the tribe's continued operation of electronic Class III games 
was without authorization.899 The court also noted the governor acted without 
legislative approval.900 
The plaintiffs were "[l]egislators, organizations and individuals opposed to 
casino gambling.,,901 They sought a declaratory judgment that the 1999 compact 
amendment and the 1993 compact were void and unenforceable.902 They also sought 
an injunction against the governor from taking action to execute a gaming compact 
that would allow the tribe to operate electronic Class III games.903 The New York 
Supreme Court granted the plaintiffs the relief they requested in 2001, and the 
appellate division affirmed in 2002.904 
The state argued, at the trial court level, that New York Civil Practice Law and 
Rule 1001(b)(2)905 required the dismissal of the case because the tribe was an 
893. 798 N.E.2d 1047 (N.Y. 2003) [hereinafter Saratoga I1l], cerro denied, 124 S. Ct. 570 
(2003). 
894. Id. at 1049. 
895. Id. 
896. Id. at 1050. 
897. See Saratoga III, 798 N.E.2d at 1050. 
898. Id. 
899. Id. 
900. See id. at 1049, 1051. 
901. Id. at 1047 
902. Saratoga III, 798 N.E.2d at 1050. 
903. Id. 
904. See id. at 1051 (citing Saratoga County Chamber of Commerce, Inc. v. Pataki, 293 
A.D.2d 20, 26 (N.Y. App. Div. 2002) [hereinafter Saratoga II]. 
905. This rule is comparable to the Federal Rule 19(b) and reads: 
When a person who should be joined under subdivision (a) has not been made a party and 
is subject to the jurisdiction of the court, the court shall order him summoned. If 
HeinOnline -- 40 Gonz. L. Rev. 85 2004-2005
2004/05] INDISPENSABLE SOVEREIGNS 85 
indispensable party.906 The trial court agreed, but the appellate division reversed.907 
The appellate court believed it "noteworthy" in its compulsory joinder analysis that 
"in every state whose constitution does not grant residual powers to the executive, the 
litigation resulted in a declaration that the compact is void and unenforceable absent 
legislative concurrence.,,908 It further held that the public interest in resolving "the 
considerable uncertainty concerning the [g]overnor's authority to bind the [s]tate to 
tribal gaming compacts and the types of gaming that may be legally authorized in 
New York" outweighed the tribe's sovereign interests in not participating in a state 
court determination of its rights under its gaming compact.909 The court concluded by 
finding that the tribe's interests were not so great after all because ''the complaints do 
not seek to interfere with any of the [t]ribe's gaming facilities or activities," except for 
the electronic gaming termina1S.910 
On June 12, 2003, the New York Court of Appeals affirmed the appellate 
division.911 The governor argued again the tribes should be considered indispensable 
parties because "a judgment eviscerating the authority under which [the tribe] 
operate[d] the casino should be sufficient to dismiss the action.,,912 The court, by a 4-
3 majority, disagreed.913 In the words of the court, "[T]he [t]ribe has chosen to be 
absent.,,914 For the majority, the damage done to the "sovereign prerogatives of the 
Indian [t]ribes,,915 are tempered by the fact that the tribe had the "opportunity to be 
jurisdiction over him can be obtained only by his consent or appearance, the court, when 
justice requires, may allow the action to proceed without his being made a party. In 
detennining whether to allow the action to proceed, the court shall consider: ... 
2. the prejudice which may accrue from the nonjoinder to the defendant or to the person 
not joined; 
N.Y. C.P.LR l00I(bX2) (McKinney 2003). Perhaps the most obvious deviation ofC.PRL. l00I(b) 
is the omission of the phrase "in equity and good conscience" that is present in federal Rule 19(b) and 
most other state court compulsory joinder rules. 
906. Saratoga County Chamber of Commerce, Inc. v. Pataki, 275 A.D.2d 145, 150 (N.Y. 
App. Div. 2000) [hereinafter Saratoga 1]. 
907. Id at 158-59. 
908. Id at 152 (citing Jicarilla Apache Tribe v. Kelly, 129 F.3d 535, 537 (lOth Cir. 1997); 
Kickapoo Tribe of Indians v. Babbitt, 827 F. Supp. 37,47 (D.D.C. 1993), rev'd on other grounds, 43 
F.3d 1491 (D.c. Cir. 1995); McCartney v. Attorney General, 587 N.W.2d 824, 827 (Mich. Ct. App. 
1998), Iv. denied, 601 N.W.2d 101 (Mich. 1999); Narragansett Indian Tribe v. Rhode Island, 667 
A.2d 280,282 (R.I. 1995); State ex- rei. CIarX v. Johnson, 904 P.2d 11,23 (N.M. 1995); State ex- rei. 
Stephan v. Finney, 836 P.2d 1169, 1185 (Kan. 1992)). 
909. Id. 
910. Id. at 153. 
911. Saratoga llJ, 798 N.E.2d 1047, 1062 (N. Y. 2003). 
912. Id at 1058. 
913. See id. 
914. Id. 
915. Id. 
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heard.,,916 The court used the fact that the tribe exercised its "sovereign prerogative" 
against the tribe, noting that its appearance as amicus curiae allowed the tribe to 
"mak[ e] the same arguments we would expect to be made by the [t ]ribe had it chosen 
to participate.,,917 For the court, any prejudice the tribe would suffer by refusing to 
consent to state court jurisdiction was its own fault.918 The Supreme Court in Martin 
v. Wilks, interpreting Rule 19, rejected the argument that an absent party's interest is 
protected by their chance to intervene.919 The Court did not discuss the prejudice the 
tribe would suffer by consenting to its jurisdiction, a remarkable and unfortunate 
OmISSIon. 
The New York Court of Appeals was persuaded that the lack of an available 
remedy outweighed the tribe's sovereign interests.920 This is a powerful argument on 
its face, but, as shown in this article, the argument is disingenuous. The court believed 
that the plaintiffs would "be stripped of a remedy if we hold that the [t]ribe is an 
indispensable party, [and] no member of the public will ever be able to bring this 
constitutional challenge.,,921 Moreover, the court predicted, absent adjudication of the 
merits, ''the [e ]xecutive could sign agreements with any entity beyond the jurisdiction 
of the Court, free of constitutional interdiction. The [e ]xecutive's actions would thus 
be insulated from review, a prospect antithetical to our system of checks and 
balances.,,922 The court made no attempt to discuss the interests of the sovereign, 
except to assert, "[T]he [t]ribe could have mitigated that prejudice by participating in 
the suit. ,,923 
The dissent emphasized the suit was an attempt by the plaintiffs to shut down the 
tribe's casino, "[s]ix years and millions of dollars" after the execution of the original 
compact in 1993.924 The dissent distinguished the plaintiffs' challenge from other 
challenges in other jurisdictions by stating, ''No other state or federal court, however, 
has grappled with indispensability in light of the extraordinary delay in bringing suit 
manifest here.,,925 The prejudice to the tribe, by allowing the suit to proceed, in the 
916. Saratoga Ill. 798 N.E.2d at 1058 (quoting First Nat'l Bank v. Shiller, 47 N.E. 262 
(1897)). 
917. Jd. 
918. Seeid at 1058-59. 
919. 490 U.S. 755, 764-65 (1989); see also YEAZELL, supra note 58, at 938. 
920. Saratoga Ill, 798 N.E.2d at 1058. 
921. Jd 
922. Jd 
923. Jd. at 1059 (citing United States ex rei. Steele v. Tum Key Gaming, Inc., 135 FJd 1249, 
1252 (8th Cir. 1998) (involving a suit brought by a tribal officer to invalidate a contract and where a 
non-Indian contractor tried to assert that the tribe's absence should have forced the court to dismiss 
the action)). 
924. Jd. at 1067 (Read, 1., dissenting). 
925. Saratoga Ill. 798 N.E.2d at 1068 & n.3 (citing State ex rei. Clark v. Johnson, 904 P.2d 11 
(N.M. 1995); Connecticut ex rei. Blumenthal v. Babbitt, 899 F. Supp. 80 (D. Conn. 1995); State ex 
rei. Coll v. Johnson, 990 P.2d 1277 (N.M. 1999); Sac & Fox Nation v. Norton, 240 F.3d 1250 (1Oth 
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dissent's eyes, was exacerbated by the fact that "[i]f plaintiffs had sued even 
reasonably promptly, the [t]ribe could have avoided or delayed substantial 
investments of time and money to develop the casinO.,,926 The dissent was also 
concerned by "the potential economic threat posed by this litigation to the casino's 
400-odd employees and to the [t]ribe's long-term economic prospects.,,927 Moreover, 
the dissent argued that the tribe's reliance on the gaming compact's validity was not 
misplaced, due to ''the [l]egislature's prompt and consistent support of the 1993 
Compact.,,928 The legislature's support was evidenced by legislation authorizing the 
State Police and the Division of Criminal Justice Systems to fulfill their 
responsibilities under the compact and appropriations to the State Police and the state 
Racing and Wagering Board to support their gaming regulatory activities.929 The 
dissent relied upon Schultz v. State. 930 In Schultz, the New York Court of Appeals 
dismissed a taxpayer's challenge to a state financing measure because the taxpayer 
waited eleven months after the measure's enactment and therefore was barred by 
laches.931 The dissent reasoned that if eleven months were long enough in Schultz to 
generate ''profound destabilizing and prejudicial effects from delay,,,932 then six years 
in the gaming compact case was also too long.933 
A court has broad discretion when viewing questions in equity, but the Schultz 
majority's failure to examine all the potential equitable factors is egregious. First, as 
the dissent noted, millions of dollars had been expended in furtherance of the gaming 
enterprise, not only by the tribe, but by the tribe's non-Indian bankers, contractors, 
vendors, and local governments in support of the enterprise.934 It is well established 
that local governments and economies ffoW to depend on Indian gaming, nearly as 
much as the gaming tribes themselves.9 5 The dissent also noted that it was probable 
that the casino employed hundreds of people, most of whom were probably non-
Cir. 2001), cen. denied sub nom. Wyandotte Nation v. Sac & Fox Nation, 534 U.S. 1078 (2002); 
Dairyland Greyhound Park, Inc. v. McCallum, 655 N.W.2d 474 (Wis. Ct App.), review denied, 655 
N.w.2d 129 (Wis. 2002); Am. Greyhound Racing, Inc. v. Hull, 305 F.3d 1015 (9th Cir. 2002». 
926. Id. at 1069. 
927. ld. 
928. ld. at 1070. 
929. See id. 
930. See Saratoga IlL 798 N.E.2d at 1069 (citing Schultz v. State, 615 N.E.2d 953 (N.Y. 
1993». 
931. See &hu/tz, 615 N.E.2d at 957-58 (Srnith, 1., dissenting). 
932. ld. at 957. 
933. See Saratoga 111, 798 N.E.2d at 1072. 
934. See id at 1067-68. 
935. See, e.g., California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202, 218-19 (1987); 
Grand Traverse Band of Ottawa and Chippewa Indians v. United States Attorney for the W. Dist. of 
Mich., 198 F. Supp. 2d 920, 926 (WD. Mich. 2002), qIf'd, 369 F.3d 960 (6th Cir. 2004); Goldberg-
Ambrose, supra note 790, at 97-98. 
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Indians.936 Taking the revenue source away from the tribe might create a chain-
reaction of economic devastation, starting with the tribe and moving like a wave 
through the local non-Indian populace and the financing bodies. The interests of 
absent parties, however, were rendered utterly voiceless by the majority.937 Second, 
the court characterized the plaintiffs as warriors for democracy and protectors of their 
state constitution.938 But these plaintiffs appear to be in the same class as the plaintiffs 
in American Greyhound, where the Ninth Circuit found them to be pushing solely 
private commercial interests. Or are they really minority politicians with an anti-
gaming constituency, pemaps the same private commercial interests? The majority 
never answers these questions. Pemaps they were never raised. One question that was 
raised by the dissent is why did these warriors for democracy wait years and years to 
file suit.939 These plaintiffs' interests could not have been consuming their every 
waking moment in order to let what they must have believed to be clear violations of 
the state constitutional separation of powers doctrine. The majority weighed these 
amorphous interests against the interests of the tribe, the local govemments, non-
Indians contractually related to the casino, and even the state.940 Third, the majority 
completely ignored the alternative fora available for the plaintiffs.941 There was a 
clear strategic reason that these plaintiffs sued in state court. There is a long history of 
state court animosity toward Indian rights, not just in New York.942 Few, if any, tribes 
would consent to suit in state courts unless they had no other choice. Part of a tribe's 
sovereignty is the right to choose when and where to be sued.943 For the New York 
Court of Appeals, an Indian tribe's interest in its sovereignty is its own interest, while 
the state court's interest in judicial review is its own interest and, therefore, controls. 
Moreover, the court did not consider the political avenues available to the 
plaintiffs.944 There is no real difference between these plaintiffs and the tribal member 
plaintiffs-often characterized as dissidents or factions, the losers in the tribal 
political process-that are routinely dismissed for failure to join the absent tribe. 
These plaintiffs were elevated to the level of constitutional warrior. These plaintiffs 
936. See Saratoga llI, 798 N.E.2d at 1069. 
937. Seeid. at 1057. 
938. Cf id. at 1053. 
939. See id. at 1067. 
940. See id. at 1057-58. 
941. Cf Saratoga llI, 798 N.E.2d at 1076. 
942. See generally Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. 261, 313 n.ll (1997) (Souter, J., 
dissenting) ("And when the plaintiff suing the state officers has been an Indian tribe, the readiness of 
the state courts to vindicate the federnl right has been less than perfect."); Native Vill. of Venetie 
I.R.A. Council v. Alaska, 944 F.2d 548, 553-54 (9th Cir. 1991) ("It would thus be ironic indeed if 
Congress then pennitted only state courts, never believed by Congress to be the historical defenders 
of tribal interests, to detennine the scope of tribal authority under the Act") (citing 25 U.S.c. § 
1901(5) (1998». 
943. See generally Goldberg-Ambrose, supra note 790, at 100-03. 
944. See Saratoga llI, 798 N.E.2d at 1049. 
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could have initiated a recall, like in California, or placed a referendum on the ballot, 
or introduced legislation to undennine the governor's asserted authority, but it 
appears they did nothing of the sort.945 Perhaps, their efforts were defeated by a 
political majority, only to be resurrected by an activist court. Finally, given that the 
court's ultimate reasoning is that there is no other way for these plaintiffs to bring 
these constitutional claims and, as will be seen below, there are actually alternative 
avenues such as suing the gaming tribes directly; what the court says is that there is 
no other way for the plaintiffs to bring a state court action.946 There is no particular 
'gh h . 947 n t, owever, to a state court actIon. 
C. Dairyland Greyhound Park, Inc. v. McCallum 
Another recent case rejecting the argument that the gaming tribes are 
indispensable parties in gaming compact cases, is Dairyland Greyhound Park, Inc. v. 
McCallum.948 The Wisconsin Court of Appeals, construing the Wisconsin court rule 
on indispensable parties,949 held that "the interests of the public in having the 
945. Cf Garreaux v. Andrus, 676 F.2d 1206, 1210 (8th Cir. 1982) ("Garreaux is not without 
alternative remedies in that the tribal constitution provides a procedure for passing a resolution by 
referendum which would be binding on the tribal council. The appellee also states that tribal council 
members may be voted out of office at regular or special elections."); Kickapoo Tribe v. Thomas, 10 
Indian L. Rptr. 3093, 3095 (D. Kan. June 24, 1983) ("[T]he parties in this case can participate in the 
tribal council elections to change the makeup of the tribal council."). See generally Ordinance 59 
Ass'n v. United States Dept of the Interior, 163 F.3d 1150, 1157 (lOth Cir. 1998) ("As the Tribe's 
supreme governmental body, the General Council may be suited to resolve the apparent conflict 
between the Tribal Court and the Business Council."). 
Id. 
946. See Saratoga III, 798 N.E.2d at 1075-76. 
947. Id at 1074-76. 
948. 655 N.W.2d 474 (Wis. Ct. App. 2002), 1t?View denied, 655 N.W.2d 129 (Wis. 2002). 
949. See WIS. STAT. ANN. § 803.03(3) (West 1994): 
[a]ny such person has not been so joined, the judge to whom the case has been assigned 
shall order that the person be made a party. If the person should join as a plaintiff but 
refuses to do so, the person may be made a defendant, or, in a proper case, an involuntary 
plaintiff. If a person as described in subs. (l) and (2) cannot be made a party, the court 
shall determine whether in equity and good conscience the action should proceed among 
the parties before it, or should be dismissed, the absent person being thus regarded as 
indispensable. The factors to be considered by the court include: 
(a) To what extent a judgment rendered in the person's absence might be prejudicial to the 
person or those already parties; 
(b) The extent to which, by protective provisions in the judgment, by the shaping of relief, 
or other measures, the prejudice can be lessened or avoided; 
(c) Whether a judgment rendered in the person's absence will be adequate; and 
(d) Whether the plaintiff will have an adequate remedy if the action is dismissed for 
nonjoinder. 
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issues ... resolved tips the scales in favor ofpennitting the action to continue.,,950 As 
in Arizona, the case was brought by a direct competitor of gaming tribes, a dog track 
racing concem.951 The court relied heavily on "the interests of the public" and the 
lack of a remedy available to "the public" in the case of disrnissal.952 Discussing two 
out-of-state precedents, the California Court of Appeals decision in People ex reI. 
Lungren v. Community Redevelopment Agency953 and the New York Appellate 
Division's decision in Saratoga County Chamber o/Commerce, Inc. v. Pataki,954 the 
court identified concerns that the dismissal of the case would ensure that "important 
and far-reaching issues" would never be heard in state COurts.955 The court concluded, 
There can be little question that the citizens of Wisconsin have a considerable 
interest in ensuring that state officials act in accordance with the peoples' will as 
expressed in the state constitution. If this action is dismissed because the tribes 
cannot be joined as parties, not only will Dairyland have no adequate remedy, 
but an important legal issue having significant public policy implications will 
evade resolution.956 
Construing state law in Dairyland Greyhound, the court expanded upon the 
concepts elucidated in American Greyhound as applied to its own compulsory joinder 
rule.957 In Dairyland Greyhound, the provision in the Wisconsin tribes' gaming 
compacts mirrored Arizona's compacts as the governor had the power to either renew 
or terminate the compacts.958 The plaintiffs argued that, because the tribes did not 
950. Dairyland Greyhound Park, Inc., 655 N.W2d at 486. 
951. Seeid. at 476-77. 
952. Seeid.at486-87&n.14. 
953. 65 Cal. Rptr. 2d 786 (Ct. App. 1997). 
954. 275 A.D.2d 145 (N.Y. App. Div. 2000), ajf'd, 798 N.E.2d 1047 (N.Y. 2003), cert. 
denied, 124 S. Ct. 570 (2003). 
955. Dairyland Greyhound Park, Inc., 655 N.W2d at 486 (quoting Saratoga 1,275 A.D.2d at 
151-52). 
956. Id. at 487. 
957. Id. at 478-79. The Wisconsin necessary party rule reads as follows: 
A person who is subject to setvice of process shall be joined as a party in the action if 
(a) In the person's absence complete relief cannot be accorded among those already 
parties; or 
(b) The person claims an interest relating to the subject of the action and is so situated that 
the disposition of the action in the person's absence may: 
1. As a practical matter impair or impede the person's ability to protect that interest; or 
2. Leave any of the persons already parties subject to a substantial risk of incurring double, 
multiple or otheIWise inconsistent obligations by reason of his or her claimed interest. 
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 803.03(1). 
958. See Dairyland Greyhound Park, Inc., 655 N.W2d at 480. 
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have a "legally protected" or "enforceable right," they were not necessary parties.959 
The court held that the interest required to be claimed "is defmed broadly in 
Wisconsin law, and that it goes well beyond the concept of a 'legally protected' 
interest, as Dairyland argues.,,960 All that was required was "an interest of such direct 
and immediate character that the [ absent party] will either gain or lose by the direct 
operation of the judgment.,,961 The court concluded, ''The tribes' interest in 
preserving their opportunity to convince the Governor of the wisdom of permitting 
the compacts to be extended beyond their current expiration dates is therefore a 
sufficient interest to render the . tribes necessary parties under WIS. STAT. § 
803.03(1)(b)(1 ).,,962 
The court agreed with the parties that the second and third factors of the rule had 
little weight for either side.96 The court noted that "the Governor will either be 
enjoined from permitting the compacts to renew, or he will not be.,,964 However, the 
court rejected the plaintiffs' argument that the governor was adequately aligned with 
the gaming tribes' interests enough to represent the tribes' interests.965 In large part, 
the court employed an economic interests analysis in reaching this conclusion, relying 
on a May 2000 report of the Wisconsin Legislative Reference Bureau entitled, ''The 
Evolution of Legalized Gambling in Wisconsin.,,966 The report noted that the state 
government would receive average annual payments from the gaming tribes 
amounting to $23.7 million, but that the tribes expected $300 million annually in 
gaming profits.967 As such, while the court acknowledged that both the governor and 
the tribes were aligned in seeking to protect the governor's "ability to exercise 
discretion and political judgment" regarding the gaming compact renewal, the court 
heavily weighed the fact that ''the financial consequences of not renewing the 
compacts would fall disproportionately on the tribes.,,968 The court also reviewed the 
sometimes acrimonious relationship between the governor's office and the tribes 
regarding "issues relating to the scope of Indian gaming in Wisconsin.,,969 They 
concluded by finding that the governor would be limited in his ability, both politically 
959. Id. 
960. Id. at 481. 
961. Id. (quoting City of Madison v. Wis. Employment Relations Comm'n, 6\0 N.W.2d 94, 
98 n.9 (Wis. 2000)). 
962. Id at 481-82. 
963. Dairyland Greyhound Park, Inc., 655 NW.2d at 485 (construing WIS. STAT. ANN. § 
803.03(3)(b) (West 1994)). 
964. Id. 
965. See id. at 482-83. 
966. Seeid.at477. 
967. See id. at 482 n.9. 
968. Dairyland Greyhound Park, Inc., 655 N.W.2d at 482. 
969. /d. (citing Lac du Flambeau Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians v. Wisconsin, 770 
F. Supp. 480 (W.D. Wis. 1991), appeal dismissed, 957 F.2d 515 (7th Cir. 1992)). 
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and equitably, from arguing ''the supremacy of federal law in constraining a state's 
ability to curtail Indian gaming.,,970 The Dairy/and Greyhound court also rejected the 
argument that the tribes' participation as amici curiae adequately protected their 
interests.971 While the tribes might have their interests heard, amicus status "does not 
secure to them the procedural rights and protections of a party, for example, to engage 
in discovery, to file dispositive motions, or to appeal an adverse decision.,,972 
This court appears to be convinced that the lack of alternative forum for the 
plaintiffs controlled the decision.973 Other than this one issue, the court correctly 
determined that the state and the tribes had different interests; the tribes' efforts as 
amici could not allow them to adequately participate, and the tribes' interests were 
considerable.974 However, the court's reliance on two out-of-state court of appeals 
cases is unfortunate, especially considering that the Ninth Circuit decided the case 
with the closest factual situation, American Greyhound,975 on exactly the same day, 
September 19,2002.976 
D. Artichoke Joe's v. Norton 
Although the tribal interest in the validity of its own gaming compact is 
significant, some courts hold that Indian tribes are not necessary parties at all; 
deciding instead that the state or federal party to the compact can adequately represent 
the tribe's interest. In Artichoke Joe's v. Norton,977 the district court held that the 
United States could adequately represent the interests of the sixty-one California 
gaming tribes hauled into court by California card clubs and charities challenging the 
validity of the California Indian gaming compacts.978 Amicus curiae California 
Nations Indian Gaming Association argued that the challenge should have been 
dismissed because the plaintiffs did not join the gaming tribes.979 The court applied 
the Ninth Circuit's test for determining whether an existing party may adequately 
represent the interests of the absentee: "(I) the present party will undoubtably make 
all of the absent party's arguments, (2) the present party is capable and willing to 
make the absent party's arguments, and (3) the absent party would not offer any 
970. Id. (citing Wolffv. Town of Jamestown, 601 N.W.2d 301, 306 (WIs. Ct App. 1999». 
971. Id. at 482 (citing WIchita and Affiliated Tribes v. Hodel, 788 F.2d 765, 775 (D.C. Cir. 
1986). 
972. Id. 
973. See Dairyland Greyhound Park, Inc., 655 N.W.2d at 482-83. 
974. See id. at 485-86. 
975. Am. GreyhOlmd, Inc. v. Hull, 305 F.3d 1015 (2002). 
976. Dairyland Greyhound Park, Inc., 655 N.w.2d at 474. 
977. 216 F. Supp. 2d 1084 (E.D. Cal. 2(02), aff'd on other grounds, 353 F.3d 712 (9th Cir. 
2003), cert. denied, 125 S. O. 51 (2004). 
978. See id. at 1118-20. 
979. Id. at 1118. 
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necessary elements that the present parties would neglect.,,98o Because the United 
States and the California gaming tribes "agree[ d] on the central issue at hand: 
Exclusive class ill gaming compacts for Indian Tribes are consistent with IGRA and 
the Equal Protection Clause," there could be no conflict of interest between the tribes 
and the United StateS.981 As such, the tribes were not necessary parties and the court 
did not enter into the indispensable party analysis.982 
This case was seriously undercut by the Ninth Circuit's decision in American 
Greyhound a little over a month later.983 Surely, the district court would have found 
differently on the necessary party issue. Nevertheless, the. decision is weak because, 
as the Dairyland Greyhound court found, the state's interest in Indian gaming is never 
as substantial or as fundamental as the absent tribe's.984 Local and state politics may 
constrain the state defendants from advancing arguments on the expansiveness of 
tribal jurisdiction or the limitation of state jurisdiction.985 Moreover, a state election 
may change the defendants, thereby possibly forcing a change in litigation strategy or 
even sides.986 Finally, the dangers to the state from losing gaming revenues, likely a 
very small portion of the state budget, is nothing compared to the impact to a ~aming 
tribe oflosing its gaming revenues, likely the vast majority of its entire budget. 87 
E. New Mexico Gaming Compact Cases 
The New Mexico courts have handled more litigation involving Indian gaming 
compacts than any other jurisdiction.988 The courts have built an impressive body of 
law on the issue of absent tribes, Indian gaming, and the compulsory joinder rule.989 
The state cases are discussed first, followed by two New Mexico federal cases. 
980. [d. (citing Shennoen v. United States, 982 F.2d 1312,1318 (9th Cir. 1992)). 
981. [d. at 1119. 
982. SeeArtichokeJoes, 216 F. Supp. 2dat ll20. 
983. See Am. Greyhound Racing, Inc. v. Hull, 305 F.3d 1015, 1024 (9th Cir. 2002) (finding 
compacting tribes were necessmy parties to litigation). 
984. See Dairyland Greyhound Parle, Inc. v. McCallum, 655 N.W.2d 474, 481-82 (Wis. Ct 
App.2oo2). 
985. See generally id. at 482 (stating political judgment is exercised when considering tribal 
compacts). 
986. See generally id. at 481 (explaining that the lawsuit was based upon an elected official's 
political discretion). 
987. See generally id. at 480 (noting that financial consequences oflosing gaming revenues 
would be "catastrophic" for the tribes). 
988. See, e.g., State ex rei. Coli v. Johnson, 990 P.2d 1277 (N.M. 1999); Srader v. Verant, 964 
P.2d 82 (N.M. 1998); State ex rei. Clark v. Johnson, 904 P.2d 11 (N.M. 1995). 
989. See cases cited supra note 988. 
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1. State ex rei. Clark v. Johnson 
In State ex reI. Clark v. Johnson,990 the New Mexico Supreme Court granted a 
petition for writ of mandamus against the governor, precluding him from 
implementing the gaming compacts and revenue sharing agreements with the state's 
tribes and pueblos.991 The governor entered into gaming compacts with two tribes 
and eleven pueblos in 1995, without the participation of the New Mexico 
legislature.992 The petitioners argued the governor had no authority to bind the state 
because his actions violated the state constitution's separation of powers provision.993 
The governor argued, in part, that the case should have been dismissed because 
the tribes and pueblos were indispensable parties.994 The court disagreed in a 
summary paragraph, citing state law regarding mandamus; "In a mandamus case, a 
party is indispensable if the 'performance of an act [to be compelled by the writ of 
mandamus is] dependent on the will of a third party, not before the court. ,,,995 
Ignoring any interest the tribes and pueblos would have on the outcome of a case that 
would determine the validity of their gaming compacts, the court held they were not 
indispensable parties because the writ of mandamus would operate to restrict only the 
governor's authority.996 Moreover, the court held that state law, not the compact, was 
the origin of the governor's authority, if any, and therefore the resolution of the action 
"does not require us to adjudicate the rights and obligations of the respective parties 
to the compact.,,997 
The case is limited to its facts in that it arose out of a petition for writ of 
mandamus.998 After Clark, the New Mexico Supreme Court decided Srader v. 
Verant.999 In Srader, individuals who lost money gambling at Indian casinos sued the 
bankers of the gaming facilities, argued that the financial institutions supported illegal 
gambling. lOoo The court agreed with the plaintiffs that, after Clark, no Indian gaming 
was legal in New Mexico without valid gaming compacts. 1001 However, the court 
concluded that the gaming tribes and pueblos were indispensable parties to the suit 
990. 904 P.2d 11 (N.M. 1995). 
991. ld. at 27. 
992. See id. at 15. 
993. ld. (citing N.M. CONST. art. ill, § 1). 
994. ld. at 19. 
995. State ex rei. Clark, 904 P.2d at 19 (quoting Chavez v. Baca, 144 P.2d 175, 182 (N.M. 
1943)). 
996. Seeid. 
997. ld. 
998. ld. at 15. 
999. 964 P.2d 82 (N.M. 1998). 
1000. ld. at 85. 
1001. See id. at 88. 
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against the banks.1002 First, the court held the gaming tribes and pueblos were 
necessary parties under the state rule.1003 Since the plaintiffs requested that the banks 
freeze the gaming accounts and further requested that the state law enforcement 
officers investigate the gaming facilities for illegal gaming, the court found that such 
action: 
would halt the exchange of money upon which the tribes rely for business at 
their casinos. It calls for the confiscation of property and funds in which the 
tribes have an interest, the garnishment of tribal funds, the interruption of 
commercial relationships between the tribes and financial institutions, and the 
nullification of transactions in which the tribes have an interest. Furthermore, it 
calls upon government and law enforcement officials to carry out these remedies 
where necessary. 1004 
The court held that the gaming tribes and pueblos could not be joined, due to their 
immunity from suit in state courts. I 005 
The court concluded that the gaming tribes and pueblos were indispensable 
parties and dismissed the Suit. IO06 The court said that "[a]s a matter of public policy, 
the public interest in protecting tribal sovereign immunity surpasses a plaintiffs 
interest is having an available forum for Suit.,,1007 The court distinguished Clark on 
the grounds that the case was an action for a writ of mandamus with a different rule to 
apply in the context of an indispensable party defense. I 008 
1002. See id. 
1003. See id. at 90 (citing N.M. Cr. R. 1-019(A». Rule l-019(A) reads: 
A person who is subject to service of process shall be joined as a party in the action if: 
(1) in his absence complete relief cannot be accorded among those already parties; or 
(2) he claims an interest relating to the subject of the action and is so situated that the 
disposition of the action in his absence may: 
(a) as a practical matter impair or impede his ability to protect that interest; or 
(b) leave any of the persons already parties subject to a substantial risk of incurring double, 
multiple or otherwise inconsistent obligations by reason of his claimed interest If he has 
not been so joined, the court shall order that he be made a party. If he should join as a 
plaintiff but refuses to do so, he may be made a defendant, or, in a proper case, an 
involuntaIy plaintiff 
N.M. Cr. R. l-019(A). 
1004. Srader, 964 P.2d at 90. 
1005. See id. at 91. 
1006. See id. at 92. 
1007. /d. at 91 (citing Enter. Mgmt. Consultants, Inc. v. United States ex rei. Hodel, 883 F.2d 
890,894 (10th Cir. 1989); Kickapoo Tribe v. Lujan, 728 F. Supp. 791,797 (D.D.c. 1990». 
1008. See id. at 92 (''Plaintiffs cannot assume that because the tribes were held not to be 
indispensable parties in [Clark] that the tribes will always be of similar status in claims that involve 
gaming. [Clark] articulates an indispensability rule based on the special character of mandamus. "). 
The Arizona Supreme Court also distinguished Clark on the basis that the New Mexico 
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2. State ex rei. Coll v. Johnson 
In State ex rei. Coil v. Johnson,1009 the New Mexico Supreme Court reversed its 
position in Clark and agreed with the governor that the gaming tribes and pueblos 
were indispensable parties in a suit attacking the validity of the legislation authorizing 
Indian gaming in New Mexico.101O The plaintiffs were four members of the New 
Mexico House of Representatives and several private citizens opposed to Indian 
amm
o lOll g g. 
The court, applying the "equity and good conscience rule," acknowledged the 
extreme importance of gaming compacts to gaming tribes. IOl2 Interpreting the state 
court rule regarding indispensable parties,IOl3 the court wrote, "Clearly, the effect of 
[a judgment invalidating the gaming compacts] would be deeply prejudiCial to the 
gaming Tribes and Pueblos, resulting in the very real possibility that their gaming 
operations could be shut down.,,1014 The possibility that the tribes might be subjected 
to federal criminal penalties and forfeiture persuaded the COurt. IOIS Missing from this 
analysis is the effect the invalidation of the gaming compacts would have had on the 
governmental services provided by the tribes and pueblos. The court held that, since 
the "halt to Indian gaming is the object of this litigation, no protective provisions can 
be crafted to insulate the Tribes or Pueblos from the effects of an adverse 
legislature had not "expressly delegated to the governor authority to enter tribal gaming compacts on 
the state's behalf." Sears v. Hull, 961 P.2d 1013, 1020 (Ariz. 1998). Arizona's legislature, in contrast, 
had "expressly authorized the Governor to execute the standard gaming compacts." Id. (footnote 
omitted). As such, the Arizona court concluded that "the serious constitutional issues that gave rise to 
the [Clark] court's decision ... do not exist here." Id. 
Id. 
1009. 990 P.2d 1277 (N.M. 1999). 
1010. See id. at 1278-79. 
1011. See id. at 1278. 
1012. See id. at 1280. 
1013. SeeN.M.Cr.R.I-019(B): 
If a person as described in Subparagraph (1) or (2) of Paragraph A of this rule cannot be 
made a party, the court shall detennine whether in equity and good conscience the action 
should proceed among the parties before it, or should be dismissed, the absent person 
being thus regarded as indispensable. The factors to be considered by the court include: 
first, to what extent a judgment rendered in the person's absence might be prejudicial to 
him or those already parties; second, the extent to which, by protective provisions in the 
judgment, by the shaping of relief, or other measures, the prejudice can be lessened or 
avoided; third, whether a judgment rendered in the person's absence will be adequate; 
fourth, whether the plaintiff will have an adequate remedy if the action is dismissed for 
nonjoinder. 
1014. State ex rei Coli, 990 P.2d at 1280 (citing Pueblo of Santa Ana v. Kelly, 932 F. Supp. 
1284, 1290-91 (D.N.M. 1996), aff'd, 104 F.3d 1546, 1559 (10th Cir. 1997)). 
1015. See id. 
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judgment.,,1016 Coil seriousl
rc 
undercuts the broader language in Clark, which was 
decided several years earlier. 017 
3. Mescalero Apache Tribe v. State o/New Mexico 
In a 1997 case, related tangentially to the state cases, the Tenth Circuit decided 
Mescalero Apache Tribe v. New Mexico. lols The Mescalero Apache Tribe originally 
sued the state to compel it to negotiate in good faith over a gaming compact. I 0 19 After 
the tribe signed a compact with the governor, the state, through its attorney general, 
counterclaimed that the compact was invalid.102o The tribe argued the United States 
was an indispensable party and the counterclaim should be dismissed under the 
compulsory joinder rule. I 021 The court began its analysis by noting that, although the 
defense may be raised at any time, I 022 the tribe did not raise the compulsory joinder 
defense until after it had received a negative ruling in the lower COurt.1023 The court 
found that, although the Secretary of the Interior approved the compact, the United 
States was not a party to the compact and, further, that the secretary's approval did 
nothing to affect the compact's validity under state law. 1024 The court held that the 
United States was therefore not an indispensable party.1025 
4. Pueblo o/Sandia v. Babbitt 
In Pueblo 0/ Sandia v. Babbitt,1026 the district court held that the state of New 
Mexico was an indispensable party to a suit seeking a declaration that two provisions 
of a gaming compact were invalid.1027 The tribe sought to invalidate the revenue 
sharing and regulatory fee provisions in its gaming compact by suing the secretary, 
who had stated the provisions were questionable, but allowed the compacts to be 
1016. Id. at 1280 (citing Srader v. Verant, 964 P.2d 82, 91 (N.M. 1998) (in tum citing In re 
United States ex rei. Hall, 825 F. Supp. 1422, 1429 (D. Minn. 1993), ajf'd, 27 F.3d 572 (8th Cir. 
1994))). 
1017. See generally State ex rei. Clark v. Johnson, 904 P.2d 11 (N .M. 1999). 
1018. 131 FJd 1379 (lOth Cir. 1997). 
1019. Id. at 1380. 
1020. See id. 
1021. Id. at 1383. 
1022. Id (citing Thunder Basin Coal Co. v. S.w. Pub. Servo Co., 104 F.3d 1205, 1211 (lOth 
Cir. 1997)). 
1023. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 131 F.3d at 1383 (citing Keweenaw Bay Indian Cmty. v. 
United States, 940 F. Supp. 1139, 1143 (W.D. Mich. 1996)). 
1024. Id. at 1384 (citing Pueblo of Santa Ana v. Kelly, 104 F.3d 1546, 1559 (10th Cir.), cert. 
denied, 522 U.S. 807 (1997)). 
1025. See id. 
1026. 47 F. Supp. 2d49 (D.D.C. 1999). 
1027. Seeid.at49. 
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approved when the forty-five day statutory period of review expired.1028 The 
secretary argued the state was an indispensable party, and the district court agreed, 
largely following the D.C. Circuit's Kickapoo Tribe decision. 1029 The court noted that 
allowing the case to proceed would, "in practical tenns constitute an intrusion on the 
[s]tate's rights under the Tenth and Eleventh Amendments.,,1030 The court also noted 
that a plaintiff must have to bring "an overpoweringly strong case ... [to] permit a 
finding that the action may proceed without joinder of the [s]tate.,,1031 
F. Taxpayers Against Casinos v. State of Michigan 
In an unpublished trial court opinion in Taxpayers Against Casinos v. State, 1 032 
the court engaged in a summary analysis of Michigan's indispensable party rule.1033 
1028. See id. at 51. 
1029. See id. at 53-54 (citing Kickapoo Tribe of Indians v. Babbitt, 43 FJd 1491, 1498 (D.c. 
Cir.1995». 
1030. Jd. at 54. 
1031. Pueblo o/Sandia, 47 F. Supp. 2d at 56. 
1032. No. 99-90195-CZ (Ingham County Cir. Ct. Jan. 18,2000) (on file with author), qff'd in 
part, rev 'd in part, 657 N.w.2d 503 (Mich. Ct. App. 2003), qff'd in part, rev'd in part and remanded, 
685 N.W.2d 221 (Mich. 2004). 
1033. Jd. at 14-15. The Michigan rules reads as follows: 
(A) Necessary Joinder. Subject to the provisions of subrule (B) and MCR 3.501, 
persons having such interests in the subject matter of an action that their presence in the 
action is essential to permit the court to render complete relief must be made parties and 
aligned as plaintiffs or defendants in accordance with their respective interests. 
(B) Effect of Failure to Join. When persons described in subrule (A) have not been 
made parties and are subject to the jurisdiction of the court, the court shall order them 
summoned to appear in the action, and may prescribe the time and order of pleading. If 
jurisdiction over those persons can be acquired only by their consent or voluntary 
appearance, the court may proceed with the action and grant appropriate relief to persons 
who are parties to prevent a failure of justice. In determining whether to proceed, the court 
shall consider 
(1) whether a valid judgment may be rendered in favor of the plaintiff in the 
absence of the person not joined; 
(2) whether the plaintiff would have another effective remedy if the action is 
dismissed because of the nonjoinder; 
(3) the prejudice to the defendant or to the person not joined that may result from 
the nonjoinder; and 
(4) whether the prejudice, if any, may be avoided or lessened by a protective order 
or a provision included in the final judgment. 
Notwithstanding the failure to join a person who should have been joined, the court may 
render a judgment against the plaintiff whenever it is determined that the plaintiff is not 
entitled to relief as a matter of substantive law. 
MICH. Cr. R. 2.205. 
HeinOnline -- 40 Gonz. L. Rev. 99 2004-2005
2004/05] INDISPENSABLE SOVEREIGNS 99 
The court first cited State ex reI. Clark v. Johnson for the proposition that "Indian 
tribes need not be joined where the claim was not for breach of contract and did not 
require the court to adjudicate the rights and obligations of the parties to the 
compact.,,1034 The court disposed of the tribal interests by asserting that ''the rights 
and obligations sought to be declared are with regards to legislative and gubernatorial 
authority, not with respect to compact itself."lo35 The court concluded that any 
prejudice to the missing four Indian tribes was diminished by the presence of two 
intervening management companies. l 036 The Michigan Court of Appeals reversed the 
decision of the trial court and did not reach the indispensable party issue. 1 037 
The circuit court's summary analysis is troubling for the tribal litigant.1038 
Though the merits of the case turned mostly on state constitutional issues, the court 
(like the plaintiff) put its heart on its sleeve when it stated, in the first line of the 
opinion, that "[ c ]asino gambling is a highly regulated activity that has been 
considered a moral evil by the citizens of the state of Michigan for decades.,,1039 In 
support of this declaration, the court cited the fact that the state electorate had not 
approved casino gaming in Detroit until 1996.1040 It appears that this court was 
convinced of the "moral evil" of gaming, even four years after a majority of the 
state's electorate had approved of casino gaming.104l With that bias already present in 
1034. See Taxpayers of Michigan Against Casinos, No. 99-90195-CZ, at 15 (citing State ex reI. 
ClaIk v. Johnson, 904 P.2d II (N .M. 1995». 
1035. Id. 
1036. Id. 
1037. See Taxpayers Against Casinos v. State, 657 N.w.2d 503, 517 n.1O (Mich. Ct. App. 
2003), aif'd in part, rev'd in part and remanded, 685 N.W.2d 221 (Mich. 2004), cert. denied, 125 S. 
Ct 1298 (2005) .. 
1038. See generally Taxpayers of Michigan Against Casinos, No. 99-90195-CZ, at 15 (holding 
that prejudice would be lessened, however, not eliminated). 
1039. Id at 2. 
1040. See id. at 2, n.2. At least one court recently has opined that Michigan's statutes 
governing gaming must now be construed as regulatory. See Grand Traverse Band of Ottawa and 
Chippewa Indians V. United States Attorney for the W. Dist. of Mich., 46 F. Supp. 2d 689, 705 (W.D. 
Mich. 1999) ("Where, as in Michigan, a state operates a wide range of gambling sites and has a 
public lottery, the statutes must be principally viewed as regulatory.") (citing California V. Cabazon 
Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202, 211 (1987»; see also Lac Vieux Desert Band of Lake 
Superior Chippewa Indians V. Mich. Gaming Control Bd., 276 F.3d 876, 878 (6th Cir. 2002) 
("[C]asino gambling in Detroit ... [is] legal."), cert. denied, 536 U.S. 923 (2002). Moreover, as a 
blue ribbon panel appointed by former Michigan Governor John Engler concluded as far back as 
1995, "Society now tolerates gambling, which has entered everyday lives in many ways including 
lotteries, bingo, horse-race betting and illegal sports betting. Because of society's toleration of 
gambling, the Committee suggests that if extension of gambling represents a shift of the moral 
compass, it is a small one." Governor's Blue Ribbon Commission on Michigan Gaming, Blue 
Ribbon Report: Executive Summary (April 11, 1995), available at 
http://www.rnichigan.gov/mgcb/0,1607,7-120-1382_1452-14473-,00.html. 
1041. See Taxpayers of Michigan Against Casinos, No. 99-90195-CZ, at 2 & n.2. 
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the courtroom, it is no wonder that the court would not exercise its equitable powers 
and dismiss the case in favor of the indispensable tribes. 1042 
G Other Gaming Compact Cases 
1. Kickapoo Tribe of Indians v. Babbitt 
Kickapoo Tribe of Indians v. BabbittlO43 is an interesting decision for the tribal 
advocate. Here, the absent party was a state. I 044 The state made all the argwnents the 
absent tribes made in Saratoga County and Dairy/and Greyhound, and the state's 
argument prevailed. 1045 There appears to be no substantive difference in the cases, 
other than that the absent party was a state in the instant case and a tribe in the other 
cases.
1046 The D.C. Circuit held the district court abused its discretion in denying the 
state of Kansas's motion for dismissal for failure to join it as an indispensable 
party.1047 The tribe and the governor of the state of Kansas entered into a gaming 
compact in 1992. I 048 Subsequently, the attorney general of the state of Kansas filed 
suit in the Kansas Supreme Court in order to determine if the governor had the 
authority to enter into an Indian gaming compact.1049 The tribe and the governor sent 
the executed compact to the Secretary of the Interior for approval. I050 When the 
secre~'s delegate refused to consider the compact as "submitted," as defined in the 
IGRA/ 51 the tribe and the governor sued, seeking a declaratory judgment that the 
compact was approved. 1052 Once the Kansas Supreme Court ruled against the 
governor, the secretary's delegate returned the compact unapproved. I 053 
The federal defendant moved to dismiss the tribe's claims for failure to join the 
state of Kansas, which the federal defendant argued was an indispensable party.1054 
1042. See generally id at 15 (holding the tribes were not an indispensable party). 
1043. 43 F.3d 1491 (D.C. Cir. 1995) [hereinafter Kickapoo Tribe 11]. 
1044. See id. at 1495. 
1045. See id at 1493 (arguing that the complaint should be dismissed because the state was an 
indispensable party). 
1046. See id. 
1047. Id. 
1048. See Kickapoo Tribe of Indians v. Babbitt, 827 F. Supp. 37, 38 (D.D.C. 1993) [hereinafter 
Kickapoo Tribe 1]. 
1049. See State ex rei. Stephan v. Finney, 836 P.2d 1169, 1170 (Kan. 1992). The Kansas 
Supreme Court in Stephan held that the governor had the authority to enter into negotiations with the 
tribe but did not have the authority to bind the state by executing a compact. Id. at 1185. 
1050. Kickapoo Tribe 1,827 F. Supp. at 39. 
1051. See 25 V.S.c. § 271O(d)(8)(c) (2000). 
1052. Kickapoo Tribe I, 827 F. Supp. at 40 
1053. See id. 
1054. Id. at 40-41. 
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The district court denied the motion, holding the state was not indispensable.1055 The 
court did find the state would be prejudiced by the approval of a compact that ''was 
not approved in accordance with Kansas law.,,1056 However, the court held there were 
several factors that "mitigated" the prejudice to the state.1057 First, since the state 
chose not to intervene, the court "assume[ d] that the State did not feel that its interest 
was of a magnitude worth protecting.,,1058 Second, since the governor, already 
popularly elected by Kansas voters, approved of the compact, forcing the state to 
comply with its terms would not "subject the [s ] tate to any burden not already 
accepted by the [s]tate's highest elected executive official or not already 
countenanced by Congress.,,1059 The court also found that the lack of an available 
remedy for the tribe weighed heavily against dismissal. l06o The court noted the state 
had already refused to negotiate in good faith over the terms of a gaming compact 
with the tribe, as required by the IGRA,1061 lending support to its conclusion that "it 
is unlikely that plaintiffs will see an~ relief in the near term in any forum-judicial or 
otherwise----outside of this court.,,1 62 The court weighed two factors outside of the 
four expressed in Rule 19 for its determination in the "equity and good conscience" 
standard 1063 First, the court noted that the state's actions-conducted through the 
state attorney general-had served to derail the pwposes ofIGRA for two years. I064 
Second, the compact had been signed by the governor who "it is assumed-had the 
best interests of the State in mind when she negotiated and approved the 
compact.,,1065 
The D.C Circuit held the district court abused its discretion in holding the state 
was not an indispensable party.1066 The court found fault with the lower court's 
analysis on several points. First, the court concluded the lower court should not have 
taken into consideration the fact that the state failed to intervene, stating, "[f]ailure to 
intervene is not a component of the prejudice analysis where intervention would 
require the absent party to waive sovereign immunity.,,1067 Second, the court 
1055. ld. at 41. 
1056. ld. 
1057. Kickapoo Tribe 1, 827 F. Supp. at41. 
1058. ld. 
1059. ld. at 42. 
1060. See id. 
1061. ld. (citing Kickapoo Tribe v. Kansas, No. 92·~m3-SAC, 1993 WL 192795 (D. Kan. 
May 19, 1993». 
1062. Kickapoo Tribe 1, 827 F. Supp. at 42. 
1063. ld. 
1064. ld. at 42-43 (citing 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701(4), 2702(1)(2000». 
1065. ld. at 43. 
1066. See Kickapoo Tribe JJ, 43 FJd 1491, 1493 (D.c. Cir. 1995). 
1067. ld. at 1498 (citing Wichita and Affiliated Tribes v. Hodel, 788 F.2d 765, 776 (D.C. Cir. 
1986». 
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concluded the district court's reliance on the governor's approval was faulty because 
of Kansas law prohibiting the governor from executing the gaming compact. I 068 The 
court stated the district court's discretion was "cabin[ ed]" by the fact that the state was 
a necessary party and was immune from Suit.1069 Citing the additional factors of 
"fiscal interests," the court held that the case should have been disrnissed. 1070 The 
tribe attempted to invoke the "public interest" exception to Rule 19, but the court 
rejected the argument,1071 stating that the tribe's suit did "not require the joining of an 
infeasibly large number of parties [nor did] it appear to implicate a matter of 
transcending importance of the type that has previously prompted courts to apply the 
exception."lon 
The district court's opinion, in most respects, reads exactly like the state court 
decisions in Saratoga County and Dairyland Greyhound.1073 First, the state courts 
and the district court make much of the refusal of the sovereign to intervene, assertin~ 
that the prejudice to the absent sovereign would be abated by their participation.107 
Second, the courts seemed to be saying the plaintiffs had very strong cases on the 
merits and that analysis weighed strongly in their favor. 1075 Third, the lack of an 
available remedy, coupled with their sympathetic legal positions, turned out to be the 
dispositive factor. 1076 The D.C. Circuit, in reversing the district court, rejected all of 
those arguments in favor of, essentially, one factor-the absent party in interest was a 
sovereign, immune from suit without its consent. I077 The state court cases and the 
district court cases allowed their initial view of the merits to control the analysis. 
1068. See id. (citing Kansas enel. Stephan v. Finney, 836 P.2d 1169, 1183 (Kan. 1992)). 
1069. Id. at 1500 (citing Wichita and Affiliated Tribes, 788 F.2d at 777 0.13). 
1070. Kickapoo Tribe 11, 43 F.3d at 1500 (citing State ex reI. Stephan v. Finney, 836 P.2d 1169, 
1176(Kan.1992)). 
1071. See id. 
1072. Id. (citing Nat'l Wildlife Fed'o v. Burford, 676 F. Supp. 271, 272, 276 (D.D.C. 1985)). 
1073. See generally Saratoga County Chamber of Commerce, lnc. v. Pataki, 798 N .E.2d 1047 
(NY App. Div. 2003) (holding the tribe was oot a oecessruy party); DaiIyland Greyhound Park, lnc. 
v. McCallum, 655 N.w.2d 474 (Wis. Ct. App. 2002) (holding the tribe was oot an indispensable 
party). 
1074. See Kickapoo I, 827 F. Supp. 37, 43 (D.D.C. 1993); Saratoga County Chamber of 
Commerr:e, Inc., 798 N.E.2d at 1059; Dairyland Greyhound Park, Inc., 655 N.W2d at 487. 
1075. See Kickapoo 1, 827 F. Supp. at 43; Saratoga County Chamber of Commerr:e, Inc., 798 
N.E.2d at 1058-59; Dairyland Greyhound Park, Inc., 655 N.W2d at 482. 
1076. See Kickapoo 1, 827 F. Supp. at 42; Saratoga County Chamber of Commerr:e, Inc., 798 
N.E.2d at 1058-59; Dairyland Greyhound Park, Inc., 655 N.W2d at 486-87. 
1077. See Kickapoo II, 43 FJd at 1500 (citing Adams v. Bell, 711 F.2d 161, 171 0.42 (D.c. 
Cir. 1983)). 
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2. People ex rei. Lungren v. Community Redevelopment Agency 
Though not exactly the same as the other gaming compact cases, People ex rei. 
Lungren v. Community Redevelopment Agency,1078 involved an Indian gaming 
development agreement between Palm Springs and the Agua Caliente Band of 
Cahuilla Indians, where the agency would transfer land to the gaming tribe in 
exchange for a percentage of the gaming revenues. I 079 The California attorney 
general challenged the authority of the agency to enter into the agreement. I 080 The 
agency moved to dismiss on the basis that the attorney general had not joined the 
tribe and that the tribe was an indispensable party under the Californian compulsory 
joinder rule. 108l The court distinguished the case from cases in which "a party not 
before the court owns some unspecified interest in property which precludes a final 
determination of the interests held in that property by those who do not appear as 
parties."l082 The court asserted that the tribe's prejudice was minimized by asserting 
that ''the [t]ribe's object in the present litigation-establishing that the [a]gency acted 
lawfully in entering into the [agreement]-would duplicate that of the [a]gency and 
would be adequately represented by the [a]gency in the present litigation.,,1083 The 
court noted that though parties to a contract are generally considered 
indispensable,lo84 the tribe's interest in the agreement was only incidental because the 
case ''would primarily address the scope of the Agency's authority.,,1085 
The court ultimately ruled that the tribe was not an indispensable party because 
to hold that, as a general matter, agreements including a tribe and a government 
subdivision could not be reviewed, would "immunize any local entity from court 
review of transfers of publicly owned real property to Indian tribes.,,1086 The court 
asserted that if the court rule would permit this result, it should have been amended to 
explicitly state SO.1087 Instead, the court implied that "sovereign immunity [is not] 
intended to carry with it a broad cloak of immunity to all who have dealings with the 
sovereign."l088 The court averred that the tribe's absence did "not appear to have any 
1 078. 65 Cal. Rptr. 2d 786 (Ct. App. 1997). 
1079. Id. at 787-88. 
1080. See id. 
1081. See id. at 790 (citing CAL. av. PRoc. CoDE § 389 (2004)). 
1082. Id. at 792 (citing Wichita and Affiliated Tribes of Oklahoma v. Hodel, 788 F.2d 765, 
774-78 (D.c. Cir. 1986)). 
1083. People ex rei. Lungren, 65 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 792. 
1084. Id. (citing Jicaril1a Apache Tribe v. Hodel, 821 F.2d 537, 540 (lOth Cir. 1987); United 
States ex rei. Hall v. Tribal Dev. Corp., 100 F.3d476, 479 (7th Cir. 1996)). 
1085. Id. at 793. 
1086. Id. at 795. 
1087. See id. at 793. 
1088. People ex rei. Lungren, 65 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 793. 
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direct impact on [the] resolution of the legal issues themselves.",089 The court 
detennined that the most important interest in the litigation was that "of the citizens of 
the state, as represented by the Attorney General, in providing some review of the 
power of a local agency to permanently relinquish its interest in property within its 
control.,,1090 The court allowed the case to proceed "in equity and good 
conscience.,,1091 
In virtually all other contexts, in order for a contract to be cancelled judicially, all 
of the parties to the contract are indispensable. ,092 Often, the compulsory joinder 
analysis has an impact because it is possible that a federal court will lose its diversity 
jurisdiction by adding all of the parties to the contract. 1093 That is the reason for 
11 ' th ed' 1094 H ·· l' a owmg e case to proce m a state court. owever, m cases mvo vmg a 
contract in which an Indian tribe is a party, the courts treat the Indian tribe as an alien, 
as though no court in the universe could have jurisdiction over that tribe.1095 The 
California Appellate Court ag£eared to put on blinders regarding the tribe's interest in 
an agreement it had signed. 1 6 By focusing on the absence of an available remedy, a 
fallacy, the court denigrated the absent sovereign's immunity.1097 
3. Keweenaw Bay Indian Community v. United States 
In Keewenaw Bay Indian Community v. United States,1098 the district court held 
that the state of Michigan, a party to a gaming compact with the tribe, was not an 
indispensable party in a case in which the terms of the agreement were at issue.1099 
The tribe had brought a suit for declaratory relief against the federal government, who 
had threatened to prohibit Class ill gaming under the tribe's compact, and won an 
initial victory. 1 100 The federal government brought a motion to reconsider, asserting 
1089. 1d. at 796. 
1090. 1d. at 795. 
1091. 1d. at 796 (quoting CAL. avo PRoc. CODE § 389(b) (2004). 
1092. See, e.g., MOORE, supra note 92, at~ 19.10. 
1093. See generally Richard D. Freer, Rethinking Compulsory Joinder: A Proposal to 
Restrncture Federal Rule 19, 60 N.Y.U. L. REv. lO61, lO63 (1985) (discussing loss of diversity 
jurisdiction as a result of compulsory joinder). 
1094. See, e.g., id. at 1077 (stating that state court can be an available forum when no other 
choice exists). 
1095. See generally People ex reI. Lungren, 65 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 793 (holding that due to tribal 
sovereign immunity, they could not be joined lll1der the rule of compulsory joinder of indispensable 
parties). 
1096. See generally id. (neglecting to consider the tribe's agreements in its analysis). 
1097. See generally id. (focusing on the fact that dismissal would leave no available remedy). 
1098. 940 F. Supp. 1139 (W.D. Mich. 1996). 
1099. See id. at 1143. 
1100. See id. at 1140 (citing Keweenaw Bay Indian Cmty. v. United States, 914 F. Supp. 1496 
(W.D. Mich. 1996), rev'd, 136 F.3d496 (6th Cir. 1996)). 
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that the state of Michigan was an indispensable party. I 101 The court rejected the 
argument, noting the federal government should have brought the issue up at a much 
earlier time in the proceedings; "[T]he federal defendants elected, however, to wait 
for a decision, and now seek to claim that the [s ]tate is essential after receiving a 
construction of the [c ]ompact with which they disagree. ,,11 02 Moreover, the court 
noted that the state "admits that it was aware of the pendency of this litigation, and in 
fact has received and retained 5% of the revenues from the gaming here at issue.,,1103 
In other words, the district court relied upon the timing of the motion to dismiss, a 
stance consistent with a critical purpose of the rules of procedure which are judicial 
efficiency and conservation of judicial resources. I 104 
H. Strategies for Tribal Litigants in Gaming Compact Cases 
Basic contract principles counsel strongly in favor of dismissal of the gaming 
contract cases. As the venerable Wright and Miller treatise acknowledges, "In cases 
seeking. . . cancellation. .. or otherwise challenging the validity of a contract, all 
parties to the contract probably will have a substantial interest in the outcome of the 
litigation and their joinder will be required.,,1105 The gaming compact cases are 
exactly such an attempt, usually by a third party, to invalidate a gaming compact. I 106 
As a general matter, courts hold that a gaming compact is a contract.1107 "Actions 
seeking cancellation of contracts cannot be permitted unless all the parties to be 
affected by a decree shall be before the COurt.,,1 108 As such, basic contract principles 
compel courts to dismiss actions unless the tribe in interest is joined. I 109 Refusing to 
1101. Seeid. at 1143. 
1102. Id. 
1103. Keweenaw Bay Indian Cmty., 940 F. Supp. at 1143. 
1104. See id. 
1105. WRIGfIT ET AL., supra note 35, § 1613, at 200-03 (footnotes omitted) (citing Enter. 
Mgmt. Consultants, Inc. v. United States ex rei. Hodel, 883 F.2d 890 (lOth Cir. 1989)). 
1106. See generally Daityland Greyhound Patk, Inc. v. McCallum, 655 N.W.2d 474 (Wis. Ct. 
App. 2002) (bringing action by a third party to invalidate the state's Indian gaming compact). 
1107. See Taxpayers Against Casinos v. State, 657 N.W.2d 503, 508 (Mich. Ct. App. 2003) 
(citing Texas v. New Mexico, 482 U.S. 124, 128 (1987)), Iv. granted, 669 N.W.2d 816 (Mich. 2003), 
ajf'd, 685 N.W.2d 221 (Mich. 2004), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 1298 (2005); Gallegos v. Pueblo of 
Tesuque, 46 P.3d 668, 679 (N.M. 2002); CBA Credit Servs. v. Azar, 551 N.W.2d 787, 788 (N.D. 
1996). 
1108. Am. Optical Co. v. Curtiss, 59 FRD. 644, 650-51 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (quoting Spanner v. 
Brandt, 1 FRD. 555, 557 (S.D.N.Y. 1941)); see Ward v. Deavers, 203 F.2d 72, 75 (D.c. Cir. 1953); 
Silvers v. TIC Indus., Inc., 395 F. Supp. 1312, 1314 (E.D. Tenn 1970); Padgett v. Theus, 484 P.2d 
697,702 (Alaska 1971); Allman v. Wolfe, 592 So. 2d 1261, 1263 (Fla Dist. Ct. App. 1992); cf Aplin 
v. Aplin, 389 So. 2d 844, 846 (La. Ct. App. 1980) (holding that United States was indispensable party 
to action seeking cancellation of sale of property to United States). 
1109. See generally WRIGfIT ET AL., supra note 35, § 1613, at 200-03 (footnotes omitted) 
(requiring courts to dismiss actions unless parties to a contract are joined). 
HeinOnline -- 40 Gonz. L. Rev. 106 2004-2005
106 GONZAGA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 40:1 
dismiss actions brought to invalidate gaming compacts, in which the tribe is not 
joined, rewards anti-Indian and anti-Indian raming elements that are engaging in a 
bad faith ploy to avoid dealing with the tribe. 110 The litigants should be steered in the 
right direction. 
1. Declaratory and Injunctive Relief in Federal Court 
Individual officers and employees of Indian tribes are not immune from suit for 
declaratory and injunctive relief if they act outside the scope of their authority under 
the Ex parte Young doctrine. IIII Plaintiffs could file in either federal or state court, 
although state court cases are likely to be removed to federal court. I 112 It is axiomatic 
that a "[P]laintiffhas no constitutional right to a federal forum.,,11l3 If an Indian tribe 
is operating Class ill gaming under a compact that is invalid under state law, for 
example, a plaintiff with standing could bring a claim in federal court that a tribal 
official is authorizing gaming outside the scope of her authority. 1114 If the compact is 
declared invalid, then the tribe would have no authority under federal or tribal law to 
authorize its officials to commence or continue gaming. 1115 Since the validity of the 
compact would be at issue, all the state constitutional claims would be heard. I 116 
However, a potential plaintiff would have to sue on violations of state law because 
there is no private cause of action in the IGRA.1117 The Tenth Circuit held in 
Mescalero Apache Tribe v. New Mexico ll18 that IGRA abrogated tribal immunity 
from a state suit, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief for an alleged violation of 
the IGRA.1119 Other courts held that a state may seek prospective equitable relief for 
1110. See generally id 
1111. See, e.g., Garcia v. Akwesasne Rous. Auth., 268 F.3d 76,87-88 (2d Cir. 2001); ITEA v. 
Ysleta del Sur Pueblo, 181 F.3d 676,680-81 (5th Cir. 1999); Tamiami Partners, Ltd. ex rei. Tamiami 
Dev. Corp. v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians, 177 FJd 1212, 1225 (11th Cir. 1999); N. States Power 
Co. v. Prairie Island Mdewakanton Sioux Indian Cmty., 991 F.2d 458, 460 (8th Cir. 1993); Tenneco 
Oil Co. v. Sac & Fox Tribe of Indians, 725 F.2d 572, 574 (10th Cir. 1984); California v. Harvier, 700 
F.2d 1217, 1223-24 (9th Cir. 1983); Wisconsin v. Baker, 698 F.2d 1323, 1332 (7th Cir. 1983). 
1112. See generally Kaighn Smith, Jr., Fightingfor a Federal Fornm in Indian Sovereignty 
Cases: A Primer, 49 FED. LAW. 37 (2002). 
1113. Richard D. Freer, Avoiding Duplicative Litigation: Rethinking Plaintiff Autonomy and 
the Courts Role in Defining the Litigative Unit, 50 U. Prrr. L. REv. 809,849 (1989) (citing John C. 
McCoid, A Single Package for Multiparty Disputes, 28 STAN. L. REv. 707, 726 (1976». 
1114. See Smith v. Babbitt, 875 F. Supp. 1353, 1363 (D. Minn. 1995), aff'd, 100 F.3d 556 (8th 
Cir. 1996), cert. denied sub. nom. Feezorv. Babbitt, 522 U.S. 807 (1997). 
1115. See id. 
1116. See generally id at 1353. 
1117. See Davids v. Coyhis, 869 F. Supp. 1401, 1410-12 (E.D. Wis. 1994). 
1118. 131 F.3d 1379 (10th Cir. 1997). 
1119. Id at 1385-86. 
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violations of an existing compact. I 120 However, plaintiffs may face a stiff sovereign 
immunity defense if they do not sue individual tribal officers, asserting that they acted 
outside the scope of their authority. In Florida v. Seminole Tribe,1121 the Eleventh 
Circuit held that IGRA does not waive tribal immunity for prospective equitable 
relief, thereby distinguishing Mescalero Apache tribe. I 122 Moreover, the state must 
. b Co • _Co I . 'b 1123 Th enter mto a compact elore It can attempt to elllorce state aw against a tn e. e 
same type of actions could be brought in other areas, such as treaty rights cases. 
2. Enforcement Actions 
Potential plaintiffs may have specific avenues to pursue in gaming cases.1124 
Federal law prohibits gaming on Indian reservations without a Class ill compact, 
approved by the Secretary of the Interior. I 125 In many P.L. 280 states or other states 
with crirninal jurisdiction over that state's Indian country, the state may choose to 
bring an enforcement action on that authority alone. I 126 Moreover, the mere threat of 
an enforcement action might draw out a suit from the tribe for declaratory and 
injunctive relief. I 127 Once the litigation begins, all of the issues and claims associated 
with the validity of the compact will be heard. For example, in Spokane Indian Tribe 
v. United States,1128 the tribe brought an action for a declaration that its Pick Six 
1120. See. e.g., New York. v. Oneida Indian Tribe, 78 F. Supp. 2d 49, 54 (N.D.N.Y. 1999); 
Calvello v. yankton Sioux Tribe, 899 F. Supp. 431, 438 (D.S.D. 1995); Maxam v. Lower Sioux 
Indian Cmty., 829 F. Supp. 277, 281 (D. Minn. 1993); Ross v. Flandreau Santee Sioux Tribe, 809 F. 
Supp. 738, 745 (D. S.D. 1992). 
1121. 181 F.3d 1237 (11th Cir. 1999). 
1122. See id. at 1242 (citing MesealeroApaehe Tribe, 131 F.3d at 1385-86). 
1123. !d. at 1249n.18. 
1124. See generally Texas v. Ysleta del Sur Pueblo, 220 F. Supp. 2d 668 (W.D. Tex. 2001) 
(holding potential plaintiffs can bring actions against a tribe to determine legality of gaming activity). 
1125. See generally 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2721 (2000). 
1126. See, e.g., Ysleta del sur Pueblo, 220 F. Supp. 2d at 696 (granting injunction against tribe, 
relying on authority granted to state under Tribe's Restoration Act), qff'd, No. 02-50711, 2003 WL 
21356043 (5th Cir. May 29, 2003), eert. denied, 124 S. Ct. 497 (2003). 
1127. See, e.g., Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe v. Green, 995 F.2d 179, 180 (lOth Cir. 
1993) (adjudicating case brought by tribe seeking declaratory relief that Jolmson Act did not prohibit 
importation of video lottery terminals); Spokane Indian Tribe v. United States, 972 F.2d 1090, 1091 
(9th Cir. 1992) (adjudicating case brought by tribe seeking declaratory relief that "lotto" machines 
were exempt from gaming compact requirement); Lac du Flambeau Band of Lake Superior 
Chippewa Indians v. Wisconsin, 743 F. Supp. 645, 655 (W.D. Wis. 1990) (holding that tribe could 
not enjoin state from enforcing state anti-gambling laws even where state had no criminal jurisdiction 
on tribe's reservation); if. Grand Traverse Band of Ottawa and Chippewa Indians v. United States 
Attorney for the W. Dist. of Mich., 198 F. Supp. 2d 920, 922 (W.D. Mich. 2002), qff'd, 369 F.3d 960 
(6th Cir. 2004) (discussing suit brought by Indian tribe against the United States for declaration that 
tnbal gaming facility was legal). 
1128. 972 F.2d 1090 (9th Cir. 1992). 
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lottery game was a Class II gaming device and therefore did not require a Class ill 
gaming compact with the state. I 129 The tribe's action was brought in response to a 
letter from the United States attorney that the game violated state law. I 130 '''The Tribe 
and the Government ultimately agreed to resolve the issue by an action under the 
Declaratory Judgment ACt.,,1131 And, in Lac du Flambeau Band of Lake Superior 
Chippewa Indians v. WlSconsin,1I32 two tribes brought an action to enjoin state law 
enforcement officials from closing down their gaming operations and seizing their 
equipment. 1133 The court held that, even though the state had no authority to enforce 
state law on either of the two tribes' reservations! 134 the court would not issue an 
injunction because "[P]laintiffs can avoid [prosecution] by refraining from operating 
class ill gambling in violation of federal gaming regulations.,,1135 However, under 
similar facts, the Ninth Circuit enjoined the state of California's threatened 
. 1136 In ~f. Dl ndre C" S' Ti'b 1137 th prosecutIons. montgomery v. r ,a au ~antee IOUX n e, e court 
suggested that plaintiffs could bring possible violations of federal gaming law to the 
attention of the National Indian Gaming Commission or the state, or bring the claims 
in tribal court. 1138 These are certainly avenues that gaming opponents may pursue. I 139 
1129. See id. at 1091. 
1130. Seeid 
1131. Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201-02 (2000)). 
1132. 743 F. Supp. 645 (W.D. Wis. 1990). 
1133. See id. at 646-48. 
1134. See id. at 652-54. 
1135. Id. at 655. 
1136. See Sycuan Band of Mission Indians v. Roache, 54 F.3d 535, 538 (9th Cir. 1994), eert. 
denied sub nom., Sycuan Band of Mission Indians v. Pfingst, 516 U.S. 912 (1995). 
1137. 905 F. Supp. 740 (D. S.D. 1995). 
Id 
1138. See id. at 747 (citing Davids v. Coyhis, 869 F. Supp. 1401,1412 n.l3 (E.D. Wis. 1994)). 
As to the alleged ordinance violations, however, plaintiffs may not be without recourse. 
They might bring the alleged violations to the attention of the National Indian Gaming 
Commission, which has the power to enforce tribal ordinances through civil fines ofup to 
$25,000 per violation and temporary or permanent closures of gaming operations, 25 
U.S.C. § 2713; the plaintiffs could bring the alleged violations to the attention of the State, 
which is authorized to initiate an action in federal district court to enjoin Class ill gaming 
conducted in violation of the Tribal-State Compact, 25 U.S.C. § 271O(d)(7)(A)(ii); or, as 
previously noted, the plaintiffs could pursue whatever remedies are available in Tnbal 
Court or otherwise as provided by the tenns of the Ordinance. 
1139. But cf Pueblo of Sandia v. Babbitt, 47 F. Supp. 2d 49,56 (D.D.C. 1999) ("It should be 
self-evident that forcing a party to submit to risk: of federal criminal prosecution cannot be an 
'adequate alternative remedy' within the meaning of Rule 19(b)."); Wisconsin v. Baker, 464 F. Supp. 
1377, 1383-84 (W.D. Wis. 1978) (discussing same principal as applied to state governments and non-
Indians). 
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3. Political Processes 
Possible plaintiffs have important political avenues to explore as well.1140 If 
nothing else, cases such as Yazzie v. Morton 1141 and Tewa Tesuque v. Morton 1142 
show that courts may take into consideration the political avenues available to 
plaintiffs. 1 143 In both of those cases, the court found that the Indian plaintiffs had an 
adequate remedy against their own government by participating in the political arena 
of the tribe. 1144 In an age in which California governors can be recalled, 1145 the fate of 
Indian gaming is routinely decided by referendum voters in several states1146 and 
federal land use decisions are made by connected political actors;1147 thus these 
political avenues are significant. Courts have no reason to disregard the political 
processes available to plaintiffs, particularly when so many plaintiffs are legislators, 
other elected officials, and political focus groups with experience in the political 
1148 
arena. 
Failure to take these effective political avenues available to non-Indians into 
consideration strikes one as disturbing in light of Yazzie and Tewa Tesuque. If Indian 
litigants' valid and possibly meritorious claims are dismissed because they had an 
1140. See, e.g., Baird v. Norton, 266 F.3d 408, 409 (6th Cir. 2001) (plaintiff legislators); Yazzie 
v. Morton, 59 FRD. 377, 385 (D. Ariz. 1973) (tribal political arena); Taxpayers Against Casinos v. 
State, 657 N.W.2d 503 (Mich. Ct. App. 2003) (political action group plaintiff), aff'd in part, rev'd in 
part and remanded, 685 N.W.2d 221 (Mich. 2004), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 1298 (2005). 
1141. 59 F.RD. 377 (D. Ariz. 1973). 
1142. 498 F.2d 240 (1Oth Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 962 (1975). 
1143. See Tewa Tesuque, 498 F.2d at 243; Yazzie, 59 FRD. at 385. 
1144. Tewa Tesuque, 498 F.2d at 243; Yazzie, 59 FRD. at 385. 
1145. See Edward Lazarus, One Reason Arnold Won: His Attack Ads Involving Indian 
Gaming, and Their Larger Context and Significance (Oct. 16, 2003), available at 
http://writ.findlaw.com/lazarusl2oo31 0 16.html. 
1146. See, e.g., Tom Wanamaker, Maine Casino Plans Go up in Flames, New York Tax 
Deadline Extended (l'J.ov. 14, 2003), available at http://www.indiancountry.com/?1068836967. 
1147. Due entirely to political considerations in 2002, the Secretary of the Interior, reversing 
the stance of the department in order to assist the farmers in the upper Klamath River area diverted 
water to the farmers; a decision that likely led directly to the massive fish-kill in September 2002. See 
Pac. Coast Fed'n of Fisherman's Ass'ns v. United States Bureau of Reclamation, No. C 02-2006 
SBA, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13745, at *28 (l'J..D. Cal. July 15,2003) ("Between September 20 and 
September 27,2002, approximately 33,000 chinook, coho, and steelhead salmon died in the Klamath 
River.''). As Karl Rove supposedly stated to the Department of the Interior, "[C]ontrol of Congress 
will tum on [a] handful ofraces decided by local issues, candidate quality, money raised, campaign 
perfonnance, etc." Tom Hamburger, Water Saga Illuminates Rove s Methods: Bush Strategist Works 
Agencies in Bid to Make Policy Decisions Jibe with Political Goals, WAIL ST. J., July 30, 2003, at A4 
(quoting Karl Rove, Presentation to Dept. of Interior Officials, Jan. 6,2002). 
1148. See, e.g., Baird v. Norton, 266 F.3d 408,409 (6th Cir. 2001); Taxpayers Against Casinos 
v. State, 657 N.w.2d 503,503 (Mich. Ct. App. 2003), aff'd, 685 N.W.2d 221 (Mich. 2004), cert. 
denied, 125 S. Ct. 1298 (2005); Saratoga County Chamber of Commerce Inc. v. Pataki, 712 N.Y.S.2d 
687 (App. Div. 2000). 
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opportunity to change the leaders or the policies of their respective governments, then 
non-Indian challengers should be held to the same standard. Tribes should strongly 
pursue this avenue and challenge the courts to apply the Yazzie and Tewa Tesuque 
cases equally. 
In Yazzie and Tewa Tesuque, the tribal plaintiffs fought the political battles within 
their tribes and lost.11 49 Cases brought by political groups and politicians are no 
different.1l50 Laura Baird, for example, a fonner Michigan State officeholder, voted 
against Indian gaming proposals and was in the minority of the Michigan 
legislature. I I 5 I She is a typical litigant in these claims. 1 152 She lost her political fight 
and attempted in two separate cases to overturn the decisions of her legislature by 
. . 1153 
resortmg to court acbon. 
4. Future Gaming Compact Negotiations 
In one area in particular, it may be worthwhile for tribes to consider waiving their 
immunity in anticipation of litigation. For tribes without a gaming compact, tribes 
that wish to renegotiate their current compact, and tribes whose compacts will expire 
in the near future, another option in the area of compact validity litigation exists-
waive immunity."54 Tribes have increasingly engaged in waivers of immunity for 
business pwposes.1155 The tribes could easily negotiate such a waiver in the 
compact's tenns and conditions: 156 Tribes could waive immunity for suits brought 
only in federal court for a short Reriod of time, say six weeks or three months, after 
the execution of the compact. 157 They could even limit the waiver to certain 
individuals or groups-if there were identified groups the tribe would agree to face in 
court--or even specific issues. 1158 The tribe could extract conditions from the state in 
return, such as cooperation durin~ the litigation and an agreement not to seek criminal 
penalties if the case goes bad. I 1 9 The down side would be that gaming opponents 
would be drawn to filing suit that they might otherwise have refrained from due to the 
1149. See Tewa Tesuque, 498 F.2d at 243; Yazzie, 59 F.R.D. at 385. 
1150. See, e.g., Baird, 266 F.3d at 409-10, 417; Taxpayers of Michigan Against Casinos, 657 
N.W.2d at 503,516-17. 
1151. Baird, 266 F.3d at 409-10. 
1152. Seeid 
1153. See id; TaxpayersoJMichiganAgainst Casinos, 657 N.W.2d at 505. 
1154. See generally Thomas P. Schlosser, Sovereign Immunity: Should the Sovereign Control 
the Purse?, 24 AM. INDIAN L. REv. 309, 324-28 (2000). 
1155. See generally id. at 325-29 (discussing methods for tailoring waivers of tribal sovereign 
immunity). 
1156. See id at 324-29. 
1157. See id. at 328. 
1158. See id at 326. 
1159. See generally Schlosser, supra note 1154, at 325-28. 
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tribe's immunity. 11 60 Based on the recent decade of proliferation of suits brought 
challenging gaming compacts, most tribes must expect some challenge.1161 Smart 
tribes and state officials will know if and from what quarter a challenge will arise. 
While this proposal is controversial and likely will not be adopted by any tribal legal 
counsel, pragmatic conditions suggest it may be a reasonable alternative to being 
blindsided by litigation that the tribe and its compacting partners cannot control. 
5. Altemativ:e Equitable Factors Under Rule 19(b) 
Some appellate courts have held that a lower court abuses its discretion by taking 
into account factors not listed among the four expressed in Rule 19(b) or factors with 
which it does not agree. 1 162 However, the advisory committee notes state that these 
four factors are merely the factors that litigation experience taught would be the most 
useful to courts, strongly implying that alternative factors may be considered. 1 163 
Moreover, since the compulsory joinder rule's application to cases involving absent 
sovereigns, particularly tribes, is not an easy application, courts should be strongly 
encouraged to take alternative factors into consideration. The gaming compact cases 
offer an opportunity to examine this strategy in detail. 1 164 
Courts should be made aware of the history of Indian gaming. Indian gaming 
arose out of the extreme poverty and devastation caused by the states and federal 
government and the non-Indian population in their drive to destroy, assimilate, 
exploit, and ostensibly help Indians and Indian tribes. 1l65 Many tribes in the 1970s 
and 1980s had little or no functioninfi &ovemment due to the lack of resources and 
tax base with which to raise revenue. 1 6 The health, employment, and social service 
1160. Cj Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 58 (1978). 
1161. See, e.g., Am. Greyhound Racing 11,305 FJd 1015 (9th Cir. 2002); Artichoke Joe's v. 
Norton, 216 F. Supp. 2d 1084 (B.D. Cal. 2002), aff'd, 353 F.3d 712 (9th Cir. 2003); Saratoga Cotmty 
Chamber of Commerce v. Pataki, 712 N.Y.S.2d 687, 687 (App. Div. 2000). 
1162. E.g., Kickapoo Tribe of Indians v. Babbitt, 43 F.3d 1491, 1495-1500 (D.c. Cir. 1995). 
1163. See FED. R avo P. 19(b) advisory committee's note ("[Rule 19(b)] sets out four relevant 
considerations drawn from the experience revealed in the decided cases. The factors are to a certain 
extent overlapping, and they are not intended to exclude other considerations which may be 
applicable in particular situations."). 
1164. See, e.g., Am. Greyhound Racing II, 305 F.3d at 1022-25; Artichoke Joe s, 216 F. Supp. 
2d at 11l8-20. 
1165. See generally Rand & Light, supra note 788, at 385-96 (describing the historical 
relationship between tribes and the government and non-Indians as one of racial discrimination, 
exploitation, oppression, impoverishment, near-eradication, and ostensible tolerance and protection). 
1166. See id. at 393 nn.66 & 68, 396 (noting that, after the federal government squeezed Indian 
budgets in the 1980s, tribes turned to "Indian gaming ... as a viable economic option ... at a time 
when federal assistance to the tribes was being cut in the name of tribal self-detennination"); Amy 
Head, Comment, The Death a/the New Buffalo: The Fifth Circuit Slays Indian Gaming in Texas, 34 
TEx. TECH. L. REv. 377, 385 (2003); National Indian Gaming Association, History o/Tribal Gaming, 
available at http://www.indiangaming.oxglinfo/pr/presskit/history.shtmI (last visited Sept. 12, 2004) 
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needs of Indians were beyond compare in the United States at a time when most of 
the focus of government pro~ for the poor were directed at urban centers, 
fanners, and other minorities. II 7 Contrary to what some may call a purely capitalistic 
boondoggle, Indian tribes did not begin gaming in order to make a few tribal leaders 
wealthy. I 168 Indian gaming began to allow the tribes and their people to survive. I 169 
The tribes that began gaIning looked at the state and federal law that cabined 
their jurisdictional authority.1170 Following the law that had been forced upon the 
tribes by the non-Indian governments and courts to the letter, the gaming tribes 
tentatively explored what means they had available to serve the needs of their 
people. I 171 Gaming is about providing government services. I 172 Indian tribes are not-
for-profit corporations that are interested only in maximizing dividends for 
investors. I 173 Many tribes operate less-than-successful casinos for the sole purpose of 
providing employment for tribal members. 1174 When applying IGRA, tribes must 
emphasize its purpose: "to provide a statutory basis for the operation of gaming by 
Indian tribes as a means of promoting tribal economic development, self-sufficiency, 
and strong tribal governments." I 175 
[hereinafter National Indian Gaming Association]. 
1167. See National Indian Gaming Association, supra note 1166 (Indian gaming was preceded 
by "decades of poverty and high unemployment on often geographically remote reservations."). 
1168. But see Head, supra note 1166 (indicating that tribes began gaming "to bring in revenue 
to improve conditions on the reservations"); National Indian Gaming Association, Histo!)" supra 
note 1166 (pointing out that gaming began to stimulate tribal economies and ensure swvival) . 
1169. See generally Kristen A. Carpenter & Ray Halbritter, Beyond the Ethnic Umbrella and 
the Buffalo: Some Thoughts on American Indian Tribes and Gaming, 5 GAMING L. REv. 311, 322-25 
(2001). 
1170. See Steven Andrew Light & Kathl)'n RL. Rand, Reconciling the Paradox of Tribal 
Sovereignty: Three Frameworks for Developing Indian Gaming Law and Policy, 4 NEV. L.J. 262, 
270(2004). 
1171. See id. at 270-71. 
1172. See Am. Greyhound Racing L 146 F. Supp. 2d 1012, 1063 (D. Ariz. 2001) (noting that 
gaming revenues allow tribes to fund housing and infrastructure projects), rev'd on other grounds, 
305 F.3d 1015 (9th Cir. 2002); State ex rei. Stephan v. Finney, 836 P.2d 1169, 1171 (Kan. 1992) 
("[Indian gaming] income often means the difference between an adequate governmental program 
and a skeletal program that is totally dependent on Federal funding.'') (quoting S. REP. No. 446, at 1-6 
(1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3971-76). 
1173. See, e.g., Trudgeon v. Fantasy Springs Casino, 84 Cal. Rptr. 2d 65, 70 (App. Dist. 1999) 
(acknowledging that Indian casinos are "governmental in nature"); Gavle v. Little Six, Inc., 555 
N.W.2d 284, 295 (Minn. 1996) (recognizing "the unique role that Indian gaming serves in the 
economic life of here-to-fore impoverished Indian communities across this country"), cer!. denied, 
524 U.S. 911 (1998). 
1174. See Light & Rand, supra note 1170, at 279-90, 282-83; National Indian Gaming 
Association, Indian Gaming Facts, available at http://indiangaming.orgllibrary/index.html (last 
visited Sept. 13,2004) ("Many Tribes operate gaming facilities primarily to generate employment") 
1175. 25 U.S.c. § 2702(1) (2000). 
HeinOnline -- 40 Gonz. L. Rev. 113 2004-2005
2004/05] INDISPENSABLE SOVEREIGNS 113 
Many tribes now operate casinos that provide critical employment opportunities 
for tribal members. I 176 Many gaming tribes employ large numbers of non-Indians 
from the SurrOWlding community. I 177 Moreover, employment of tribal members at 
their own tribe's gaming facilities reduces the financial burden on the state's social 
services. I 178 Perhaps, most importantly, the economic benefits of gaming do not stop 
at the reservation borders. I 179 In North Dakota, for example, where Indian gaming is 
modest, "the annual economic benefits to the state resulting from the [five] casinos' 
payroll and purchases totals nearly $125,000,000.,,1180 
Conversely, when Indian gaming facilities close down, Indian communities and 
the non-Indian communities dependent on tribal gaming are ravaged. I 181 It is 
axiomatic that the loss of casino jobs could devastate Indian cornmunities.1182 "In the 
absence of the casino jobs, it is likely that the tribal member employees will not find 
replacement jobs, will be Wlemployed, and will be forced to rely upon some fonn of 
public assistance relief from the state or federal government and from tribal social 
services programs.,,1183 The closure of Indian casinos and the resulting loss of 
governmental revenue could force tribal governments to shut down fundamental and 
1176. See, e.g., Lac du Flambeau Band ofLake Superior Chippewa Indians v. WlSCOnsin, 743 
F. Supp. 645, 646 (W.o. Wis. 1990) ("In May 1989 83% of the [casino] employees were tribal 
members; in February 1990 just Wlder 80"10 of those employed were tribal members."); 
Implementation of the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act Hearing Before the Select Committee on 
Indian Affairs, 102d Congo 6 (1992) (statement of Sen. Thomas A. Daschle) (noting that 
Wlemployment in many reservations has dropped from eighty percent to virtually zero due to Indian 
gaming); Rand & Light, supra note 788, at 402 ("In Minnesota, for example, Indian gaming is the 
state's seventh-largest industly, creating over 10,000 jobs directly and 20,000 jobs indirectly."). 
1177. See, e.g., Saratoga COWlty Chamber of Commerce, Inc. v. Pataki, 798 N.E.2d 1047, 
1069 n.4 (2003) (Read, 1., dissenting) (noting that the Oneida Indian Nation's Utica, New York 
casino employed 3300 people with an annual payroll of $70 million), cert. denied, 124 S. Ct. 570 
(2003); see also Rand, supra note 789, at 76 ("[E]ven relatively modest casino revenues and levels of 
casino employment benefit surroWlding non-Indian communities, as well as the state economy."); 
Rand & Light, supra note 788, at 404 ("Indian casinos have created nearly 140,000 jobs in the 
United States, approximately eighty-five percent of them held by non-Indians."). 
1178. See Thompson, supra note 646, at 521 n.7 ("[T]he number of people on welfare on four 
rural reservations in Minnesota dropped sixteen percent after casinos were opened"). 
1179. See id. at 543 n.l67 ("Indian gaming has created tens of thousands of jobs, removed 
thousands from Wlemployment lines and existing welfare roles, and generated millions of dollars in 
governmental revenues for tribal, local, state, and federal governments."). 
1180. See Rand, supra note 789, at 76 (citing N.D. INDIAN GAMING Ass'N, OPPORruNITIES 
AND BENEFITS OF NOR1H DAKOTA TRmALLyOWNED CASINOS 7 (2000)). 
1181. See Light & Rand, supra note 1170, at 267. 
1182. See, e.g., Wis. Wmnebago Nation v. Thompson, 22 F.3d 719, 722 (7th Cir. 1994) 
("[When] the [Indian gaming] facilities were forced to close[,] ... over 300 Wmnebago employees 
were laid off. 'J. 
1183. Lac du Flambeau Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians v. Wisconsin, 743 F. Supp. 
645,647 (W.D. Wis. 1990). 
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critical governmental seIVices. 1184 The impact of the closure of tribal gaming facilities 
would reverberate throughout the non-Indian local communities and the state, as well, 
with its concomitant increase in non-Indian employment, the swelling of the welfare 
rolls, and the reduced non-Indian state income tax base. 1185 
6. The Motivation and Private Interests of the Challengers 
In the gaming compact cases, the motivation and private interests of the plaintiffs 
should be fair game in the equitable analysis of the compulsory joinder rule. Often, 
the private interests of the plaintiffs are very easy to determine. For example, 
plaintiffs such as Artichoke Joe's card rooms, American Greyhound Racing, and 
Dairyland Greyhound Park are direct economic competitors to Indian gaming 
facilities. 1186 The political motivation of some plaintiffs is less obvious, but usually 
can be determined. For example, the Taxpayers of Michigan Against Casinos state 
their motivation in the name of their organization.1187 Legislators have begun to 
campaign against tribal gaming, making their motivation clear.1188 These plaintiffs 
are not interested in the principles underlying the merits of the gaming compact 
cases-separation of powers, compliance with federal gaming law, and so on.1189 
These plaintiffs are political and economic power players. If courts lined these 
plaintiffs up next to the gaming tribes they are suing, the equities would generally 
favor the tribes.1190 
1184. See, e.g., id ("Without casino revenue, the band will not be able to support tribal 
programs and services."). See generally Note, In Defense of Tribal Sovereign Immunity, 95 HARv. L. 
REv. 1058, 1073 (1982) ("Unlike other governmental bodies, Indian tribes would find the loss of 
assets more difficult to replace because tribes have only a limited revenue base over which to spread 
any losses.") (citing Atkinson v. Haldane, 569 P.2d 151,169 (Alaska 1977)). 
1185. See Light & Rand, supra note 1170, at 267 (noting the extensive benefits to states and 
non-tribal communities from Indian gaming). 
1186. See Am. Greyhound Racing II, 305 F.3d 1015, 1020 (9th Cir. 2002); Artichoke Joe's v. 
Norton, 216 F. Supp. 2d 1084, 1089-90 (B.D. Cal. 2002); DairyIand Greyhound Park, Inc. v. 
McCallum, 655 NW.2d 474, 476-77 (Wis. Ct. App. 2002), vacated sub. nom. Dairyland Greyhound 
Park, Inc. v. Doyle, 677 N.W.2d 275 (Wis. 2004); see also Court Asked to Stop New Compacts in 
WISconsin (May 26, 2004), available at 
htlp:llwww.indianz.comlIndianGaming/archive/caUitigation.asp ("The dog track industIy is 
fighting the expansion of Indian gaming, saying tribes are taking over the market."). 
1187. Taxpayers Against Casinos v. State, 657 NW.2d 503 (Mich. Ct. App. 2002), aff'd, 685 
N.W.2d 221 (Mich. 2004), cert. denied 125 S. Ct. 1298 (2005). 
1188. See, e.g., Baird v. Norton, 266 F.3d 408 (6th Cir. 2001); Saratoga County Chamber of 
Commerce v. Pataki, 712 N.Y.S.2d 687 (App. Div. 2000). 
1189. See, e.g., Baird, 266 F.3d at 408 (seeking to invalidate a gaming compact by challenging 
the constitutionality of the legislature's approval process). 
1190. See generally Arlinda Locklear, Morality and Justice 200 Years After the Fact, 37 NEW 
ENG L. REv. 593, 598 (2003) (asserting that seventy-five percent of so-called innocent landowner 
defendants in Indian land claims cases knew about the claims when they purchased their land). 
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7. Vulnerability of Tribal Economic Development 
The immunity of tribal sovereigns is especially important in comparison to the 
immunity of state and federal governments. First, state and federal governments have 
large tax bases. I 191 They can tax property, income, and investment wealth with the 
potential to collect huge reservoirs of dollars that Indian tribes can only dream will 
come to the reservation. I 192 "Unlike other governmental bodies, Indian tribes would 
find the loss of assets more difficult to replace because tribes have only a limited 
revenue base over which to spread any losses.,,1193 Second, Indian tribes are not mere 
businesses. They are governments, just like the state, local governments, and the 
federal government for all practical purposes. 1194 The only way for most Indian tribes 
to raise revenue needed to operate critical governmental programs and services is to 
engage in a business venture. 1195 This is not unheard of for local governments. State 
governments must engage in cornmercial enterprises, as well, in order to raise 
revenue.
1196 It is extraordinarily difficult for Indian tribes to conduct efficient and 
profitable business enterprises. II 97 Third, gaming is completely voluntary/198 
whereas government taxation by federal, state, and local governments is not. 1199 
When non-Indian governments lose a revenue stream, it does not spell catastrophe for 
that entity.1200 When an Indian tribal government loses its revenue stream, the entire 
tribal government is at risk of being forced to shut down.1201 The non-Indian 
governments can afford to lose more than once, while most Indian tribal governments 
1191. See David B. Jordan, Note, Federal Indian Law: Tribal Sovereign Immunity: Why 
Oklahoma Businesses Should Revamp Legal Relationships with Indian Tribes After Kiowa Tribe v. 
Manufacturing Technologies, Inc., 52 OKLA. L. REv. 489, 504 (1999). 
1192. See Kenton Keller Pettit, Note, The Waiver of Tribal Sovereign Immunity in the 
Contractual Context: Coriflict Between the Ninth Circuit and the Alaska Supreme Court?, 10 
ALAsKAL.REv. 363, 394 (1993). 
1193. In Defense of Tribal Sovereign Immunity, supra note 1184, at 1073 (citing Atkinson v. 
Haldane, 569 P.2d 151,169 (Alaska 1977)). 
1194. See Robert L. Gips, Current Trends in Tribal Economic Development, 37 NEW ENG L. 
REv. 517,519 (2003). 
1195. See generally id at 517-22 (discussing general development of tribal businesses); Light 
& Rand, supra note 1170, at 267 (specifically discussing the business of gaming). 
1196. See Department of the TreasUty, Internal Revenue Service National Office Field Service 
Advice, No. 20024712 (Aug. 12, 2002) (comparing tribal golf course revenues to golf course 
revenues derived by facilities owned by state and local governments), available at 
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-wd/0247012.pdf 
1197. See Gips, supra note 1194, at 519. 
1198. See Light & Rand, supra note 1170, at 266-fJ7 (indicating that many tribes choose not to 
pursue gaming). 
1199. Cf Clifford J. Rosky, Force Inc.: The Privatization of Punishment, Policing, and 
Military Force in Liberal States, 36 CONN. L. REv. 879, 884 (2004). 
1200. Cf Pettit, supra note 1192, at 394. 
1201. Cf id 
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cannot. I 202 Additionally, for absent sovereigns who do not desire or consent to 
litigation, the procedural rules do not allow for easy participation.1203 
8. Difficulty of Creating Adequate Factual Record 
The first factor in Rule 19(b }--prejudice to the absentee tribe-is the factor that 
is most important to tribes in gaming compact cases, the factor the courts tend to 
weigh in favor of the absent tribes, and the one factor that is almost always least 
developed factually.1204 Tribes may either intervene under Rule 24(a) for the limited 
pwpose of filing a Rule 12(b)(7) motion, file an amicus brief, or rely upon the party 
defendants to make the motion and the argurnents.1205 In motions practice, however, 
the tribe is afforded virtually no opportunity to establish facts about its gaming 
operations, the advantages of gaming for the tribe, the local non-Indian community 
and the state, nor the devastation that would be caused by the invalidation of its 
gaming compact. 1206 Tribes that have taken gaming cases to trial fare much better on 
appeal than those who rely upon motions to dismiss or cross-motions for summary 
judgment.1207 It is easy for a court to give lip service to the tribe's concerns without 
the fully developed record. 1208 
Contrast this procedural position with Grand Traverse Band of Ottawa and 
Chippewa Indians v. United States Attorney for the Western District of Michigan. 1209 
The Grand Traverse Band brought suit for declaratory relief that its Turtle Creek 
Casino, located on trust lands outside the reservation boundaries, met the 
requirements of the restored lands and restored tribes exception to the prohibition on 
lands acquired after October 17, 1988.1210 The case went to a bench trial, and the 
band entered evidence about the history of the band's administrative termination and 
the importance of the gaming revenues derived from the Turtle Creek facility.1211 
Information on this track provided at an earlier hearing in the matter helped to 
1202. Cj id. 
1203. See, e.g., Wichita and Affiliated Tribes v. Hodel, 788 F.2d 765,774-76 (D.c. Cir. 1986). 
1204. See Merkley, supra note 640, at 947-49; see also Am. Greyhound 11,305 F.3d 1015, 
1024-25 (9th Cir. 2002); Tewa Tesque v. Morton, 498 F.2d 240,242 (lOth Cir. 1974). 
1205. See Makah Indian Tribe v. Verity, 910 F.2d 555, 560 (9th Cir. 1990); Wichita and 
Affiliated Tribes, 788 F.2d at 774-76; Merkley, supra note 640, at 958,963-64. 
1206. Cj Mruy Lynn Tate, How to Avoid Getting Buried in Paper-Effective Motions 
Practice, Ass'n of Trial Lawyers of America, CLE 1079, in 1 AILAANN. CONVENTION REFERENCE 
MATERIALS, July 2001. 
1207. See, e.g., Davis v. United States, 192 F.3d 951, 961 (lOth Cir. 1999). 
1208. See, e.g., Am. Greyhound 11,305 F.3d at 1024-25. 
1209. 198 F. Supp. 2d 920 (W.O. Mich. 2002), aff'd, 369 FJd 960 (6th Cir. 2004). 
1210. See id. at 922 (citing 25 U.S.C. § 2719(b)(I)(B)(iii)). 
1211. See id. at 924-26 (citations to record omitted). 
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persuade the district court to deny the federal government's motion for a preliminary 
injunction against continued operation of the facility. 1212 
However, even in strong cases favoring absent compacting tribes, the court takes 
it as a given that the impact on the tribes would be great and does not engage in 
substantive analysis.1213 The American Greyhound court dedicated exactly one 
sentence to this proposition: ''The amount of prejudice to the tribes from termination 
of existing compacts and inability to enter new ones would be enormous.,,1214 
Missing from this discussion is the impact of the loss on gaming revenues to a 
compacting tribe's operating budget, with the attendant catastrophic derogation of 
tribal housing, social and human services, health care, environmental protection, and 
employment of tribal members. 1215 Loss of gaming puts gaming tribes back where 
they were before the Indian Reorganization Act-on the brink of extinction!216 
Without a factual record, the impact on tribes is such a given that courts can 
seemingly ignore it in their balancing of interests. 1217 
1212. See Grand Traverse Band of Ottawa and Chippewa Indians v. United States Attorney for 
the W. Dist of Mich., 46 F. Supp. 2d 689, 705 (W.D. Mich. 1999). 
Id. 
The third factor, the balance of hardships caused by the preliminary injilllctiOn, also 
weighs against the government Accepting as true that the government has an interest in 
enforcing the laws, the consequence of granting the preliminary injilllction and shutting 
down the facility is to create substantial financial hardship to the Band, its members and 
employees. If the government does not ultimately prevail on its statutory claims, the Band 
not only will have been deprived of revenues for the intervening period but also would be 
faced with significant obstacles to restarting the facility. In addition, numerous families 
within and without the Band, who are employed by Turtle Creek, will have their 
livelihoods interrupted. Moreover, the Band has introduced evidence that a wide variety of 
social services are funded by revenues from Turtle Creek. See BennettAff. 'lMJ19-21. If the 
United States is ultimately illlSUccessful on the merits, the intervening loss of vital services 
will have imposed a substantial and unnecessary hardship on a large group of individuals. 
In the absence of very clear likelihood of success on the merits, this factor cuts strongly 
against the injilllction. 
1213. See, e.g., Am. Greyhound /J, 305 F.3d at 1024-25; Taylor v. Bureau of Indian Affairs, 325 
F. Supp. 2d 1117, 1122 (S.D. Cal. 2004). 
1214. Am. Greyhound II, 305 F.3d at 1025. 
1215. Cf Dawavendewa v. Salt River Agric. Improvement and Power Dist., 276 F.3d 1150, 
1162 (9th Cir. 2002) (mentioning, but not discussing, economic prejudice to the tribe in terms of 
employment and tribal income), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 820 (2002). 
1216. See Rand & Light, supra note 788, at 386-91. 
1217. See, e.g., Confederated Tribes of the Chehalis Indian Reservation v. Lujan, 928 F.2d 
1496,1499 (9th Cir. 1991). 
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V. "IN EQUITY AND GooD CONSCIENCE"-WHERE DOES 
THE ABSENT TRIBE FIT? 
[Vol. 40:1 
The compulsory joinder rule should, under virtually any circumstances, prevent a 
court from adjudicating the sovereign rights of any sovereign-federal, state, or 
tribal-in its absence or without its consent. Adjudicating the rights, especially 
contract rights, which are the clearest cases 1218 of a soverei~ without its presence is a 
back-door method of abrogatin~ sovereign immunity. I 19 There are alternative 
avenues for plaintiffs to explore.12 0 The purposes of the compulsory joinder rule can 
be fulfilled by dismissing a case in deference to the absent gaming tribe. 122 I The 
doctrine of tribal sovereign immunity, while no stranger to criticism by federal, state, 
and tribal courts, remains a valid body of law and should be treated as such by courts 
in equity unless Congress, the arbiter of public policy, chooses to change the 
doctrine. 1222 Although the compulsory joinder rule is unusual in that it is intended to 
affect substantive rights more than other procedural rules, the riWts of sovereigns are 
too important to be tinkered with in applying procedural rules. 12 3 
A. Dismissal Fulfills the Purposes of the Compulsory Joinder Rule 
The compulsory joinder rule was never intended to deal with sovereigns as 
parties.1224 The rule originated out of questions dealin~ with diversity jurisdiction or 
instances when state court remedies were available.122 Judicial economy, efficiency, 
and predictability are served when the courts tend toward dismissing cases where 
b · . 1226 A I akin f b·gh 1· . a sent sovereIgns are necessary partIes. ru e to more 0 a n t- me IS 
justified in this instance in order to avoid multiple litigation.1227 
If an absent tribe wishes to rely upon the indispensable party defense, then that 
tribe should roll the dice as early as possible.122 While it is true that this is a 
jurisdictional issue that may be raised at any time during the pendency of the 
litigation or even by the court itself, every fraction of judicial resources expended 
1218. See, e.g., Roos v. Tex. Co., 23 F.2d 171, 172 (2nd Cir. 1927) (Learned Hand, J.). 
1219. See Merkley, supra note 640, at 93942. 
1220. See generally idat 955-66 (discussing alternatives to dismissal under Rule 19). 
1221. See id at 942-44. 
1222. See id at 942. 
1223. See Roos, 23 F.2d at 172; Merkley, supra note 640, at 931. 
1224. But see Merkley, supra note 640, at 933 n.14. 
1225. See Provident Tradesmans Bank & Trust Co. v. Patterson, 390 U.S. 102, 120-21 (1968); 
Merkley, supra note 640, at 933 n.14. 
1226. See Merkley, supra note 640, at 933-34,94243. 
1227. See id. at 931. 
1228. See id. at 933 (noting Rule 19's interest in expediency). 
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makes the argument less persuasive.1229 At all costs, the argument should be made 
before the case goes to trial or at least before substantial fact-finding by the court. 1 230 
At that point, Provident Tradesmens gives ammunition to the argument that since 
judicial resources have already been expended the case may as well proceed to final 
resolution. 123 1 However, Provident Tradesmens did not involve absent sovereign 
parties. 1232 Sovereign immunity and the indispensable party defense are 
jurisdictional questions that can be raised at any time during litigation.1233 Courts 
would be wise to raise the matter sua sponte if the parties do not. 
Certainty is the best tool to improve judicial efficiency and conserve resources. If 
a plaintiff knows the court is likely to dismiss a case in which a necessary sovereign is 
an absent party, then the plaintiff will choose another avenue to proceed, such as 
suing the sovereign directly.1234 Courts rewarding plaintiffs for attempting to litigate 
the interests of Indian tribes without their presence should be aware that the tribes are 
not bound by the decision under res judicata principles.1235 Tribes affected by an 
adverse decision invalidatin~ their gaming compact, for example, could continue to 
game under the compact. 123 If the plaintiffs or the state want to shut down gaming 
after a court invalidates the compact, they would have to initiate an enforcement 
action, which is something these parties could have done prior to the original 
lawsuit.1237 Courts proceeding without the sovereign tribe in interest are simply 
adding another lawsuit to the equation. 1238 This result most certainly does not 
improve judicial efficiency. 
The cases regarding gaming compacts and treaty hunting and fishing rights place 
the courts in a position to decide ~uestions of public policy under the guise of 
applying the standards of equity.123 It is a maxim of the separation of powers 
1229. See generally fED. R avo P. 12 (b), (h); Globe Indem. Co. v. Teixeira, 230 F. Supp. 444, 
448 (D. Haw. 1963). 
1230. But see Enter. Mgmt Consultants, Inc. v. United States ex rei. Hodel, 883 F.2d 890, 892 
(lOth Cir. 1989) (noting that the indispensable party defense is not generally waivable even if first 
raised during trial or on appeal). 
1231. See Provident Tradesmens Bank & Trust Co. v. Patterson, 390 U.S. 102, 106-16 (1968). 
1232. See id at 104-07. 
1233. Pit River Home and Agric. Coop. Ass'n v. United States, 30 F.3d 1088, 1100 (9th Cir. 
1994). 
1234. But see Lomayaktewa v. Hathaway, 520 F.2d 1324, 1326 (9th Cir. 1975) (indicating that 
tribes cannot be sued directly or through joinder absent congressional or tribal consent due to 
sovereign immunity). 
1235. Am. Greyhound II, 305 F.3d 1015, 1024 (9th Cir. 2002). 
1236. See Merldey, supra note 640, at 947. 
1237. See, e.g., Florida v. Seminole Tribe, 181 F.3d 1237, 1244 n.1O (11th Cir. 1999). 
1238. See Tewa Tesuque v. Morton, 498 F.2d 240, 24243 (10th Cir. 1974) ("[J]udgment ... 
would not be adequate in the [tribe's] absence because it may very likely invite additional lawsuits."). 
1239. See, e.g., South Dakota v. Bourland, 508 U.S. 679, 687 (1993) (hunting and fishing 
rights); Am. Greyhound II, 305 F.3d at 1018 (gaming compacts). 
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doctrine that the courts should refrain from deciding questions of public policy.124o 
Tribal sovereign immunity is a question of federal law, not merely public policy.1241 
As several courts have held, tribal sovereign immunity is protected by the fact that 
Congress has seen fit to preserve it.1242 Only Congress or the tribe can abrogate 
immunity.1243 It is not the province of the courts to weigh tribal immunity any 
differently than the same courts would weigh state or federal immunity. 1244 
American Greyhound is a perfect example of a court choosing to apply a black-
letter ruling "in equity and good conscience.,,1245 The court acknowledged that the 
absent tribes' sovereign interests and the plaintiff's interest in a forum collided 
dir 1 1 . h 1· f 1246 Th .. th ect y, eavmg no way to s ape re Ie . e court was at an Impasse, or m e 
words of the Dawavendewa court, "~uipoise."1247 That is where every court that 
confronts this issue seems to end up. 1 48 The interests of the sovereign should be 
dispositive at this point. 1 249 The compulsory joinder rule does not have the 
substantive underpinnings to decide the rights of sovereigns.125o The alternative 
remedies and fora discussed below should shake the courts from their "~uifoise" 
and convince them that dismissal is not a catastrophic result for the plaintiffs. 25 
1240. See Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748, 757-58 (1996) ("[Separation of powers] 
make[s) Congress the branch most capable of responsive and deliberate lawmaking."); Ferguson v. 
Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 730 (1963) ('The criterion of constitutionality is not whether we believe the 
law to be for the public good") (quoting Adkins v. Children's Hosp., 261 U.S. 525, 567, 570 (1923) 
(dissenting opinion)); Local 1976, United Brotherhood of Carpenters v. NLRB, 357 U.S. 93, 99-100 
(1958) ("[The work of Congress is] the result of conflict and compromise between strong contending 
forces and deeply held views .... "). 
1241. See Merkley, supra note 640, at 941. 
1242. E.g., Wichita and Affiliated Tribes v. Hodel, 788 F.2d 765, 777 (D.C. Cir. 1986) ('The 
dismissal of this suit is mandated by the policy of tribal immunity. This is not a case where some 
procedural defect such as venue precludes litigation of the case. Rather, the dismissal turns on the fact 
that society has consciously opted to shield Indian tribes from suit without congressional or tribal 
consent. "). 
1243. C&L Enters., Inc. v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe, 532 U.S. 411,418 (2001) 
(citing Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 58 (1978)); Kiowa Tribe v. Mfg. Techs., Inc., 
523 U.S. 751, 759 (1998). 
1244. Cj Merkley, supra note 640, at 94042. 
1245. Am. Greyhound II, 305 F.3d 1015, 1024-25 (9th Cir. 2002). 
1246. ld at 1025. 
1247. Dawavendewa v. Salt River Project Agric. Improvement and Power Dist., 276 F.3d 
1150,1163 (9th Cir. 2002). 
1248. See id at 1162 (citing nine previous decisions where the court held than an absent tribe 
was indispensable and dismissed the case despite the fact that the plaintiff would have no alternative 
forum). 
1249. See, e.g., Wichita and Affiliated Tribes v. Hodel, 788 F.2d 765, 777 (D.c. Cir. 1986). 
1250. Cj Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 55-56 (1978); Merkley, supra note 
640, at 931-32. 
1251. Cj Merkley, supra note 640, at 974-75. 
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B. Defending Tribal Immunity 
Courts should defer to Congress's action, or inaction, in regard to tribal sovereign 
immunity. The federal rules do not exist to allow creative glaintiffs to litigate a tribe's 
sovereign rights and responsibilities behind its back. 12 The Eleventh Circuit in 
Florida v. Seminole Tribe put it succinctly: 
[W]e note that Congress has been consistent in its approval of the Supreme 
Court's tribal sovereign immunity doctrine and has acted against the background 
of this doctrine in order to restrict tribal immunity in certain circumstances. 
[citation] In addition, the Court has stated that "Congress is in a position to 
weigh and accommodate the competing policy concerns and reliance interests" 
associated with any decision to alter the limits of tribal immunity. [Citation] It is 
little wonder, therefore, that the Court has chosen to defer to Congress rather 
than to revisit its own tribal sovereign immunity jurisprudence. 
In light of these considerations, we decline to modify the doctrine of tribal 
sovereign immunity absent an express command to the contrary from either 
Congress or a majority of the Supreme COurt.1253 
The federal rules do not waive the immunity of a sovereign and thus should not be 
construed to allow a suit to proceed where a sovereign's contractual rights are directly 
impacted, particularly with respect to gaming compacts.1254 The court's protection of 
state and federal sovereignty in Kickapoo Tribe and Pueblo of Sandia should 
similarly work to the benefit of tribal sovereignty. 1255 
However important, the vitality of tribal immunity is not the only aspect of tribal 
sovereignty at issue.1256 
C. Problems with Continuing Without the Tribal Sovereign 
1. Confidence in the Judiciary 
There is a concern by tribes and their representatives that the federal judiciary is 
taking a leading role in determining national and state policy in regard to Indians and 
1252. See FED. R. CIv. P. 1; Merkley, supra note 640, at 931. 
1253. 181 F.3d 1237, 1245 (lIth Cir. 1999) (citing Kiowa Tnbe v. Mfg. Techs., Inc., 523 U.S. 
751 (1998); Okla. Tax Comm'n v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe, 498 U.S. 505 (1991)). 
1254. See Merkley, supra note 640, at 942. 
1255. See Kickapoo Tribe of Indians v. Babbitt, 43 F.3d 1491, 1495-96 (D.C. Cir. 1995); 
Pueblo of Sandia v. Babbitt, 47 F. Supp. 2d 49, 52-54 (D.D.C. 1999). 
1256. See supra notes 1257, 1260, 1264, 1281 (detailing concerns that the judiciary has 
assumed a primary role in shaping Indian policy and has blurred longstanding principles of Indian 
law by reevaluating and questioning the impenetrability oftnbal sovereignty). 
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Indian tribes. 1257 There are strong claims that congressional plenary power 
recognized by the Supreme Court for more than two centuries is giving way to an 
unspoken regime change by vesting the so-called plenary power over Indian affairs in 
the federal COurts. 1258 It goes without saying that the federal courts are not 
policymaking bodies in the separation of powers scheme established by the United 
States Constitution.1259 Nevertheless, to tribal advocates, the federal courts are 
undermining the base of federal law upon which the tribes have begun to learn, 
understand, and rely.1260 Just as the tribes have begun to deal with and make peace 
with the BIA and many state governments, their advances have been undercut by 
adverse federal court decisions. 1261 For many tribes, the states are no longer the 
"deadliest enernies,,1262 and the BIA is not a living joke, 1263 but the federal courts are 
in danger of being perceived by Indians and Indian tribes as the new Seventh 
Calvary.1264 Tribal governments are on the brink of being "coerc[ed] ... into 
following policies preferred by the national or state judiciary.,,1265 As such, self-
determination and self-governance of Indians and Indian tribes is gravely 
threatened.1266 Perhaps what is lacking is what some call 'judicial hurnility.,,1267 
1257. See Robert N. Clinton, There is No Federal Supremacy Clause for Indian Tribes, 34 
ARIz. ST. LJ. 113, 205 (2002). 
1258. See, e.g., Milner S. Ball, Constitution, Court, Indian Tribes, 1987 AM. B. FOUND. REs. J. 
1,56 (1987) ("[Federal pleruuy] power continues to expand. Now it is taking place in the Supreme 
Court rather than in Congress."); Frank Pommersheim, Tribal Courts and the Federal Judiciary: 
Opportunities and Challenges for a Constitutional Democracy, 58 MONT. L. REv. 313, 328 (1997) 
("[T]he Court now recognizes a judicial pleruuy power to parse the limits of tribal court authority 
based on federal common law."). 
1259. See Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748, 757-58 (1996) ("[Separation of powers] 
makes [the Legislature] the branch most capable of responsive and deliberate lawmaking."); cf THE 
FEDERALIST No. 47 (James Madison) ('The accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive, and 
judiciaI)', in the same hands, whether of one, a few, or many, and whether hereditaty, self-appointed, 
or elective, may justly be pronounced the very definition of tyranny."). 
1260. See Clinton, supra note 1257, at 163,205. 
1261. See generally David H. Getches, Conquering the Cultural Frontier: The New 
Subjectivism of the Supreme Court in Indian Law, 84 CAL.L.REY. 1573, 1573-75 (1996). 
1262. United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 384 (1886). See generally Robert A. Williams, 
Jr., "The People of the States Where They are Found are Often Their Deadliest Enemies ": The 
Indian Side of the Story of Indian Rights and Federalism, 38 ARIz. L. REv. 981 (1996). 
1263. "BlA means 'Boss Indians Around,' and the BlA is NOT your friend" Ken Bellmard, 
EndeavOring to Persevere: Becoming and Being a Tribal Attorney, 9 KAN. J.L. & PuB. POL'y 752, 
759 (1999). 
1264. See Getches, supra note 1261, at 1654-55 (criticizing the Court's subjectivism and 
willingness to modify tribal sovereign rights to accommodate non-Indian interests). 
1265. In Difense of Tribal Sovereign Immunity, supra note 1184, at 1077. 
1266. Seeid at 1069-70, 1077-78. 
1267. See Paul L. Caron & Rafael Gely, A Needfor Judicial Humility, 26 NAT'LL.J., Nov. 24, 
2003, at 34 ("A humble judge recognizes that he or she has neither the power of the purse nor the 
power of the police. Instead, ajudge's authority comes from the power of persuasion. ... "). 
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Effectively abrogating the immunity of Indian tribes from suit via the 0Eeration 
of a procedural court rule creates a difficult problem for the judiciary.12 8 "One 
consequence of adopting a rule of procedure that simply seems to ignore an accepted 
rule of substantive law would be to undermine confidence in the judiciary because 
such decisionrnaking appears purely result_oriented.,,1269 The courts are not the 
proper places to determine broad issues of federal Indian policy and, in fact, are 
uniquely unqualified to make judgments about Indian tribes and Indian people.1270 
Nevertheless, some courts are not above choosing to pursue a specific public policy 
in opposition of the established will of the legislature or the electorate.1271 
2. Lack of Predictability Reduces Judicial Efficiency and Wastes 
Limited Judicial Resources 
Courts should avoid applying illusory equitable factors. Some courts have 
expressed their judgment that tribal sovereign immunity is not a compelling interest 
that would justify dismissing a claim when the tribe is a necessary party.l272 Federal 
and state courts tend to shortchange tribal sovereignty because most people view 
Indian tribes as a weak cousin to federal and state sovereignty.1273 While it is true that 
tribal immunity may be waived by Congress, it may never be waived or abrogated by 
a state.1274 For purposes of the compulsory joinder analysis, tribal immunity is at least 
as impenetrable as state immunity until Congress saxs otherwise, especially when a 
state or private entity is suing against tribal interests. 275 Most courts follow the tenet 
that all parties to a contract are indispensable.1276 It should be that the rule is even 
1268. See Stephens, supra note 31, at 1131 (noting that comts could be viewed as "pursuing a 
tactic that might destabilize a disfavored substantive rule," thereby subverting the predictability and 
unifonnity of the judicial system). 
1269.Id 
1270. Cj In Defense of Tribal Sovereign Immunity, supra note 1184, at 1076-77 (''If federal or 
state courts attempt to litigate matters involving tribal disputes and tribal law, the risk of 
misinterpretation and mistake is even greater than when a federal court interprets state law, because 
such courts may have limited knowledge of a reservation's conditions and needs.") (citing Alvin J. 
Ziontz, In Defense of Tribal Sovereignty: An Analysis of Judicial Error in Construction of the Indian 
Civil Rights Act, 20 S.D. L. REv. 1,48 (1974». 
1271. E.g., Taxpayers Against Casinos v. State, No. 99-90l95-CZ at 2 (Ingham County Cir. Ct. 
Jan. 18,2000) (on file with author), qIf'd and rev'd in part, 657 N.W.2d 503 (Mich. Ct. App. 2003), 
qIf'd and rev 'd in part, 685 N.W.2d 221 (Mich. 2004), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 1298 (2005) .. 
1272. See Davis v. United States, 192 F.3d 951,960-61 (10th Cir. 1999). 
1273. See, e.g., Clinton, supra note 1257, at 114-15, 117-18, 163 (noting that the Court has 
actively protected state sovereignty from judicial intrusion, but has failed to similarly respect and 
preserve tribal sovereignty). 
1274. See cases cited supra note 1243 and accompanying text; Merkley, supra note 640, at 
942. 
1275. See Merkley, supra note 640, at 942, 94647. 
1276. See Dawavendewa v. Salt River Project Agric. Improvement and Power Dist., 276 F.3d 
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more concrete where the contractual rights of a sovereign are at stake.1277 Both 
federal and state courts promulgate rules of procedure to improve the efficiency of 
their courts and to preserve their judicial resources.1278 By creating this dynamic of 
litigating back and forth with no bright-lille rule because courts are uncertairl or 
because they disfavor tribal immunity, they are undermirlirlg the very pwpose of the 
rule: efficiency.1279 "[A] justification based upon the supposed 'disfavored' nature of 
the action affords little or no predictability.,,128o Non-Indian plair1tiffs are goillg to 
continue (and, ill fact, are encouraged) to sue ill the absence of the tribes ill illterest 
and tribes are goillg to continue to assert the compulsory joillder defense until the 
courts establish clear guidelines.1281 It appears that some courts will dismiss and 
others will not, often by makir1g choices that are ill direct contrast to the choices made 
by other COurts.1282 The uncertamty of this area of the law will continue long after the 
gammg compact cases have run their course.1283 Plair1tiffs opposed to tribal activities 
and relationships with non-Indians will continue to sue only the non-Indians, 
asserting that their dispute is only between them and the non-Indians and has nothir1g 
to do with the tribes when nothir1g could be further from the truth. Until courts see 
through this charade, the compulsory joillder rule is a bad joke. 
D. A Major Pitfallfor Tribes 
Tribes that look ill from the outside at state or federal court litigation that affects 
their gammg comf.act or operate as illtervenors or as friends of the court do not have 
a lot of options. 12 4 There is a real danger that the court will reject an absent tribe's 
motion to illtervene.1285 Some courts effectively reward plair1tiffs for their back-door 
attempt to subrogate sovereign immunity. 1286 A court might refuse to allow the absent 
tribe to illtervene, effectively excludirlg the Indian tribe from the case, even if the tribe 
chooses to participate.1287 If the state or federal defendants illterests are substantially 
1150,1157 (9th Cir. 2002); Lomayak:tewa v. Hathaway, 520 F.2d 1324, 1325 (9th Cir. 1975). 
1277. SeeDawavendewa, 276F.3dat 1157. 
1278. See Peoplev. Carter, 678 F. Supp. 1484,1486 (D. Colo. 1986). 
1279. Seeid 
1280. Stephens, supra note 31, at 1133. 
1281. See generally Getches, supra note 1261, at 1573 (discussing the cwrent absence of clear 
guiding judicial principles in Indian Law). 
1282. See Merkley, supra note 640, at 938, 948-50. Compare Sac & Fox Nation v. Norton, 
240 F.3d 1250, 1259-60 (lOth Cir. 2001), with Am. Greyhound II, 305 F.3d 1015, 1025 (9th Cir. 
2002). 
1283. See generally Getches, supra note 1261, at 1573, 1636, 1654. 
1284. See cases cited supra note 1205 and accompanying text 
1285: See, e.g., South Dakota ex rei Barnett v. United States Dep't of Interior, 317 F.3d 783, 
783 (8th Cir. 2003). 
1286. See e.g., id; Merkley, supra note 640, at 963-64. 
1287. See, e.g., South Dakota ex rei Barnett, 317 F.3d at 783. 
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aligned with the tribes' interest, then the court might refuse the tribes motion to 
intervene.1288 The district courts in American Greyhound and Artichoke Joe s both 
held that the absent tribes were not necessary parties.1289 Recently, in South Dakota 
ex reI. Barnett v. United States Department of Interior, 1290 the Eighth Circuit upheld 
the decision of the district court to deny an Indian tribe the opportunity to intervene in 
a case where the state had sued the federal government over secretarial trust 
acquisitions for the benefit of the tribes. 1291 Unfortunately, the tribe was undermined 
by its trustee, the United States, which "supported the Tribe's bid for permissive 
intervention but opposed its motion for intervention as a matter of right.,,1292 Citing 
familiar Rule 19 cases, the Eighth Circuit agreed with the United States that it could 
adequately represent the tribe's interests and upheld the determination of the district 
court that the tribe could intervene, as of right.1293 It is a real danger, even for tribes 
that wish to participate fully through Rule 24 intervention, that the court will act to 
keep the tribe out. One wonders what due process principles the Eighth Circuit 
conveniently forgot when it chose to keep the tribe out of a case that goes to the very 
heart of the tribe's governmental and political existence. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The compulsory joinder analysis is an equitable analysis, for the most part, and 
only where a sovereign is the absent Rarty will a court invoke more substantive 
jurisdictional factors into the equation. I 4 One can trace the contours of how courts 
apply the rule in cases in which the absent party is a tribe and compare how those 
courts apply the rule when the absent party is a federal or state government.1295 The 
identity of the plaintiff is also an aspect.1296 Perhaps, most important is the scope and 
significance of the legal rights at issue. 1297 It appears that many courts enter into the 
compulsory joinder analysis with an orientation toward a particular result 
In gaming and treaty rights cases, arguably the most important cases for tribes, 
the courts are unlikely to dismiss a challenge to a tribal right in the absence of the 
1288. See, e.g., id. at 786-87. 
1289. See generally Artichoke Joe's v. Norton, 216 F. Supp. 2d 1084 (E.D. Cal. 2002); Am 
Greyhound L 146 F. Supp. 2d 1012, 1012 (D. Ariz. 2001), vacated, 305 F.3d 1015 (9th Cir. 2002). 
1290. 317 F.3d 783 (8th Cir. 2003). 
129l. See id. at 783-85. 
1292. Id. at 785. 
1293. See id. at 786-87 (citing Connecticut et rei. Blumenthal v. Babbitt, 889 F. Supp. 80, 83 
(D. Conn. 1995); S.w. Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Babbitt, 150 F.3d 1152,1154 (9th Cir. 1998)). 
1294. See Carlson, supra note 60, at 580-87. 
1295. See discussion infra Parts II, ill 
1296. Cf. Minnesota v. United States, 305 U.S. 382, 386-87 (1939). 
1297. See, e.g., California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202, 219 (1987). 
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tribe.1298 Though generalizations are discouraged, one can place the parties in a grid 
and arrive at an educated conclusion as to the outcome of a motion to dismiss for 
failure to join an indispensable party in these cases. If the absent party is an Indian 
tribe and the plaintiffs are individual Indians, it is likely the case will be dismissed. If 
the absent party is an Indian tribe and the plaintiffs are other Indian tribes, it is likely 
the case will be dismissed. If the absent party is a federal or state government and the 
plaintiffs are individual Indians or Indian tribes, it is likely the case will be dismissed. 
If the absent party is an Indian tribe and the plaintiffs are non-Indians, it is likely the 
case will proceed in the absence of the tribe. It is important to note that the Supreme 
Court easily forced the dismissal of tribal claims that the states were negotiating in 
bad faith when it came to Class ill gaming compacts, based on the Eleventh 
Amendment, even though the states' immunity effectively gave the tribes no 
remedy.1299 The Court has also had no problem in denying tribes a forum in which to 
bring land claims against state governments. 1300 
Until Congress or the tribes formally decide that tribal immunity is not in the best 
interest of society, the courts should respect that state of affairs. Federal and state 
court procedural rules are simply that---procedure. Using the equitable analysis 
required under the compulsory joinder rule to criticize or ignore tribal immunity is 
abhorrent and recalls the not-too-distant past when non-Indians used the legal system 
to exploit Indians and Indian tribes, defrauding them of land, natural resources, treaty 
rights, and their way oflife.1301 The justice system is not intended to be used as the 
tool for those opposed to Indian activities to stop those activities without the presence 
of the Indian interests. The basic due process principle of the court system is at stake, 
as is the basic sovereignty principle of Indian tribal government. The strategy 
employed by many opponents to Indian activities is to exclude the tribes from the 
litigation, as if to say that this dispute is between non-Indians only and the tribes have 
nothing to do with it Because it is axiomatic that the parties to a contract are 
indispensable and that a plaintiff with standing can bring an action for declaratory 
relief against tribal officials, under no circumstances should a case be allowed to 
proceed in the absence of the tribe in interest. 
1298. See supra Part Iv. 
1299. See Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996). 
1300. See Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. 261 (1997). 
1301. Cf McCLURKEN, supra note 3, at 80 ("[Michigan Ottawas] left their land for part of 
each year for fishing, gathering, or by then, lwnbering. It was not uncommon for Americans to 
declare these parcels abandoned and then take possession of them."). 
